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Abstract 
 
Municipal associations carry out two core functions – advocacy and providing member 
services.  How associations prioritize and perform these functions is largely unclear.  This 
dissertation explores how membership composition affects their activities.  Canada’s 18 
provincial level municipal associations all provide advocacy and services for their members, 
but there are considerable differences within their memberships.  Some associations represent 
all municipalities within a province while others are divided along linguistic, regional, or 
rural/urban lines.  In addition, the municipalities they represent can vary by size, legal type, 
region, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character.  Two measures of membership 
composition are employed: rural/urban dominance and population size.  They are used to 
examine three areas of associations’ activities: issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, 
the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and the allocation of collective resources.   
The three research questions employed in this dissertation share the approach of 
measuring the input of membership composition and correlating it with the outputs of 
organizational behaviour and policy requests.  In total, seven hypotheses are tested. 1: 
Unified associations pursue functional, municipal issues. 2: Rural associations pursue socio-
economic issues. 3: Urban associations pursue stronger municipal regulatory control.  4: 
Associations with homogeneous member populations lobby for provincial programs to meet 
their requests.  5: Associations with heterogeneous member populations request the resources 
to institute municipal programs. 6: Small municipalities positively affect an association’s 
level of service delivery.  7: Large municipalities negatively affect an association’s level of 
service delivery.  The results of analysis provide strong evidence that associational behaviour 
is not determined by the external environment alone, but also by internal composition of 
membership.  Associations use organizational structures – boards of directors, caucuses, sub-
associations, and district meetings – to represent the cleavages in their membership, but the 
extent of these cleavages impacts the mix and content of the associations’ activities.  
Rural/urban dominance influences the type of issues associations pursue in 
intergovernmental lobbying.  The dispersion of member populations affects both the 
jurisdictional aspect of policy requests and the allocation of collective resources between 
services and advocacy.  These findings provide exploratory, empirical evidence that 
membership composition influences associational behaviour.  They advance our 
understandings of municipal associations and of collective action.  
 
Keywords: Municipal Associations, Interest Group Behaviour, Collective Action, 
Multilevel Governance, Local Government, Interest Representation, Public Policy, Canada  
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction  
 
Municipal associations, also known as municipal leagues and local government 
associations, normally include as members municipalities lying within a geographic area, 
usually that of a sovereign country or, in a federation, of a sub-national unit like a state or 
a province.  The core functions of municipal associations are advocacy and providing 
member services.  Advocacy refers to the promotion of common objectives, usually by 
lobbying senior governments.  Member services are provided to member municipalities, 
normally more cheaply than self-provision by local governments would cost.  Little 
empirical research has been undertaken on municipal associations, particularly in the 
Canadian context.  There is no existing comparative analysis of municipal associations in 
Canada, and the literature on associations in other countries has been dominated by 
analyses of their lobbying strategies. 
Researchers have been preoccupied with understanding where associations target 
their lobbying efforts and the tactics they employ.  In answering these questions, two 
dominant explanations have been identified: institutional structures and degrees of access 
to senior levels of government.1  However, when other aspects of associational activities 
                                                
1 Jens Blom-Hansen, “Policy-Making in Central-Local Government Relations: Balancing Local 
Autonomy, Macroeconomic Control, and Sectoral Policy Goals,” Journal of Public Policy 19:3 (1999), 
237. Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal 
System (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995). Beverly A. Cigler, “Not Just Another Special Interest: 
The Intergovernmental Lobby Revisited,” in Interest Group Politics, eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. 
Loomis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012).  Tom Entwistle and Martin Laffin, “The Multiple Strategies of 
the Local Government Association: Partner, Player, and Think-Tank?” Policy and Politics 31:1 (2003), 47.  
Patricia K. Freeman and Anthony J. Nownes, “Intergovernmental Lobbying in the States,” Southeastern 
Political Review 27:4 (1999), 619-634.  Donald H. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington: 
Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying (New York: Free Press, 1974).  Beryl A. Radin and 
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have been considered, a third explanation of their behaviour has emerged: composition of 
membership.2  This dissertation expands on this third explanation by examining two 
aspects of member composition: rural/urban dominance and population size.3  It tests 
how membership composition affects three aspects of associational behaviour: the 
allocation of collective resources, approaches to jurisdictional responsibility, and the 
issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying.  This dissertation focuses on the 
relationship between inputs of associational characteristics and the outputs of resolutions, 
demands on senior levels of government, and services.  
At present, there are eighteen independent, provincial level municipal associations 
in Canada.  There is considerable range in the size and type of municipalities represented 
within these associations.  The Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des 
Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick has eight members and la Fédération québécoise des 
municipalités has more than 1,000.  The municipalities that belong to associations can 
vary by size, region, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character.  In order to maintain 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Joan Price Boase, “Federalism, Political Structure, and Public Policy in the United States and Canada,” 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 2:1 (2000), 47.  
2 William De Soto, “Cities in State Politics: View of Mayors and Managers,” State & Local Government 
Review 27:3 (1999), 188-194.  R. Allen Hays, “Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of 
Issue Priorities,” The Western Political Quarterly 44:4 (1991), 1081-1098. Beverly A. Cigler, “The 
County-State Connection: A National Study of Associations of Counties,” Public Administration Review 
54:1 (1994), 3-11.  
3 “Rural” and “urban” are contested concepts, but in this dissertation, provincial and associations’ own 
definitions of rural and urban municipalities are used.  This captures self-identification and provides 
consistency in longitudinal analysis, but does cause some limitations in cross-provincial comparisons.  The 
definitions of rural and urban in each province and association are discussed later, in the selection of case 
studies.  There are also some exceptions to rural/urban divisions, such as special municipalities in Alberta 
that contain both rural and urban areas.  Where exceptions exist they are also discussed within the selection 
of case studies.  
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their membership bases, associations must use advocacy and member services to 
represent and meet the interests of their members.  
Municipal associations have existed in Canada since 1899.  Despite their 
endurance, little is known about their actions and activities.  Therefore, the purpose of 
this dissertation is twofold.  It furthers our understanding of local government 
associations’ behaviour and of collective action, and it advances our knowledge of 
municipal associations in the Canadian context.  These contributions are important for 
two reasons.  First, membership composition has emerged as an explanation of 
associational behaviour, but minimal empirical research has been undertaken to test this 
theory.  Second, this dissertation is the first cross-provincial analysis of Canadian 
municipal associations.  It develops a dataset of Canadian municipal associations’ 
memberships and structures.  In short, it contributes to our knowledge of local 
government associations, collective action, and Canadian local government.  
 
1.1 Formation, Development, and Functions of Municipal 
Associations in Canada  
 
Canada experienced a rapid diffusion of municipal associations during the first decades 
of the twentieth century.  The first provincial association formed in 1899, and a federal 
association and nine other provincial associations formed in the following two decades.  
Unified associations, which were intended to represent all municipalities within a 
province, were founded in six provinces (Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario 
Manitoba, and British Columbia).  Separate associations for rural and urban 
municipalities were founded in two provinces (Saskatchewan and Alberta).  Unified 
associations later formed in Newfoundland and Labrador (1951) and Prince Edward 
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Island (1957).  Numerous associations underwent divisions and mergers in the following 
decades.  At present, there are six provinces with unified associations (British Columbia, 
Manitoba, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador) 
and three provinces with separate rural and urban associations (Alberta, Saskatchewan, 
and Quebec).  New Brunswick has distinct anglophone, francophone, and urban 
associations.  Manitoba has an association for bilingual municipalities, and Saskatchewan 
has associations for northern municipalities and resort communities.  
Municipal associations were established as forums for elected government 
officials to discuss common concerns and collectively lobby provincial governments on 
municipal issues.  The formation of provincial associations coincided with the 
establishment of a federal organization, the Union of Canadian Municipalities (UCM), in 
1901.  In 1937, the Union merged with the Dominion Conference of Mayors (DCM, est. 
1935) to form the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities (CFMM), later 
renamed the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM).4  For decades, the 
relationship between provincial associations and the FCM was competitive.  Although the 
provincial associations are members of FCM, they lobbied at both the federal and 
provincial levels.  FCM also involved itself in provincial matters.  In the early 1980s, 
though, provincial associations and the FCM re-organized their priorities.   Provincial 
associations began to limit their lobbying activities to the provincial level, while the FCM 
concentrated on issues where the federal government had direct control, such as the 
                                                
4 Donald Stevenson and Richard Gilbert, “Coping with Canadian Federalism: The Case of the Federation 
of Canadian Municipalities,” Canadian Public Administration 48:5 (2005), 528-551.  
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national Goods and Services Tax (GST) and infrastructure, and refrained from involving 
itself in provincial lobbying.5  
The establishment and evolution of Canadian associations coincided with the rise 
of state municipal leagues in the United States, and the formation of North American 
leagues followed the establishment of local government associations in Europe.  The first 
municipal association was founded in the kingdom of Hanover in 1866.  Its formation has 
been attributed to increased service provision by the urban local state and the flourishing 
of associational culture.6  Other jurisdictions adopted the local government association 
model in the following decades.  In England and Wales, the Association of Municipal 
Corporations formed in 1873 and the County Councils Association was established in 
1889.  In North America, the first attempt at league formation occurred in 1891 in 
Indiana, and the first formal leagues were established in three states (California, Iowa, 
and Wisconsin) in 1898.  Other early leagues formed in Prussia (1896), Bavaria (1896), 
Italy (1889), Germany (1905), Ireland (1912), and France (1920).7   
By 1956, 64 national local government associations had been established – 1 in 
Africa, 4 in South America, 5 in North America, 5 in Oceania, 12 in Asia, and 37 in 
Europe.8   In a survey of local government associations conducted that year, 45 of the 57 
responding associations reported that they formed for reasons that fit with the purposes 
of: “To represent the common interest of the municipalities, to foster the exchange of 
                                                
5 Ibid., 538-9.  
6 Matthew Potter, “The First Decade of an Irish Local Government Association: The Association of 
Municipal Authorities of Ireland, 1912-1922,” International Journal of Regional & Local Studies 7:1/2 
(2011-12): 90-114.  
7 Ibid.  
8 International Union of Local Authorities, National Associations of Local Authorities Throughout the 
World (The Hague: International Union of Local Authorities, 1956), 14.  
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experiences among them, and to advise the government in the preparation and the 
carrying out of such laws and regulations as concern the common interests of the 
municipalities.”9  Eleven associations reported that they had formed for a specific reason.  
These included fighting a specific threat from a senior level of government and sharing 
experiences when implementing new legislation that affected local governments.10  
In North America, while American leagues preceded Canadian associations, 
Canadian associations spread more rapidly than their counterparts in the United States.  
The Union of Canadian Municipalities (UCM) was formed in 1901, but an enduring 
national association of municipalities was not established in the United States until 1924.  
The early formation of UCM quickened the diffusion of provincial level municipal 
associations in Canada.  By 1919, eight of nine provinces had an association, compared 
to only eighteen of forty-eight states.11  Canadian municipal associations and municipal 
leagues in the United States also differ on a key organizational factor.  While a number of 
                                                
9 Ibid., 17.  
10 The 1956 survey was conducted by the International Union of Local Authorities.  The Union, which 
was founded in 1913 and headquartered in The Hague, represented national municipal associations until its 
merger with the United Towns Organization in 2004.  The merger formed the United Cities and Local 
Governments (UCLG), an organization that represents both national associations and individual city 
governments.  In 2015, UCLG had 124 associational members, but it does not include all national 
associations nor any sub-national associations as members.  See: The City Mayors Foundation, 
“Unification of IULA and UTO Creates Largest International Local Government Association,” 
www.citymayors.com. United Cities and Local Governments, “UCLG Local Government Associations,” 
www.cities-localgovernments.org.  
11 Two short-lived associations had been formed previously.  The American Municipal Improvement 
Society and the League of American Municipalities (est. 1911) were “focused on improving city services 
and maximizing efficiency in administration,” and did not become involved with intergovernmental 
lobbying at either the state or federal level. Bertram Johnson, “Associated Municipalities: Collective Action 
and the Formation of State Leagues of Cities,” Social Science History 29:4 (2005) 554-574. 
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Canadian provinces have multiple associations, in the United States there is one 
municipal league per state.12 
The efforts of municipal associations to persuade municipalities to become 
members have largely been successful.  As a result, associations indirectly represent 
almost everyone in Canada.  Nearly 90 percent of the Canadian population lives in a 
municipality that belongs to a provincial level municipal association.  The City of 
Toronto, which is not a member of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario, accounts 
for most of the population that is not represented in a provincial association, and Toronto 
is a member of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities.  When Toronto is excluded, 
more than 98 percent of the Canadian population lives in a municipality that belongs to a 
provincial-level association.  
The high level of membership uptake in associations is a source of collective 
strength and legitimacy in their work.  Municipal associations have high degrees of 
access at senior levels of government and their work attracts the attention of provincial 
officials.  Premiers and opposition leaders address associations’ annual conventions.  At 
most conventions, entire cabinets participate in ministerial forums, or “bear pit sessions,” 
that give municipal officials the opportunity to question the premier, ministers, associate 
                                                
12 The exception to this rule is Hawaii, which does not have municipal government structures comparable 
to other US states, and subsequently does not have a municipal league. 47 states also have an association of 
counties.  Ibid., 562.  Outside North America, the terms used to describe municipal associations vary 
widely by country and within the literature.  At present, terms used include: association of governments, 
association of municipalities, council of governments, government association, government conference, 
government group, government interest group, government lobbying group, intergovernmental group, 
league of cities, league of municipalities, local government association, local government pressure group, 
municipal league, public interest group, public official association, and state-level generalist association.   
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ministers, and parliamentary assistants about issues in their community and in the 
province.  
 
Image 1-1. Ministerial Forum at the 2014 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts 
and Counties Annual Convention 
 
Source: The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, Twitter Post, 
November 20, 2014, 9:07 AM, www.twitter.com/aamdc.  
 
 
High membership uptake gives an association legitimacy and leverage at the 
provincial level, but it can also be a source of internal conflict.  Associations can have 
deep cleavages in their membership – between small communities and large cities, 
metropolitan and remote regions, anglophone and francophone municipalities, and rural 
and urban areas.  In order to maintain the membership of diverse municipalities, 
associations must bridge divisive interests, achieve legislative changes, and provide 
beneficial services to their members.  
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 Municipal associations work to protect and represent the interests of their 
members through advocacy.  The majority of their advocacy efforts involve direct contact 
with senior levels of government.  The status of associations as the representatives of 
elected officials affords them high levels of access to elected officials at other levels of 
government.   Associations frame their advocacy efforts as “government-to-government 
relationships.”  They use these relationships to make formal policy requests, question 
cabinet ministers at their annual conventions, appear before legislative committees, and 
meet regularly with government officials.  In Ontario, Nova Scotia, and British 
Columbia, municipal associations have secured a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with their respective provincial governments.  The MOUs mandate that the 
provincial government must consult with the municipal association on any proposed 
legislative and regulative changes that would affect municipalities.  
 Associations’ direct advocacy tactics have been successful in achieving legislative 
changes.  In recent years, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) has 
secured local government representation in Aboriginal treaty negotiations and had social 
assistance costs removed from the property tax.13  L’Association francophone des 
municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB) has successfully lobbied for an increase 
in the variation of electoral riding populations, from +/- 5 % to +/- 15%.  This gave 
greater representation to francophone communities.14  The Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities’ (UNSM) efforts led to the creation of an integrated coastal management 
                                                
13 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “UBCM Overview,” www.ubcm.ca.  
14 Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Carte électorale provinciale : les 
demandeurs se réjouissent des gains importants et saluent l’ouverture du gouvernement provincial,” June 2,  
2015, www.afmnb.org.  
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framework for the province that guaranteed municipal consultation and involvement.15  
Beyond their large-scale achievements, associations regularly advocate for small and 
incremental changes that meet their members’ needs and interests.  Recent issues pursued 
by associations include: drainage upgrades, timber salvage fees, development control 
bylaws, business revitalization zone regulations, policing levies, and wastewater 
infrastructure funding.  
Associations also attract and maintain members through the provision of member 
services.  There are a number of services that are offered by the majority of associations, 
including insurance, fuel supply, bulk purchasing and employee benefits.  But 
associations also tailor their services to provincial and member conditions.  In 
Newfoundland and Labrador, three-quarters of municipalities have a population under 
1,000.  These small municipalities have few employees.  In response, Municipalities 
Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL) provides services that would be met internally by 
larger municipalities, including a telephone legal referral service and a parliamentary 
procedures advisory service.  The Saskatchewan Association Rural Municipalities 
(SARM) addresses the needs of its members through the provision of agricultural 
products and programs.  SARM sells discounted rat and gopher control products, 
administers the Provincial Rat Eradication Program, and provides invasive weed 
management support and education.  
 Association staffs provide support for advocacy efforts and the implementation of 
services.  On average, municipal associations have 18 employees, but the number ranges 
from three for the Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities to 76 for the Alberta 
                                                
15 Government of Nova Scotia, “Coastal Management in Nova Scotia,” www.novascotia.ca.  
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Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA).  Despite the variation of their advocacy 
issues, member services, and staff sizes, what all associations have in common is their 
core functions of collective intergovernmental lobbying and the provision of member 
services.  They facilitate local input at higher levels of government and provide collective 
benefits to their members.  
  
1.2 Methodology 
 
The hypotheses tested in this dissertation are drawn from the local government 
association and collective action literatures.  They share the common approach of 
measuring the inputs of municipal associations, and correlating the inputs with measured 
outputs of associations’ behaviour.  Two inputs are evaluated, and both are measures of 
membership composition: rural/urban dominance and population size.  These measures 
can be tested empirically, vary across Canada’s provinces and municipal associations, 
and are rooted in the literature.  The three behavioural outputs that are correlated with 
inputs of membership composition are: the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, 
the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and the allocation of collective resources.   
The main sources of data are associations’ own records – including the resolutions 
passed at their conventions, annual reports, and financial documents – and population 
statistics.  Correspondence, media reports, and academic literature supplement these 
sources.  Data collection was carried out in person, by traveling to associations’ offices; 
provincial archives; and legislative assembly, university, and public libraries. At these 
locations, printed records of, and about, municipal associations were digitized.  Between 
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6 and 31 days were spent in each province.16  In total, 115,418 pages of municipal 
association records were digitized over 114 days of field research.  The specific dates and 
locations of fieldwork are detailed in Appendix A.  
Using the records collected through fieldwork, case studies for the three research 
questions are drawn from the local government association literature and are based on the 
histories and compositions of municipal associations in Canada.  The first research 
question examines instances of associational restructuring studies to test the impact of 
restructuring on the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying.  The resolutions 
passed by associations before and after instances of restructuring in Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, and Ontario are compared.  The second research question is used to compare 
the dispersion of associations’ member populations to the jurisdictional aspect of policy 
requests.  The resolutions of two associations with homogeneous memberships – the 
Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, and the Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities – are compared to two associations with heterogeneous memberships – the 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities and the Alberta Urban Municipalities 
Association.  The distribution of their resolutions between 1999 and 2013 are correlated 
with their population dispersions.  The sources of resolutions used in the first and second 
research questions are detailed in Appendix B.  Finally, multiple regression analysis is 
used to test the relationship between member populations and the allocation of collective 
resources.  The analysis is based on 2013 financial and membership data from eleven 
associations in nine provinces.  The specific methodological choices for each of the 
                                                
16 Quebec was excluded from fieldwork because its municipal associations do not make most their 
records publically available.  Therefore not enough records are available for a rigorous, comparative 
analysis comparison between Quebec’s municipal associations and those in other provinces.  
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dissertation’s three research questions are discussed in their respective chapters, but three 
all measure inputs and correlate them with outputs, rather than focusing on internal 
politics to evaluate associations behaviour.   
 
1.3 Organization of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters, with the common approach of measuring 
outputs of organizational behaviour and correlating them with inputs of membership 
composition.  The second chapter reviews the existing literature on local government 
associations.  Most research on government associations has been focused on the 
lobbying tactics they employ, but membership composition has emerged as a determinant 
of associational behaviour.  This chapter situates the hypotheses tested in the dissertation 
within the wider literature on local government associations.  The third chapter examines 
how municipalities and their associations deal with cleavages in their memberships.  It 
compares the organizational structures used by associations to represent municipalities 
that vary by size, legal type, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character.  All eighteen 
independent, provincial level associations in Canada are discussed.  Chapters Four, Five, 
and Six are used to test the hypotheses of different research questions on the relationship 
between membership composition and associational behaviour.  In total, they test seven 
hypotheses.  These hypotheses are used to consider how rural/urban dominance and 
population size affect three aspects of associational behaviour: the issues pursued in 
intergovernmental lobbying, the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and how 
associations allocate collective resources between advocacy and the provision of member 
services.  
14 
 
 In Chapter Four, the comparison is made between rural/urban dominance and 
associational behaviour.  Canadian local government associations differ from those in 
other federal states because some provinces have separate associations for rural and urban 
municipalities.  In most federal countries, there have only been unified associations at the 
sub-national level, containing both rural and urban members.  In Canada, four provinces 
have undergone associational restructuring, where the number and type of associations 
formed by their municipalities changes.  The chapter is used to examine instances of 
restructuring between unified, rural, and urban associations to test how changes in 
membership composition affect the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying.  
 Hypothesis 1: Unified associations are expected to pursue functional, municipal 
issues that are common to all of their members.  When a group of municipalities leaves a 
unified association to form distinct rural or urban association, the new association 
institutionalizes a shared sense of place and creates stronger membership cohesion.  It is 
expected that these changes manifest themselves differently in rural and urban 
associations.  Hypothesis 2: Rural associations are expected to pursue the socio-economic 
issues that are of common interests to their members.  Hypothesis 3: The greater density 
and diversity within, and between, urban municipalities are expected to drive them to 
request stronger regulatory control over municipal functions.  Instances of associational 
restructuring in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario are used to test these 
expectations.  The issues pursued by unified and rural/urban associations in Nova Scotia 
and Saskatchewan are also examined.   
 The results of analysis in this chapter are mixed.  Rural and urban associations act 
as expected.  Rural associations pursue a higher percentage of socio-economic issues than 
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the unified associations they left, and urban associations pursue a higher percentage of 
jurisdictional resolutions.  Unlike rural and urban associations, unified associations do 
not act as expected.  The resolutions they pass reflect the interests of their predominant 
municipal type, whether rural or urban.  The behaviour of a unified association is not 
changed by the presence or absence of their minority municipal types.  
 Chapter Five examines a second measure of membership composition: population 
size.  This measure is compared to associations’ requests for jurisdictional responsibility 
in intergovernmental lobbying.  Do associations request increased municipal 
responsibilities or for the province to act on their behalf?  A key variation between 
provinces, and subsequently their municipal associations, is the relative heterogeneity of 
municipal populations.  This variation is expected to affect how associations approach the 
jurisdictional aspect of intergovernmental lobbying.  Hypothesis 4: Associations with 
relatively homogeneous member populations are expected to lobby for provincial 
programs to meet their requests, as they see the interests of other members as similar to 
their own.  They will trust the provincial government to enact uniform legislation to 
address their concerns.  Hypothesis 5: In associations with significant dispersion in 
member populations, it is expected that members will request the resources to institute 
programs at the municipal level, as they are unlikely to think that the majority of other 
members share their interests.   
Four associations are used to test for a relationship between municipal population 
dispersion and the jurisdictional aspect of associational policy requests.  They come from 
three provinces: two with unified associations (Nova Scotia and British Columbia), and 
one with split rural and urban associations (Alberta).  The dispersions of their member 
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populations are compared to the dispersion of lobbying requests between different 
configurations of jurisdictional responsibility: municipal, provincial, federal, or shared 
control.  The findings give support to the argument that the heterogeneity of member 
populations influences how they approach jurisdictional responsibility in 
intergovernmental lobbying.  Homogeneous associations request provincial action and 
heterogeneous associations request the power and resources to carry out programs at the 
municipal level.  
As discussed above, the core functions of municipal associations are advocacy 
and the provision of member services.  In Chapter Six, the focus is on how membership 
composition influences the prioritization of these two activities.  Two variables are drawn 
from the literature: the presence of small members and the presence of large members.  
Hypothesis 6: Small municipalities are reliant on the services associations provide due to 
their limited internal resources and capacity.  Hypothesis 7: Large municipalities, that 
have the human and financial capital to provide most services for themselves, join 
associations for their collective weight in lobbying senior levels of government.  Taken 
together, the two factors affect the number of services an association provides and the 
allocation of expenditures between member services and advocacy.  Using data from 
eleven associations in nine provinces, the results from multiple regression analysis give 
strong support to the proposition that both aspects of membership composition are 
significant determinants of associational behaviour.  
In short, every province and provincial level association is discussed in at least 
one chapter.  This is shown in Table 1-1 and Table 1-2. 
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Table 1-1. Provincial Case Studies by Chapter  
Province Descriptive 
Chapter 
Research 
Chapter One 
Research 
Chapter Two 
Research 
Chapter Three 
Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
X   X 
Nova Scotia X X X X 
Prince Edward Island X   X 
New Brunswick X X  X 
Quebec X    
Ontario X X  X 
Manitoba X X  X 
Saskatchewan X X  X 
Alberta X  X X 
British Columbia X  X X 
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Table 1-2. Associational Case Studies by Chapter 
Association Descriptive RC1 RC2 RC3 
Municipalities Newfoundland and 
Labrador 
X   X 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities X X X X 
Federation of Prince Edward Island 
Municipalities 
X   X 
Association Francophone des Municipalités 
du Nouveau-Brunswick 
X X  X 
Cities of New Brunswick Association-
Association Cites du Nouveau-Brunswick 
X X   
Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick X X   
Fédération Québécoise des Municipalités X    
Union des Municipalités du Québec X    
Association of Municipalities of Ontario X X  X 
Association des Municipalités Bilingues du 
Manitoba 
X    
Association of Manitoba Municipalities X X  X 
Provincial Association of Resort 
Communities of Saskatchewan 
X    
The New North – SANC Services Inc. 
(Saskatchewan Association of Northern 
Communities) 
X    
Saskatchewan Association of Rural 
Municipalities 
X X  X 
Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities 
Association 
X X  X 
Alberta Association of Municipal Districts X  X X 
Alberta Urban Municipalities Association X  X X 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities X  X X 
 
  
1.4 Conclusion  
 
The literature on municipal associations has been dominated by questions related to their 
lobbying strategies.  In answering questions about where associations target their 
lobbying efforts and the tactics that they employ, the dominant explanations for 
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associations’ actions are institutional structures and access to senior government officials.  
However, membership composition has emerged as an important determinant of 
behaviour.  This research seeks to expand on this finding and broaden the understanding 
of municipal associations.  Two measures of membership composition – rural/urban 
dominance and population size – are used to test how memberships affect three aspects of 
associations’ behaviour: how they allocate collective resources, requests for jurisdictional 
responsibility, and the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying.  These areas do not 
cover all aspects of associational activities or measures of membership composition, but 
they do provide initial, testable means of measuring how membership composition 
influences associational behaviour.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Theories of Government Association Behaviour 
 
The literature on government associations is small, but a few common threads have 
emerged in how they are studied.1  Researchers have focused primarily on the factors that 
shape associations’ lobbying strategies: where they target their lobbying efforts and the 
tactics they employ.  To a lesser extent, researchers have also sought to identify the issues 
upon which associations lobby, why they formed, and the degree of support they receive 
from their members.  In answering these questions, three dominant explanations for 
associational behaviour have emerged: institutional structures, high degrees of access at 
senior levels of government, and the composition of association memberships.  This 
chapter reviews the literature on lobbying strategies, issue priorities, and membership 
support and engagement before it details prior research on two aspects of membership 
composition: rural/urban dominance and population size.  
 
2.1 Intergovernmental Lobbying Strategies 
 
The predominant focus in the government association literature has been on lobbying 
tactics and targets.  This dissertation is focused on the content of associational lobbying, 
rather then the strategies they employ.  However, it is important to recognize the other 
factors researchers have identified as determinants of associational behaviour.  On the 
                                                
1 As Beverly Cigler has summarized: “Although there is a substantial literature on interest groups and 
lobbying, the empirical research or theory development focused on governments lobbying governments is 
sparse.”  Beverly A. Cigler, “Not Just Another Special Interest: The Intergovernmental Lobby Revisited,” 
in Interest Group Politics, eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012).  
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question of where associations target their lobbying activity, the most common factor 
identified is institutional structures.  In his discussion of federal level state and local 
government associations in the United States, Donald Haider argued that Governors are 
more likely to lobby Senators, while mayoral groups are more likely to target members of 
the House of Representatives.2  Anne Marie Cammisa reinforced this argument with her 
research on intergovernmental lobbying in the United States Congress.  She contended 
that the division of powers is a strong determinant of associations’ lobbying activities.  
Her interviews of government associations and Congressional staffs demonstrated that 
state-based associations focused their lobbying efforts in the Senate, while local 
government associations concentrated their efforts in the House.3  Both Haider and 
Cammisa attributed these lobbying patterns to the geographic implications of the division 
of powers.  The jurisdiction of Senators matches governors’ own constituencies.  For 
mayoral groups, their constituencies more closely mirror House districts.  Haider and 
Cammisa argued that associations’ strategic recognition of these differences has shaped 
their lobbying activities.   
 Beryl Radin and Joan Boase expanded on Haider and Cammisa’s approach by 
accounting for institutional structures beyond the legislative branch.  In a cross-national 
comparison of federal-level government associations, they found that Canadian 
associations were more likely to target the bureaucracy than their American counterparts, 
                                                
2 Donald H. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and 
Intergovernmental Lobbying (New York: Free Press, 1974).  
3 Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal 
System (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995).  
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who focused their efforts on the legislature.4  Jens Blom Hansen also attributed 
associational lobbying strategies to the institutional structure of the state.  He examined 
the policy-making environments of central-local relations in Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden.  In his analysis, he found that the relative strength of advocates (bureaucrats) vs. 
guardians (finance ministries and budget committees) determined where associations 
targeted their lobbying efforts and the degree of access that they enjoyed.  Stronger 
bureaucracies afforded greater degrees of policy involvement.5  Peter Johnson also 
identified an institutional influence on intergovernmental lobbying.  His longitudinal 
study of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities demonstrated a shift in the Union’s 
strategy from targeting cabinet ministers to lobbying civil servants.  He argued that this 
was a strategic response to the growth of the provincial civil service.6   
However, while Cammisa, Haider, Radin and Boase, Blom Hansen, and Johnson 
identified institutional structures as a determinant of lobbying strategies, there is a second 
perspective in the literature: the limitations that legislative institutions place on effective 
lobbying in the United States.  Frederic Cleaveland identified a core institutional 
limitation on intergovernmental lobbying: legislative committees are organized by 
function and cut across the concerns of geographic areas.  In his discussion of two urban 
associations in the United States, Cleaveland documented six House committees and six 
Senate committees that played a central role in managing bills concerned with urban 
                                                
4 Beryl A. Radin and Joan Price Boase, “Federalism, Political Structure, and Public Policy in the United 
States and Canada,” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 2:1 (2000), 77-8.  
5 Jens Blom-Hansen, “Policy-Making in Central-Local Government Relations: Balancing Local 
Autonomy, Macroeconomic Control, and Sectoral Policy Goals,” Journal of Public Policy 19:3 (1999), 
237.  
6 Peter Johnson, “Relations between the Government of Nova Scotia and the Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities: 1906-1966,” (MA Thesis: Dalhousie University, 1968).  
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issues.  He also found a lack of cohesion and cooperation between them on how such 
issues should be addressed.  Cleaveland argued that this tension between function and 
geographic space created a lack of Congressional leadership on urban issues and 
fractured the weight of urban associations.7  Haider teased out this argument further: 
The age-old administrative problem – area and function as competing bases of 
organization and governance – conflicts the groups in their Washington lobby.  
The scope of immediate concerns to the government interest groups is influenced 
by geopolitical boundaries.  Policies and problems tend to be defined largely 
within the context of a spatial setting determined by city, county, and state lines.  
But since Congress and its committee structure are organized along functional and 
not geopolitical lines, the government interest groups confront a chronic and 
overriding problem.  That is, they seek the imposition of spatial concerns on 
functionally oriented and structured institutions.8  
 
The committee structure of American legislatures necessitates that government 
associations target their lobbying efforts across committees, but this diminishes their 
collective influence.  Institutional structures shape where associations target their 
lobbying activities in senior levels of government, but they also create limitations on 
lobbying effectiveness.  
Prior research on government associations has also focused on a second aspect of 
their lobbying strategies: the tactics they employ.  There is a consensus in the literature 
that association members enjoy access to, and personal relationships with, senior 
government officials.  There is also consensus that their access is enabled by their status 
as elected officials, and that this is the strongest determinant of their lobbying tactics.9  
                                                
7 Frederic N. Cleaveland, Congress and Urban Problems: A Casebook on the Legislative Process 
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1969).  
8 Haider, 223.  
9 Cammisa, 28-32. Bertram Johnson, 551. Patricia K. Freeman and Anthony J. Nownes, 
“Intergovernmental Lobbying in the States,” Southeastern Political Review 27:4 (1999), 619-634.  
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However, whether this access is a source of strength or a constraint is a point of 
contention.  
Haider argued that gubernatorial and mayoral groups used direct tactics – 
contacting senior officials directly and testifying before committees – due to the 
geographic overlap of state and federal politicians’ constituencies.  They shared a 
common constituency base with senior officials and drew on this overlap for legitimacy 
and persuasion.10  Patricia Freeman and Anthony Nownes, and Cammisa expanded on 
this argument by comparing the lobbying techniques of government associations to non-
governmental interest groups.  At the state level, Freeman and Nownes found that 
government lobbyists used more direct tactics than their non-governmental counterparts.  
They attributed this to their “closer relationship with public officials than lobbyists who 
represent other types of groups.”11  Cammisa’s interviews of Congressional members and 
staff also provided evidence that state and local interest groups had more access in the 
legislative branch than other interest groups. She found that local groups used more 
conciliatory, direct tactics – testifying and personally contacting members of Congress – 
while other groups used more indirect tactics, such as attracting media attention and 
organizing grassroots movements.  She argued that access was reason for associations’ 
direct lobbying.  State and local groups used their personal connections to contact senior 
officials directly, while other groups turned to the media and public to increase public 
pressure on Congress.  However, Cammisa noted that direct tactics also had the effect of 
                                                
10 Haider, 265.  
11 Freeman and Nownes, 619-634.  
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not alienating Congress.12  Other scholars have offered a more pessimistic interpretation 
of this effect.  
The common, pessimistic view of associations’ tactics is rooted in the idea that 
personal connections get associations in the door at senior levels of government, but they 
also create limitations on how such access is used.  Peter Johnson argued that the 
personal relationships – and political aspirations – of municipal officials created caution 
in taking action against the provincial government.  From this, he questioned whether, if 
the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities was unwilling to undertake measures that would 
hurt or embarrass the provincial government, did it really have any power at all?  Could it 
get government to do what it does not want to do?13   
In his discussion of local authority associations in England and Wales, K. Isaac-
Henry attributed their failure to achieve their major objectives to their close relationship 
with the central government.  Isaac-Henry argued that associations should adopt a “more 
discriminating response in relation to [the] central government” and that their role had 
been reduced to “explaining government policy to member authorities.”14  He believed 
that their use of direct tactics made them “prisoners of the centre” rather than independent 
actors.15  In the context of the United States, David Berman also argued that personal 
connections between members of municipal leagues and state government officials grant 
them access, but limit their willingness to act.  He attributed the mild, direct forms 
                                                
12 Cammisa, 28-32.  
13 Peter Johnson, 80-85.  
14 K. Isaac-Henry, “Taking Stock of the Local Authority Associations,” Public Administration 62:2 
(1984), 129, 145.  
15 Ibid. 145.  
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lobbying to municipal officials’ unwillingness to denounce higher levels of government 
publically, lest they need their support in the future.16    
Like Johnson, Berman understood this as an issue of personal aspirations, but he 
also identified the unequal distribution of power between levels of government as an 
important factor in how these relationships affect the associations’ lobbying tactics.17    In 
their analysis of the Local Government Association (LGA) in England and Wales, Tom 
Entwistle and Mark Laffin pushed this argument further.  They identified three main 
tactics of associational lobbying – partner, player, and think-tank – but argued that the 
last strategy is prioritized, as it is believed to have the greatest rewards.  Due to unequal 
distributions of power, the LGA has a “chronic weakness of voice” as a partner or a 
player, but it can provide senior government officials with information on issues.18  The 
LGA can input information, but it cannot leverage action.  Personal connections give 
associations access, but the unequal nature of these relationships creates an unwillingness 
to employ tactics that might put this access in jeopardy.  
 
2.2 Issue Priorities 
 
Although the literature on government associations has been dominated by analysis of 
lobbying strategies, there have been some efforts to identify the issues associations 
pursue in their lobbying activities.  Two dominant methods have been used to categorize 
issues.  In the context of the United States, the first follows the issue areas of committee 
                                                
16 David R. Berman, Local Government and the States: Autonomy, Politics, and Policy (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2003).  
17 Bertram Johnson, “Associated Municipalities: Collective Action and the Formation of State Leagues of 
Cities,” Social Science History 29:4 (2005), 551.  
18  Tom Entwistle and Martin Laffin, “The Multiple Strategies of the Local Government Association: 
Partner, Player, and Think-Tank?” Policy and Politics 31:1 (2003), 47.  
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structures.  American scholars have grouped issues by where they are targeted in senior 
legislative committees.  A second approach has been to group issues by what they seek to 
change.  For example, Beverly Cigler developed four issue types – internal operations, 
structural change, intergovernmental arrangements, and policy issues – in her analysis of 
state-level county associations.  
In both of these approaches, composition of membership has been identified as 
the dominant determinant of the issues associations pursue.  William De Soto examined 
whether municipal interests are cohesive, despite regional and cultural diversity.  He 
surveyed elected officials in 403 municipalities in the United States with populations 
greater than 60,000 and the executives of state-level leagues of municipalities.  When 
asked to identify their issue priorities, the former gave equal weight to tax and revenue, 
environment, and crime, while the latter overwhelmingly identified tax and revenue as 
their core priority.  De Soto attributed this gap to a greater reliance on municipal leagues 
by smaller cities (pop. 60,000 – 100,000) than their more populous counterparts.  Larger 
cities (pop. > 100,000) reported viewing municipal leagues as unable to address the 
diversity of their interests.  As a result, they often pursued individual, direct lobbying.  
Smaller cities were the most active within associations and, therefore, their interests were 
reflected in the associations’ issue agendas.19 
Allen Hays also identified diversity of membership as a determinant of 
associations’ issue prioritization.  Hays used testimony before Congress as an indicator of 
lobbying priorities, and found a difference in groups’ activities.  State and county 
                                                
19 William De Soto, “Cities in State Politics: View of Mayors and Managers,” State & Local Government 
Review 27:3 (1999), 188-194.  
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associations targeted their lobbying activity where they did not want to gain 
responsibility or involvement.  In particular, they targeted redistributive and regulatory 
policies to push for continued federal control.  Federal-level city groups, however, 
targeted areas where they wanted greater control.  They concentrated their lobbying 
efforts on issues where they sought to gain regulatory, but not redistributive, 
responsibility.  This active lobbying, compared to state and local groups’ defensive 
efforts, was attributed to the more cohesive interests of members in city associations.  
Cities were able to reach agreement on shared interests, while state and local associations 
deflected responsibility due to a lack of member cohesion.20 
 Beverly Cigler found further evidence that member composition is a determinant 
of the interests pursued in collective intergovernmental lobbying.  Her analysis of state-
level associations of counties found that 31 of 48 associations reported organizational 
challenges due to conflicts between rural and urban counties, and that these challenges 
were reflected in their policy-issue agendas.  Cigler established that state population had 
a positive relationship with the number of issues on associations’ lobbying agendas.  In 
particular, intergovernmental arrangements and substantive policy issues were 
significantly affected.  Associations in more populous states lobbied on a greater number 
of these issues.  In addition, Cigler found that there were negative correlations between 
rurality and the number of issues on an association’s agenda.  The more rural a state’s 
                                                
20  R. Allen Hays, “Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of Issue Priorities,” The 
Western Political Quarterly 44:4 (1991), 1081-1098.  
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population, and the greater proportion of residents in nonmetropolitan areas, the fewer 
issues an association was likely to pursue in intergovernmental lobbying.21  
 The formation of government associations also provided evidence that there is a 
relationship between population, urbanization, and collective intergovernmental 
lobbying.  Bertram Johnson identified four significant factors of why state-level 
associations formed in the United States.  Three were related to membership 
composition: the population of the state in the 1900 Census, the percentage of the state 
vote for the Progressive Party presidential campaign of Robert LaFollette in 1924, and 
the level of urbanization in 1900.22  These findings provide further evidence that 
composition of membership is a determinant of associations’ behaviour. 
 
2.3 Member Support and Engagement 
 
Another strand of research concerns members’ support for associations, and their 
willingness to engage in collective action.  Membership composition clearly influences 
support.  De Soto, for example, found that larger municipalities are more likely to pursue 
individual lobbying rather than rely on municipal leagues.23  Lionel Feldman and 
Katherine Graham made the normative argument that large cities should pursue 
                                                
21 Beverly A. Cigler, “The County-State Connection: A National Study of Associations of Counties,” 
Public Administration Review 54:1 (1994), 3-11.  
22 The fourth significant factor was institutional, whether a state ban on special legislation – legislation 
that dealt with a single municipality – was in place.  Bertram Johnson, 551.  Lowery et al. also sought to 
identify the factors that led to the growth of public sector lobbies, and concluded that fiscal stress and 
Republican controlled legislatures are the most significant factors.  David Lowery, Virginia Gray, John 
Cluverius, and Jeffrey J. Harden, “Explaining the Anomalous Growth of Public Sector Lobbying in the 
American States, 1997-2007,” Publius 43:4 (2013), 580-599.  Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith also attributed 
the formation of Bulgaria’s National Association of Municipalities to political stress and changes in 
municipal law.  Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Organising for Mutual Advantage: 
Municipal Associations in Bulgaria,” Public Administration and Development 26:5 (2006), 373-382.  
23 De Soto, 189.  
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individual, rather than collective, lobbying.  They argued that the only way the “true 
interests” of municipalities can be articulated is through individual lobbying and that 
collective action diminishes the overall power of urban centres.24  However, William 
Browne highlighted that opinions vary on whether smaller or larger cities are best served 
by collective action.  He interviewed officials in nine suburban municipalities in St. Louis 
County, Missouri and found that smaller cities perceived associations as big-city 
oriented.  This perception translated into ambivalent attitudes towards associations’ 
lobbying activities.  From this, they reported that they more highly prized the member 
services associations offered than their lobbying efforts.25 
Finally, Pamela Goldsmith-Jones demonstrated that both lobbying activities and 
member services were important determinants in members’ support of municipal 
associations.  Her research did not address membership composition, but it did add depth 
to others’ findings on lobbying and member services.  To provide a descriptive account 
of these activities, Goldsmith-Jones surveyed members of the Union of British Columbia 
Municipalities (UBCM).  Forty percent of respondents identified lobbying as UBCM’s 
most important function and fifty-six percent believed lobbying and member services to 
be of equal importance.  Different members had different priorities in belonging to 
UBCM.  Despite the split in most important function, members perceived the Union as 
equally effective in these two areas of activity; eighty-three percent of respondents 
perceived UBCM as effective in the provision of member services and as a means of 
                                                
24 Lionel D. Feldman and Katherine A. Graham, Bargaining for Cities: Municipalities and 
Intergovernmental Relations – An Assessment (Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1979), 
27-28.  
25 William P. Browne, “Municipal Interest Groups: What Role for Smaller Cities?” State & Local 
Government Review 10:2 (1978), 51-55.  
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changing provincial legislation.26  These findings, taken with Browne and De Soto’s 
research, indicate that rural/urban dominance and population size may be determinants of 
associational behaviour.  
 
2.4 Membership Composition and Associations’ Behaviour 
 
This dissertation sets about to measure what municipal associations do – that is, their 
policy outputs.   This is accomplished by employing Thomas Dye’s model of public 
policy analysis.27  In his analysis of state and community governments in the United 
States, Dye identified measurable characteristics of the state, or inputs, and then ran 
regressions between those inputs and policy outcomes.   
 Dye focused on the evidence of correlations between characteristic inputs and 
policy outputs, rather than on the internal politics of policy formation.  In his analysis, he 
asked questions that included: “Are single-industry states more likely to have powerful 
pressure groups dominating the state legislature than multi-industry states?  Are 
governors generally more powerful in the urban industrial states than in the rural 
agricultural states?  What effect does urbanization have on party competition in the 
states?” and then approached them from a comparative, empirical viewpoint.28  His 
analysis identified patterns of behaviour in policy outcomes that cut through the 
complexity and diversity of state conditions and legal frameworks.  
                                                
26 Pamela J. Goldsmith-Jones, “A Reevaluation of Local Government Associations: A Case Study of the 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities” (MA Thesis: Union of British Columbia, 1988), 48-50.  
27 Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities, 3rd Edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977).  
28 Ibid., 4-5.  
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This dissertation uses Dye’s model of measuring inputs and correlating them with 
outputs to test how different variations in the membership composition affect the mix of 
associations’ activities.  This is accomplished by focusing on evidence, rather than the 
internal politics.  Future research can examine internal politics – including norms, 
conflicts, and power – but this dissertation is concerned with the relationship between 
inputs and outputs.  
The literature on government associations has demonstrated that composition of 
membership is a determinant of associational behaviour.   Thomas Dye’s methodological 
framework is used expand upon that finding by testing how different variations in 
composition affect the mix of associations’ activities.  Although there are a number of 
ways to measure membership composition, including economic status, ethnic/linguistic 
character, and geographic distribution, a typology of membership characteristics is used 
to identify three core categories of variation in groups’ memberships: 
1. Group size 
2. Dominant member type 
3. Heterogeneity 
 
1. Group size, the number of members within a group, is a common measure within the 
collective action literature and is often considered in the context of free rider problems 
and selective incentives.  2. Dominant member type measures whether one kind of 
member – rural or urban, large or small, anglophone or francophone – is the primary kind 
of member within a group.  This category is concerned with how a dominant member 
type can influence the agenda and activities of a group.  3. The third way to conceptualize 
membership composition is heterogeneity.  This measures the dispersion and diversity of 
33 
 
group members, and how the extent of dispersion influences a group’s approach to issues 
and jurisdictional control.  
These measures are rooted in the literature, can be tested empirically, and vary 
across Canada’s municipal associations.  However, while membership composition has 
emerged as a common factor in the government associations, the literature on local 
government associations is still small.  The broader group behaviour literature and the 
more narrow research on business associations offer natural parallels for municipal 
associations.  Both municipal and business associations are institutionalized groups: they 
have stable and limited memberships, enjoy close relationships with government, and 
employ professional staffs.  As well, their members represent groups of people, rather 
than individuals.  Therefore, the group and business association literatures are used in the 
subsequent chapters for the formation of research questions and hypotheses.  
 
Membership Composition: Rural/Urban Dominance 
 One way to measure membership composition is to measure the mix of rural and 
urban municipalities within an association.  This falls under the membership composition 
measure of dominant member type.  The definition of rural and urban municipalities 
varies by province, but in each province, the provincial Municipal Act and the self-
identification of municipalities are used to designate which member type is dominant 
within an association.  The particulars of this methodological choice are detailed in 
Chapter 4.  The category of dominant member type is rooted in the idea that differences 
in rural and urban interests influence associational activities and will be tested in Chapter 
Four.  Cigler established that rural/urban conflicts caused organizational challenges for 
associations and that a state’s degree of urbanization shaped its lobbying agenda.  Taken 
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with Bertram Johnson’s finding that urbanization was a significant factor in the founding 
of associations, there is a strong indication that member dominance is a key factor in how 
associations behave. 
 The importance of this factor is increased when the structure of Canada’s 
municipal associations is considered.  Whereas the county and municipal associations 
Cigler and Johnson studied were statewide and unified, incorporating both rural and 
urban members, not all provinces in Canada share this structure.  The American literature 
has established that the conflicts between rural and urban members limit issue activity.  
The institutional difference in Canada, between split and unified associations, offers 
further opportunity to test how member dominance shapes the behaviour of associations.  
If the mix of rural and urban municipalities creates organizational challenges, how does 
the separation of these municipal types into distinct organizations change their pursuit of 
member interests?   
Hays’ research on federal level government associations in the United States 
offers insights on how differences in membership composition affect the issues they 
pursue in intergovernmental lobbying.  As discussed earlier, Hays found that city 
associations pursued more jurisdictional control in intergovernmental lobbying than 
associations representing counties, state legislatures, and governors.  Hays attributed this 
difference to more cohesive member interests in city associations than in groups that 
represented both rural and urban regions.29  This dissertation tests whether interest and 
membership cohesion manifests itself differently in rural and urban associations.  
 
                                                
29 Hays, 1084-1092.  
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Membership Composition: Population Size 
The second measure of member composition tested is population size.  Within the 
typology of membership composition measures, this is a measure of heterogeneity.  It 
will be explored in Chapters Five and Six.  The use of population size as a measure of 
membership composition provides further insights flowing from Mancur Olson’s 
discussion of group behaviour and collective action.  Olson identified public goods 
(lobbying) and selective incentives (member services) as the core components of group 
activities.  He argued:  
Large or ‘latent’ groups have no incentive to act to obtain a collective good, 
however valuable the collective good might be to the group as a whole, it does not 
offer the individual any incentive to pay dues to any organization working in the 
latent group’s interest, or to bear in any other way any of the costs of the 
necessary collective action.  Only a ‘separate and selective’ incentive will 
stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to act in a group-oriented way.30 
 
In his analysis of group activities, Olson focused on the measure composition of group 
size as a determinant of behaviour.31  Larger groups need selective incentives to motivate 
members to act in a group-orientated way, yet as his discussion of groups was limited to 
considering group members as individuals, rather than businesses or governments that 
represented multiple people, he did not account for the potential of greater variation in 
interests and internal capacities when group members represent populations.  Do 
members that represent populations prioritize the balance of public goods and selective 
incentives differently than individuals?  Do larger populations prioritize public goods and 
selective incentives differently than less populous members?   
                                                
30 Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 50 
31 Ibid., 50.  
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 Goldsmith-Jones found that municipal officials differ in how they prioritize 
municipal associations’ functions.  As noted earlier, when asked whether they viewed 
lobbying or member services as the UBCM’s top priority, forty percent of municipal 
officials chose lobbying, compared to fifty-six percent who gave the two activities equal 
weight.32  Although Goldsmith-Jones did not correlate responses with population size, 
William Browne’s findings offer a potential explanation of the root cause: smaller 
municipalities prize member services over intergovernmental lobbying.   
In the context of European employer organizations, Alessia Vatta argued that 
small- and medium-sized enterprises join these organizations because they rely on the 
services the organizations provide.33  Smaller firms were reliant on the collective pooling 
of resources, whereas larger employers could afford the services offered by associations 
individually.  Larger firms, then, join associations for their lobbying activities.  However, 
while these authors identify how population influences membership in associations, they 
fail to consider how members’ preferences translate into behaviour.  Does the dispersion 
of member populations shape the mix of activities an association undertakes? 
 Martin Perry has theorized on how the dispersion of member sizes affects group 
behavior.  In his research on trade associations in Ireland and New Zealand, Perry 
identified eight characteristics of associational structures and hypothesized how each 
would influence group behavior.  One of these variables was the mix of members’ sizes, 
in particular whether larger or small enterprises were predominant.  He argued that this 
would influence the balance of associational activity between lobbying and providing 
                                                
32 Goldsmith-Jones, 48-50.  
33 Alessia Vatta, “Employers’ Organizations and Concertation: Internal Dynamics and Institutional 
Influence,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 5:3 (1999), 259. 
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member benefits.  If an association was dominated by small enterprises that had greater 
needs for the services they were unable to provide autonomously, then the association 
would focus the majority of its collective resources on service provision.  If large firms 
that could self-provide services dominated an association, then the association would 
allocate most of its resources to lobbying efforts.34  Matilde Bombardini tested this 
theory on trade associations in the United States, and found that industrial sectors 
characterized by a higher share of larger firms exhibited greater levels of political 
intensity.  That is, they allocated more resources for lobbying.35  These findings provide 
support for the proposition that the extent of small members and the presence of large 
members within an association can influence the allocation of collective resources 
between service provision and lobbying.  
 Browne, Vatta, Perry, and Bombardini built on Olson’s arguments about group 
size and collective action.  They argued that it is not just the size of a group, but also the 
size of group members that determines its behaviour.  Terry Moe extended this idea by 
considering how the competing demands of large and small members interact.  He 
theorizes about internal group dynamics and how they influence an association’s goals:  
a) Members of latent groups can only be induced to join through the operation of 
selective incentives, yet b) the sale of selective incentives yields a surplus (in 
selective groups) that can be used by group leaders for lobbying and other 
expenditures on collective goods; it follows that c) these political activities are the 
by-products of the operation of selective incentives – they have nothing to do with 
why members join, but are made possible because members join; therefore d) the 
leaders of latent groups may pursue any collective goods they wish without fear 
                                                
34 Martin Perry, “Trade Associations in Ireland and New Zealand: Does Institutional Context Matter for 
Collective Action?” The Irish Journal of Management 31:2 (2012), 19-44.  
35 Matilde Bombardini, “Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation,” Journal of International 
Economics 75:2 (2008), 329-331.  
38 
 
of losing member “support,” since contributions are independent of political 
considerations.36 
 
Groups offer services to gain and retain members, but these services are also profitable 
for the group.  They can use these profits to carry out the advocacy prioritized by large 
members.    
 Olson argues that, in large groups, the focus of group behavior is on the provision 
of member services, but he does not attempt to analyze internal politics.  Moe addresses 
this gap by considering the interactions of small and large members’ competing interests, 
and the distribution of member sizes.  Internal group dynamics shape the goals that 
associations pursue.  Moe argues that groups offer services to small organizations attract 
and retain members, but these services are also sold at a cost.  The profits of service 
provision can be used to carry out advocacy.  Group members that are small 
organizations create the need for service provision, but large organizations are motivated 
to join groups because of their advocacy.  They can self-provide services, but groups 
need them in order to have collective weight in advocacy.  Therefore they must direct 
profits made from the services provided for small organizations to carry out advocacy on 
behalf of large organizations. 
 Moe identifies that the competing demands of small organization members for 
services and of large organization members for advocacy can create “a disjunction 
between member goals and group goals.”37  Small organization members are driven by 
service provision, but the presence of large organizations within a group make the 
                                                
36 Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal Dynamic of Political Interest 
Groups (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 75.  
37 Moe, 75.  
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provision of services more economical, due to economies of scale.  Groups must be 
responsive to the advocacy goals of large organizations in order to meet the service goals 
of small organizations.  From this, the advocacy goals of a group may not reflect the 
advocacy interests of most of its members.  Rather, they will reflect the goals of its 
largest members. Taken together, Olson and Moe’s theories suggest that associations 
must balance the provision of member services and advocacy, and that this balance is 
dependent on the sizes of its members.  
 Beyond the influence of membership sizes on member services and advocacy, the 
literature offers another perspective on the distribution of member populations.  Whereas 
small municipalities are expected to influence the mix of associational activities, 
population distribution is also expected to influence the jurisdictional aspect of policy 
requests.  That is, the shape of size distributions will affect which level of government 
member municipalities want to meet their needs.  As Cammisa discussed, “while 
government lobbies are interested in particular policies, they, unlike other groups (or at 
least to a greater extent than other groups), are also interested in the spatial dimension of 
any policy, that is, who will have the authority in implementation and control of funds.”38  
In lobbying senior levels of government, municipal associations are concerned with 
whether their interests are met through programs at the provincial level, or through 
transfers to fund municipal programs.  Hays attributed the difference in jurisdictional 
requests to the greater of cohesiveness of members in city associations, but the 
relationship between the shape of size distributions and jurisdictional responsibility can 
also be considered in the inverse.   
                                                
38 Cammisa, 25.  
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 If a narrow dispersion of member populations translates into more cohesive 
interests, it can be expected that cohesive associations would lobby for provincial 
programs to meet their needs, as they see the interests of other members as similar to 
their own.  In associations with a high variation in member populations, it can be 
expected that members will request the resources to institute programs at the municipal 
level.  They are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share their interests. 
In their analysis of trade association lobbying, Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi 
pinpointed dispersion of membership as a factor in collective lobbying.  They found that 
the less differentiated an industry, the more likely its members were to pursue lobbying 
through their trade association, as opposed to individually.  Although they measured 
differentiation by firms’ range of products, rather than their size, their findings still 
present strong evidence that whether or not actors see the interests of other members as 
similar to their own influences their approach to associational lobbying.39  Iain Osgood 
tested this finding in a specific policy-area: US-Korea and US-Australia Free Trade 
Agreements.  He found that product differentiation was a significant factor in lobbying 
activity.  Industries with low product differentiation were more likely to reach consensus 
on trade liberalization and have an active trade association.40   
Cammisa and Hays recognized that jurisdictional responsibility is an important 
aspect of municipal associations’ concern, but we need to know whether this concern is 
influenced by member heterogeneity.  The business literature provides insights into how 
                                                
39 Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi, “Competition and Political Organization: Together or 
Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics 87:1 (2012), 18.  
40 Iain Guthrie Osgood, “Differentiated Products, Divided Industries: Firms and the Politics of Intra-
Industry Trade” (PhD Thesis: Harvard University, 2013), 3-10.  
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the membership characteristics of associations influence members’ perceptions of shared 
interests.  Both aspects of membership composition – the percentage of members that are 
small municipalities and the preponderance of a single size type – are drawn from the 
literature on group and associational behaviour. 
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
The following research chapters draw on prior government association and collective 
action research to develop hypotheses that are rooted in the literature and empirically 
testable.  Most of the literature on government associations has focused on the tactics 
they employ and has attributed their use of direct lobbying to institutional structures and 
high degrees of access at senior levels of government.  When researchers have examined 
the issues pursued by associations, a third explanation of their behaviour has emerged: 
membership composition.  The research questions in this dissertation build on that 
explanation by testing how rural/urban dominance and population size affect three 
aspects of associational behaviour: issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, the 
jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, and the allocation of collective resources. 
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Chapter 3  
3 Membership Cleavages and Association Structures  
 
Minimal research has been conducted on provincial level municipal associations in 
Canada.  The literature that does exist has been focused on individual associations.1  This 
chapter examines how associations deal with cleavages in their memberships.  To address 
this question, a comparable dataset of associations’ memberships and structures was 
compiled.  Associations use fee structures, boards of directors, caucuses, sub-
associations, and district meetings to represent and accommodate municipalities that vary 
in size, region, legal type, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban composition.  When 
associational structures are examined, three predominant divisions amongst members 
emerge: size, region and legal type.  Once the variation amongst associations is 
established, the effect of membership differences on their behaviour can be tested.2   
 
3.1 The Complexity of Association Memberships 
 
Prior research on local government associations has argued that they pursue “issues 
which affect all of the units represented” in order to maintain their membership bases.3  
The ability of associations to identify and pursue common interests is complicated by the 
                                                
1 Pamela J. Goldsmith-Jones, “A Reevaluation of Local Government Associations: A Case Study of the 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities,” (M.A. Thesis: University of British Columbia, 1988), Peter 
Johnson, “Relations between the Government of Nova Scotia and the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities: 
1906-1966” (MA Thesis: Dalhousie University, 1968). 
2 Other aspects of associational behaviour – member services, advocacy, and resolutions – are discussed 
in depth in Chapters 4-6 and are therefore not discussed here.    
3 R. Allen Hays, “Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of Issue Priorities,” The 
Western Political Quarterly, 44:4 (1991), 1081-1098. 
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diversity of municipal conditions.  Associations represent municipalities with widely 
different populations (Table 3-1).   
 
Table 3-1. Populations of Member Municipalities (2013) 
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MNL 275 5 250 469 922 106,172 1,668 75.4 
UNSM 54 481 2,323 5,545 10,838 390,096 16,947 73.6 
FPEIM 40 167 287 360 930 34,562 2,064 77.0 
AFMNB 52 145 848 1,334 4,215 69,074 5,479 71.9 
UMNB 59 232 799 1,294 3,260 56,224 3,823 67.3 
AMO 412 145 2,192 7,190 19,899 1,296,814 39,315 80.8 
AMM 197 10 602 1,071 2,394 663,617 5,766 82.7 
SARM 296 73 299 419 622 8,354 5,890 40.3 
SUMA 450 0 102 247 634 222,189 1,776 86.9 
AAMDC 69 79 5,299 3,160 10,061 92,490 9,218 54.0 
AUMA 274 10 220 808 3,020 1,096,833 11,435 91.5 
UBCM 191 125 1,493 5,021 16,701 603,502 22,249 76.9 
Note: Entries based on 2013 membership lists and 2011 Census data. 
 
 
At the extreme, the Association of Municipalities of Ontario’s (AMO) member sizes 
range from 145 to nearly 1.3 million.  Even in an urban association, the Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association (AUMA), member populations range from a village of 10 to 
more than one million in Calgary.  The Gini coefficient of each association, which 
measures statistical dispersion, shows that there are variations in the distribution of 
member populations.  The Gini coefficients range from 40.3 in SARM to 91.5 in AUMA.  
The populations of SARM members are relatively similar, whereas AUMA members’ 
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populations are the most widely distributed.  Most member populations are widely 
dispersed and associations must balance the diverse needs of their other members.  
As hypothesized in the previous chapter, a wide range of member populations can 
constrain an association’s ability to develop a cohesive message and lobbying priorities.  
In practice, an association can pursue issues relevant to all of its members, balance 
interests relevant to different groups, or find other means of ensuring that its members 
feel well represented within the organization.  An association can limit its work to 
common interests or risk alienating portions of its membership by pursuing issues that are 
not universal.  This tension challenges associations’ executives and staff, and is felt by 
their members.  In 2001, the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) 
carried out an extensive internal review of its operations, including a survey of its 
members.  The review identified the “lack of unity and cohesiveness owing to diverse 
membership needs” as a systematic internal limitation.4   
The diverse needs of associational members are rooted in their regional, legal 
type, socio-economic, ethnic/linguistic, and rural/urban variations.  Legal type refers to 
different kinds of municipalities that can be formed under a province’s Municipal Act.  
For example, Manitoba’s Municipal Act defines four legal types: cities, towns, villages, 
and rural municipalities.5  Association members can include municipalities in densely 
populated metropolitan regions and remote northern villages, affluent bedroom 
communities and struggling one-industry towns.  Associations use structural mechanisms 
– including board of directors, caucuses, and regional meetings – to allow different types 
                                                
4 Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, Strategic Planning 2001 (Regina: Saskatchewan 
Urban Municipalities Association, 2001), 4.  
5 Government of Manitoba, The Municipal Act, 427(1) and 427(2), web2.gov.mb.ca. 
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of municipalities to voice and represent their needs.  The development of municipal 
associations in Canada reflects the complexity of member interests.  
 
3.2 Formation of Associations  
 
The early decades of the twentieth century saw a rapid growth in Canadian municipal 
associations.  Between 1899 and 1919, ten associations were established in eight 
provinces.  Seven were formed between 1905 and 1907.  As noted in Chapter One, the 
growth of municipal associations in Canada coincided with the development of state 
municipal leagues in the United States.  A convention of Ontario municipalities was held 
in Toronto in the late 1880s, but a second meeting was not held until 1899.6  The first 
attempt at league formation in the United States occurred in Indiana in 1891.  In July 
1893, a meeting was held to form The Municipal Association of British Columbia.  
Delegates at the meeting passed a constitution that provided for periodic gatherings to: 1. 
Discuss municipal matters, 2. Promote legislative enactments in the interest of good 
municipal government, 3. Develop uniformity in municipal government, and 4. Share 
information.  But the association did not meet again.7  The first lasting American state 
leagues were formed in California, Iowa, and Wisconsin in 1898.   
 Bertram Johnson’s research on state municipal leagues found that they formed in 
response to state constitutional bans on “special legislation” – laws that were specific to 
individual cities.  He argued that these bans changed the incentive structure of collective 
action for municipalities.  Local governments could no longer advocate for laws that 
                                                
6 The Evening Citizen, September 7, 1899.  
7 The Colonist, July 9, 1893.  In Union of British Columbia Municipalities, UBCM: The First Century 
(Richmond, BC: Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 2005), 4-5.  
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affected their individual municipalities and began to work together for legislation that 
addressed common interests.8  Canadian municipalities did not face similar constitutional 
changes, but they adopted the structure of municipal unions to address a different issue: 
the growth of public utilities.  
The Ontario Municipal Association (OMA), Canada’s first enduring municipal 
union, was formed in 1899, one year after the first state leagues were established.  An 
impromptu meeting of Ontario municipalities occurred in the spring of 1899 and they 
decided to hold a formal convention in September of that year.  The core issue addressed 
at the founding convention was the method of assessing personal property.  Municipal 
officials in attendance unanimously agreed that the existing method was unjust and 
elected a delegation of municipal officials to present their proposed changes to the 
provincial government.9  A national municipal association, the Union of Canadian 
Municipalities (UCM), was started in 1901.  It was founded “largely to contest the utility 
companies’ assumptions that they could tear up public infrastructure without negotiating 
municipal rights-of-way.”10  UCM encouraged all Canadian municipalities to become 
members and its advocacy for collective action spurred the formation of municipal unions 
at the provincial level.  
The Union of Manitoba Municipalities (UMM), the second provincial level 
association to form, was founded in March 1905.  The Mayor of Brandon, John Fleming, 
organized a meeting with the intent of forming a municipal association in Manitoba.  
                                                
8 Bertram Johnson, “Associated Municipalities: Collective Action and the Formation of State Leagues of 
Cities” Social Science History 29:4, 554-. 
9 The Evening Citizen.  
10 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, UBCM: The First Century, 8.  
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Municipalities in the province had been fighting for oversight of telephone companies.  
Fleming believed that a municipal union “would be better equipped than to confront these 
challenges [of utility oversight].”11  He also referenced the success of the new Union of 
Canadian Municipalities in pursuing collective action against utility companies.12  At the 
March 1905 meeting, delegates from 31 rural and urban municipalities voted 
unanimously to create UMM.  The new association “resolved that any provincial or 
federal bills affecting railways, telegraph, telephone and electric power lines should be 
vetted by the municipalities which might be affected by them.”13  Delegates passed a 
constitution for UMM and voted on resolutions that addressed tax revenue for public 
works, railway crossings, and assessments of swamplands.  
The next UCM convention was held in Winnipeg in August 1905.  At that 
meeting, Fleming encouraged delegates to form municipal unions in their own provinces.  
He argued that unions would help municipalities fight affronts to their authority, 
including utility companies.14   The next month, representatives from 22 municipalities in 
British Columbia met and voted to create the Union of British Columbia Municipalities 
(UBCM).  The Vancouver Daily Province reported that municipal unions were formed 
out of the necessity of “securing some means of protection for encroachment … of 
private companies against the rights of the people.”15  Several municipalities in BC had 
begun meeting on an informal basis in 1903, but the organization of UMM spurred the 
                                                
11 Gordon Goldsborough, With One Voice: A History of Municipal Governance in Manitoba (Alton, MB: 
Frisen Printers, 2008), 11. 
12 Ibid.,12-15.  
13 Ibid., 15.  
14 Ibid., 12-13.  
15 Vancouver Daily Province, September 29, 1905.   
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Mayor of Kamloops, Charles Stevens, to spearhead the establishment of a formal 
association.  He organized the September 1905 meeting where UBCM was founded.16 
Representatives of municipalities in Alberta also met in September 1905, 
following Fleming’s call to action at the UCM convention.  The Mayor of Calgary, John 
Emerson, who was also the Vice-President of UCM, organized the inaugural meeting.  
The Union of Alberta Municipalities (UAM) was established two months later.  At a 
UAM convention in March 1906, delegates voted on the association’s chief objectives.17  
They were: 1. Uniformity in assessment law, 2. Protecting municipalities from corporate 
encroachments, 3. Enacting provincial legislation for uniformity in municipalities, and 4. 
“Making arrangements in reference to indigent persons chargeable to municipalities.”18  
UAM did not pass a constitution until 1910, by which time the independent Alberta Local 
Improvement Districts Association (ALIDA) had been founded.19  ALIDA members 
included local improvement districts, rural municipalities, and hamlets.20  The 1906 
UAM convention had been open to all municipalities, but its 1910 constitution specified 
that UAM membership was open to cities, towns, and villages.21  ALIDA represented 
rural local governments.22  
                                                
16 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, UBCM: The First Century, 8.  
17 UAM was renamed the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association in 1966.  
18 Ernie Patterson, AUMA’s First Century: 100 Years That Shaped Alberta (Edmonton: Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association, 2005), 3.  
19 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “About the AAMDC,” www.aamdc.com.  
20 The Granum News, December 08, 1911.  
21 Patterson, 4-5.  
22 Early records of ALIDA have been lost.  It was renamed the Alberta Association of Municipal 
Districts by 1955 and the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties in 1961.  Association of 
Municipal Districts and Counties, 53rd Annual Convention (Edmonton: Alberta Association of Municipal 
Districts and Counties, 1961).  Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, Report of the Proceedings of the 
Sixtieth Annual Convention (Edmonton: Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, 1966).  
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The inaugural meeting of the Union of Saskatchewan Municipalities (USM) was 
held in August 1906, ahead of the UCM annual convention.23  Regina’s Mayor, Peter 
McAra, Jr. organized a meeting of representatives from 12 Saskatchewan cities, towns, 
and villages.  He invited the Mayor of Calgary, John Emerson, to speak about the Union 
of Alberta Municipalities and encourage USM’s formation.  At the meeting, delegates 
voted on resolutions concerning municipal jurisdiction over public utility companies, 
taxation, funding for hospitals, hail insurance, and quarantine enforcement.  The 
Saskatchewan Local Improvement Districts Association (SLIDA) had formed the year 
prior, but its founding purposes are unknown.24  At the founding convention, USM made 
its membership open to all municipalities and advocated for local improvement districts 
to become rural municipalities.  Despite these efforts, USM did not address the division 
between itself and SLIDA directly, and rural-urban tensions still arose in convention 
debates.25  
At the inaugural USM meeting, there was a discussion of town municipalities 
bearing the cost of hospitalization for the residents of rural municipalities.  Delegates at 
the USM convention expressed discontent that their towns and cities had to “take care of 
people from the country who do not contribute towards the support of [hospitals].”26  At 
the same convention, USM passed a resolution asking the provincial government to 
                                                
23 USM was renamed the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association in 1937.  Saskatchewan Urban 
Municipalities Association, Constitution (Regina: Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 1937).  
24 SLIDA’s inaugural convention was held on September 4, 1905, the same week that the province of 
Saskatchewan was founded.  Its formation did not receive coverage in provincial newspapers.  Like 
ALIDA, SLIDA’s early meeting records have been lost.  SLIDA was renamed the Saskatchewan 
Association of Rural Municipalities in 1911.  Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “History,” 
sarm.ca.  
25 The Leader (Regina), August 7, 1906.  The Leader (Regina), August 9, 1906.   
26 Union of Saskatchewan Municipalities, “Discussions at the Inaugural Meeting of the Union of 
Saskatchewan Municipalities,” August 6, 1906, 4-5.  
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mandate a blanketed hail insurance for all cultivated land, citing the negative effect of 
crop failure on town business communities.27  SLIDA formed first, but when cities, 
towns, and villages came together to form USM, they used their new association to 
express rural-urban tensions to the provincial government.  
The first meeting of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) was held 
at the UCM annual convention in August 1906 in Halifax.  Mayor W.M. Black of 
Wolfville put forward a motion that “a Provincial Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities 
be formed.”28  It passed unanimously.  Delegates who supported the motion cited the 
success of municipal unions and municipal ownership of “telephones, street railways, 
water works and electric lighting” in other provinces.29  They passed a proposed 
constitution “similar to that which has been adopted by other Provincial Unions.”30  The 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities (UNBM) was founded in 1906/07, but records 
of its proceedings are not available until 1912.31  Seven associations had formed in two 
years.  ALIDA followed in 1909, but it was a longer period of time before there was a 
municipal association in every province.  
The Province of Quebec established a Ministry of Municipal Affairs in 1918.  
Municipalities formed the l‘Union des municipalités du Québec (UMQ) the following 
year.  UMQ attributes its formation to the end of the First World War, urban reform, and 
                                                
27 Ibid., 15.  
28 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, Proceedings of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities 1906, 
1907, 1908, 1909 (Halifax: Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1909), 4.  
29 Ibid. 4.  
30 Ibid., 5-6.  
31 Later records of UNBM conventions have conflicting reports of what year UNBM first met.  Some 
records indicate that its inaugural meeting was held in 1906, while others report 1907.  
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industrialization in Quebec.32  The inaugural meeting of the Newfoundland Federation of 
Municipalities (NFM) was held in 1951, just two years after Newfoundland joined 
Confederation.  The founding purpose of the NFM was to “increase efficiency and raise 
the standard of municipal administration throughout the Province.”33  At that meeting, 
delegates from 19 municipalities passed a constitution and voted on resolutions 
concerning the cost of road construction, traffic regulations, vehicle registration, 
firefighting, and town planning acts.  The last province to establish a municipal 
association was Prince Edward Island.  The Federation of Prince Edward Island 
Municipalities (FPEIM) was founded in 1957, with the objectives of “the guidance and 
improvement of legislation upon municipal issues, united action on matters of municipal 
concern, and the fostering of a fraternal spirit among members.”34  Delegates who 
supported the formation of a municipal union on Prince Edward Island cited the 
accomplishments of the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities (CFMM). 
Between 1899 and 1909, one national and nine provincial municipal associations 
were founded in Canada. There are two common themes in the formation of these 
associations: the perceived need for collective action in contesting utility companies and 
the sharing of information between associations as they organized.  The Union of 
Canadian Municipalities brought together municipalities from across the country and 
spurred the development of provincial level associations.  UCM’s founding concerns 
about municipal jurisdiction over railways and telegraph, telephone, and electric power 
                                                
32 Union des Municipalités du Québec, “Mission et historique,” www.umq.qc.ca.  
33 Newfoundland Federation of Municipalities, Report of the Proceedings of the First Convention (St. 
John’s: Newfoundland Federation of Municipalities, 1951), 6.  
34 Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, “A Brief History of FPEIM,” www.fpeim.ca.  
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lines were reflected in the early organizing of at the provincial level.  There was a rapid 
diffusion of provincial unions.   
At the 1905 UCM convention, John Fleming used the formation of UMM to rally 
municipalities in other provinces to establish their own municipal unions.  Six 
associations formed in the following two years.  Associations also shared information as 
they formed.  Municipal representatives in British Columbia and Alberta answered 
Fleming’s call to action within a month.  USM invited a representative of UAM to its 
inaugural meeting.  UNSM drew on the constitutions of other associations when drafting 
its own.  Municipal leagues were first established in the United States, but they spread 
quickly in Canada.  The expansion of public utilities created new problems for 
municipalities, problems they felt would best be addressed through collective action.  
UCM and provincial unions were founded in response to the encroachment of utility 
companies on municipal authorities, but their constitutions encourage cooperation on 
other areas of joint concern.  
In short, by 1919 unified association were founded in six provinces (Nova Scotia, 
New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia).  These were 
intended to represent all municipalities within a province.  Separate rural and urban 
associations were founded in two provinces (Saskatchewan and Alberta).  Unified 
associations later formed in Newfoundland and Labrador (1951) and Prince Edward 
Island (1957) (Table 3-2).    
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Table 3-2. Original Municipal Associations in Each Province 
Founding Name Founding Year Type  
Ontario Municipal Association (OMA) 1899 Unified 
Union of Manitoba Municipalities (UMM) 1905 Unified 
Saskatchewan Local Improvement Districts Association 
(SLIDA) 
1905 Rural 
Union of Alberta Municipalities (UAM) 1905 Urban 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) 1905 Unified 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) 1906 Unified 
Union of Saskatchewan Municipalities (USM) 1906 Urban 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities (UNBM) 1906/07 Urban 
Alberta Local Improvement Districts Association (ALIDA) 1909 Rural 
Union des Municipalités du Québec (UMQ) 1919 Unified 
Newfoundland Federation of Municipalities (NFM) 1951 Unified 
Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities (FPEIM) 1957 Unified 
 
 
During the twentieth century, the number and type of associations formed by 
municipalities became larger and more complex.  
 
3.3 Current Municipal Associations in Canada  
 
At present, there are six provinces with unified associations (Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, Manitoba, and British Columbia) 
and three provinces with separate rural and urban associations (Quebec, Saskatchewan, 
and Alberta).  New Brunswick has distinct anglophone and francophone associations, and 
an association for cities.35  Saskatchewan has associations for its northern and resort 
communities, and Manitoba has an association for bilingual municipalities (Table 3-3) 
                                                
35 AFMNB’s membership is open to francophone and bilingual municipalities.   The Constitution of 
UMNB states that the association is bilingual and that every municipality in the province is eligible for 
membership.  Despite this assertion, UMNB does not designate any board representation for Zone 8 in the 
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Table 3-3. Provincial-Level Municipal Associations (2015) 
Name Founded Type 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) 1905 Rural 
Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) 1905 Urban 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) 1905 Unified 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) 1906 Unified 
Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) 1906 Urban  
Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties 
(AAMDC) 
1909 Rural 
Union des municipalités du Québec (UMQ) 1919 Primarily 
Urban  
Fédération québécoise des municipalités (FQM) 1944 Outside 
Major Cities 
Cities of New Brunswick Association-Association Cités du 
Nouveau-Brunswick (CNBA-ACNB) 
1949 Section 
Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL) 1951 Unified 
Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities (FPEIM) 1957 Unified 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) 1972 Unified 
Provincial Association of Resort Communities of 
Saskatchewan (PARCS) 
1986 Section 
Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-
Brunswick (AFMNB) 
1989 Linguistic 
Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick (UMNB) 1995 Linguistic 
Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba 
(AMBM) 
1995 Section 
The New North – SANC Services Inc. (Saskatchewan 
Association of Northern Communities) (SANC) 
1996 Section 
Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM) 1999 Unified 
 
The types of municipal associations have become more complicated since the original 
unified, rural, and urban associations were established.  In the discussion, the term 
                                                                                                                                            
 
province, which is entirely francophone.  UMNB has six bilingual and no francophone members. AFMNB 
makes UMNB an anglophone association by default.  
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“section associations” is used to denote associations that represent a particular type of 
municipality within a province, but are not the largest municipal association available for 
these municipalities to join.36  In Alberta and Saskatchewan, where there are split rural 
and urban associations, these are the broadest, largest provincial level association 
available to either rural or urban municipalities.  In New Brunswick, the anglophone and 
francophone associations are the largest organizations. These rural/urban and linguistic 
associations, along with unified associations in other provinces, are the primary 
associations for their members and are referred to as “primary associations.”   
Section associations represent more niche memberships.  The four section 
municipal associations in Canada are the Cities of New Brunswick Association – 
Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick (CNBA-ACNB), the Provincial 
Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS), The New North – 
Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities (SANC), and L'Association des 
municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM).   All of their members are eligible to join 
a larger municipal association, but the section and the primary associations do not have 
formal, legal relationships with each other.37  These legal types chose to break away from 
                                                
36 Section associations are not included in the subsequent analysis.  Because they represent narrow 
memberships, they do not have to deal with internal divisions to the same extent as other associations.  
37 Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Members,” 
www.cnba-acnb.ca. Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Municipalités 
membres” www.afmnb.org.  Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick, “Zone Listings,” www.umnb.ca.  
Lynne Saas, Coordinator of Member Services, PARCS, Email to the Author, October 30, 2014.  New North 
– Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities, “Communities,” www.newnorthsask.org.  
Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, “SUMA Members,” www.suma.org.  Association des 
municipalités bilingues du Manitoba, “Nos municipalités,” directionmanitoba.com.  Association of 
Manitoba Municipalities, 2013 Annual Report, (Portage la Prairie: Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 
2013), 5.  The one exception to this is is SANC-SUMA.  SANC is a member of SUMA – which gives its 
executive the right to attend SUMA conventions – but SANC members must join SUMA individually.  
They do not automatically receive SUMA benefits through their membership in SANC.  
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primary associations in order to voice their needs independently within the provincial 
political sphere.   
 In summary, the types of municipal associations in Canada are: 
Primary:  The broadest, largest provincial association available for a 
municipality to join.  All municipalities in a province can be eligible for 
membership in a primary association, or a primary association’s 
membership can restricted on a rural/urban or linguistic basis.  An 
association is primary when there is no larger association that its members 
are eligible to join.   
 
Examples: The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities is a primary 
association because it is the only municipal association in Nova 
Scotia.   
 
Members of Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities 
(SARM) are not eligible for membership in the Saskatchewan 
Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA), and vice-versa.  They 
are the largest municipal association for their eligible members.  
SARM and SUMA are both primary associations.  
 
Section:  The association represents a particular type of municipality 
within a province, but is not the largest municipal association available for 
its members to join.   
 
Example: Provincial Association of Resort Communities of 
Saskatchewan (PARCS).  All resort communities are eligible for 
membership in the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities 
Association (SUMA).  
 
Example’s self-description: “PARCS is the independent 
association that supports and represents the interests of cottage 
communities in Saskatchewan.”38 
 
The categories of primary associations in Canada are:  
Unified: The only primary association in a province.  All municipalities 
are eligible for membership.   
 
Example:  The Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM). 
 
                                                
38 Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan, “Home,” www.skparcs.com.  
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 “The AMM helps our rural and urban municipal governments with 
one voice.”39 
 
 
Split:  A primary association whose membership is drawn from only a 
portion of municipalities in the province.  Another split association 
represents the other municipalities in the province.  
 
Example: Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities.  
 
“The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities is the 
independent association that represents rural municipal 
government in Saskatchewan and is the principal advocate in 
representing them before senior levels of governments.”40 
 
The types of split associations are:  
 
Rural: The association’s membership is limited to rural municipalities, 
defined either by the province’s Municipal Act or the association’s 
constitution.  
 
Example: Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and 
Counties.   
 
“The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties is an 
independent association comprising Alberta’s 69 counties and 
municipal districts.  Since 1909, we have helped rural 
municipalities achieve strong, effective local government.”41 
 
Urban: The association’s membership is limited to urban municipalities, 
defined either by the province’s Municipal Act or the association’s 
constitution.  
 
Example: Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association.   
 
“SUMA is the unified, respected, and influential voice of urban 
municipalities promoting effective governance and progressive 
public policies that improve the quality of urban life.”42  
 
                                                
39 Association of Manitoba Municipalities, “About,” www.amm.mb.ca.  
40 Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “About,” sarm.ca. 
41 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “About AAMDC.” 
42 Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, “SUMA’s Mission, Vision, and Values,” 
www.suma.org.  
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Linguistic: The association’s membership is limited to either 
francophone/bilingual municipalities or anglophone/bilingual 
municipalities.  All municipalities that meet its linguistic requirement are 
eligible for membership.  For primary linguistic associations, there is not a 
larger association that is open to both anglophone and francophone 
municipalities.  
 
Example: Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-
Brunswick (AFMNB). 
 
“Agir comme porte-parole des municipalités francophones et 
mixtes sur les dossiers d'intérêt commun.”43 
 
In short (3-1): 
 
Figure 3-1. Types of Municipal Association Memberships 
 
 
 
                                                
43 Association Francophone des Municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Mission et mandat,” 
www.afmnb.org.  
Association 
Primary 
Unified Split 
Urban Rural Linguistic 
Section 
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The division between municipal associations in Quebec is less straightforward than in 
other provinces.  La fédération québécoise des municipalités was founded in 1944 for 
municipalities “outside major cities.”  This made l’Union des municipalités du Québec, 
founded in 1919, primarily urban.  Despite this distinction, both associations position 
themselves as a voice for rural and urban municipalities in Quebec.  UMQ states that it 
represents municipalities of all sizes and in all regions of Quebec.44  FQM describes itself 
as “interlocuteur incontournable des municipalités et des régions du Québec.”45  Neither 
UMQ nor FQM make their membership lists publically available, but they must have an 
overlap in membership.  There are 1,111 municipalities in Quebec.  FQM states that it 
has approximately 1,000 members and UMQ has over 300.  The two associations lack 
clear divisions and are in competition for members.  
 Finally, two associations (AMO and UBCM) have internal groups, called sub-
associations.  Sub-associations have their own staffs and annual conventions, but are part 
of a larger association.  They are organized along legal type, regional, mayoral/warden, 
and/or linguistic lines.  Unlike section associations, they are not independent.  
Municipalities automatically become members of a sub-association when they join its 
primary association.  
 In addition to the growing number of section associations, the number of 
linguistic associations in Canada has also expanded in recent decades.  FQM split from 
UQM in 1944, but francophone or bilingual associations formed in New Brunswick 
(AFMNB, primary), Ontario (AFMO, sub-association), and Manitoba (AMBM, section) 
                                                
44 Union des municipalités du Québec, “À propos,” www.umq.qc.ca.  
45 Fédération québécoise des municipalités, “fédération Québécoise des municipalités,” fqm.ca.  
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between 1989 and 1995.46  AFMNB makes New Brunswick’s other primary association, 
UMNB, anglophone by default.  
Patterns of municipal association mergers and splits are discussed at length in 
Chapter Four and Appendix D, but the majority of provinces have had stable associations 
over time.  In four provinces, there has been one association that has remained unified 
since its formation (Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, 
and British Columbia).  In Saskatchewan and Alberta, the founding urban and rural 
associations have remained split over time.  New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and 
Manitoba all started with one unified association, but have undergone changes in the 
number and type of associations formed by their municipalities. 
With the exception of CNBA-ACNB, section associations have formed in recent 
decades.  Manitoba’s association for bilingual municipalities (AMBM) was started in 
1989.   Saskatchewan’s association for resort communities (PARCS) began as a working 
group under SUMA in 1983, but became an independent sectional association in 1986.  
The association for northern communities in Saskatchewan (SANC) was formed in 1996.  
At present, there are 18 independent, provincial level municipal associations in Canada.47  
 
3.4 The Non-Partisan Status of Associations and their Staff  
 
A feature of all 18 provincial level municipal associations is their status as non-partisan, 
not-for-profit organizations.  Their non-partisanship is informed by the absence of 
                                                
46 Sub-associations are organizations of municipalities within a larger association’s governing structure.  
Unlike section associations, they are part of another municipal association, rather than independent.  They 
are discussed at greater length later in the chapter.  
47 There are also municipal associations in two territories, the NWT Association of Communities 
(NWTAC) and the Association of Yukon Communities.  Because of legal differences between territorial 
communities and provincial municipalities, they are not considered in this dissertation.  
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partisan affiliation at the local government level in most provinces, formalized in their 
constitutions and governing documents, and reinforced through the work of association 
staff.  Although elected municipal officials in eight provinces do not have formal partisan 
affiliations, association staff members offer a neutral face to counter any informal 
partisan networks that exist among associations’ elected leaders.   
The Executive Director or Chief Executive Officer of an association plays a key 
role in maintaining a non-partisan stance, as provincial governments and association 
board members change.  Executive Directors often have long tenures in their position, 
and can exercise a degree of autonomy in their role.  The autonomy of Executive 
Directors to pursue the issue priorities voted on by members and the non-partisan status 
of associations both work to quell internal frictions among association members.  These 
features also contribute to associations’ success in attracting and retaining municipalities 
as members. 
 
3.5 Membership Uptake Amongst Municipalities 
 
Associations focused their early activity on persuading all municipalities to become 
members.  These efforts have been largely successful (Table 3-4).48  In every province 
the municipal association, or associations, collectively represent the majority of 
municipalities.  The lowest percentage is found in Prince Edward Island (55.6%), but in 
twelve of the thirteen associations where membership lists are available, the association 
                                                
48 Table 3-4 reflects the member populations of Manitoba before its large-scale set of municipal 
amalgamations that went into effect on January 1, 2015.  The amalgamations that reduced the number of 
municipalities from 197 to 137, but the most recent Census data gives municipal populations for the 197 
pre-amalgamation municipalities.  The Association of Manitoba Municipalities maintained full municipal 
association both before and after the amalgamations.  
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represents more than 90% of eligible members.  In three provinces (Nova Scotia, 
Manitoba, and British Columbia), the unified provincial association represents every 
municipality.  There are municipalities that do not belong to an association in the seven 
other provinces, but associations could have a more a severe free-rider problem.  All 
associations represent the majority of their province’s population, either individually or 
together with their urban, rural, or linguistic counterpart.  The lowest percentages are 
found in Ontario (78.1%) and PEI (87.0%), but in seven of ten provinces, municipal 
associations account for more than 99% of the provincial population living within 
municipalities.49  This is a source of collective strength and legitimacy in their 
representation of municipal interests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49 The associations in Quebec, la Fédération québécoise des municipalités (FQM) and l’Union des 
municipalités du Québec, are excluded because they do not make their membership lists public. 
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Table 3-4. Membership Uptake Amongst Municipalities (2013) 
Association Members / Municipalities 
Eligible for Membership 
(% members) 
Population of Members / 
Population of Municipalities 
Eligible for Membership 
(% population) 
MNL 275 / 281 
(97.9) 
457,021 / 459,763 
(99.4) 
UNSM 54 / 54 
(100) 
915,138 / 915,138 
(100) 
FPEIM 40 / 72 
(55.6) 
82,558 / 94,854 
(87.0) 
AFMNB 52 / 52 
(100) 
284,891 / 284,891 
(100) 
UMNB 59 / 65 
(90.8) 
221,705 / 382,038 
(58.0) 
AMO 412 / 444 
(92.8) 
9,991,963 / 12,764,756 
(78.3) 
AMM 197 / 197 
(100) 
1,135,956 / 1,135,956 
(100) 
SARM 296 / 296 
(100) 
174,585 / 174,585 
(100) 
SUMA 450 / 495 
(90.9) 
799,046 / 803,104 
(99.5) 
AAMDC 69 / 70 
(98.6) 
636,076 / 640,127 
(99.4) 
AUMA 274 / 274 
(100) 
3,133,274 / 3,133,274 
(100) 
UBCM 191 / 191 
(100) 
4,400,056 / 4,400,056 
(100) 
Note: Entries based on 2013 membership lists and 2011 Census data. 
 
 
The municipalities that are not members indicate that the dispersion of member 
populations complicates the ability of associations to represent diverse member needs.  In 
MNL, FPEIM, and SUMA, non-members are amongst the smallest villages and 
communities in each province.  All towns and cities are members.  This is also true for all 
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but one non-member in AMO.  The City of Toronto, which left AMO in 2004, represents 
the other challenge in membership uptake: maintaining large population outliers as 
members.  In New Brunswick, only two of eight cities belong to UMNB.   Associations 
represent diverse member populations and face difficulties in maintaining population 
extremes as members, in part due to the financial cost of membership.  In very small 
municipalities, financially limited councils must always question whether membership is 
worth the price.  In a very large municipality, like Toronto, there may not be any services 
that an association can provide more cheaply than the city can provide itself.  Despite the 
issues with population extremes, associations are largely successful in attracting and 
maintaining municipalities as members.  They are examples of voluntary inter-municipal 
cooperation and their high levels of membership uptake indicate that the benefits they 
offer outweigh the cost of membership for nearly all municipalities.  
These calculations do not account for First Nations or those living in 
unincorporated areas.  New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island have the most 
significant populations living in unincorporated areas, 35.5 percent and 32.0 percent, 
respectively.50  In British Columbia, the Union of British Columbia Municipalities has 
begun to allow First Nations to become members.  As of May 2015, six of the province’s 
203 First Nations had joined the association.51  In Manitoba, First Nations can be 
associate members of AMM.  As of 2015, no First Nations are associate members, but 
AMM, the Treaty Relations Commission of Manitoba, and the Treaty Land Committee of 
                                                
50 Government of Prince Edward Island: Department of Finance, Energy, and Municipal Affairs, 
“Municipal Affairs and Provincial Planning,” www.gov.pe.ca.  Government of New Brunswick, “Where 
We Are Today: A Portrait of New Brunswick’s Local Government Structures,” www.gnb.ca.  
51 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “First Nations Members,” www.ubcm.ca. 
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Manitoba have signed a partnership agreement.  This agreement establishes regular 
meetings between the three groups.52 
 
3.6 Membership Fee Structures 
 
With one exception, all municipalities pay membership fees to belong to an association.53  
Numerous associations do not make the cost of membership publically available.  Where 
fees are available, there is a mix of fee structures determined by population size, tax base, 
and provincial assessment (Table 3-5).  
 
Table 3-5. Municipal Association Membership Fees (2014) 
MNL 
Population Per Capita Membership Fee ($280 Minimum) 
First 5,000 $1.01 
Next 5,000 $0.67 
Over 10,000 $0.34 
Note: Entries based on Craig Pollett, CEO, Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, 
Email to the Author, June 10, 2015.  
 
 
 
UNSM 
 
1. All units with the exception of those units paying the capped membership fee pay 
a base fee of $1000; and 
2. A combination of the unit’s population and assessment be used to calculate the 
remaining dues based on 85% population and 15% assessment; and  
3. A capped fee is annually established by the Board. 
Note: Entries based on Judy A. Webber, Event Planner/Financial Officer, UNSM, Email 
to the Author, June 16, 2015. 
                                                
52 Association of Manitoba Municipalities, “We all Work Together: Municipalities and First Nations Join 
Forces to Streamline Treaty Land Entitlement Process,” March 17, 2015, www.amm.mb.ca.  
53 The one exception is SANC, which receives a grant for operating through the provincial Northern 
Municipal Trust Account.  Matt Heley, Research and Communications, New North, Email to the Author, 
October 31, 2014.  
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FPEIM 
Population Per Capita Membership Fee ($400 Minimum) 
Up to 5,000 $1.75 
Next 5,000 $1.6275 
Next 5,000 $1.505 
Next 5,000 $1.3825 
Next 5,000 $1.26 
Next 5,000 $1.1375 
Next 5,000 $1.015 
Note: Entries based on Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, “Membership 
Fee Structure,” www.fpeim.ca. 
 
 
 
AFMNB – Based on the Tax Base of Municipalities 
Rate Category Tax Base Maximum Amount 
0.005% 0 -­‐ 54,999,999 2,200 
0.004% 55,000,000 -­‐ 99,999,999 3,500 
0.0035% 100,000,000 -­‐ 199,999,999 5,000 
0.0025% 200,000,000 -­‐ 399,999,999 6,000 
0.0015% 400,000,000 -­‐ 749,999,999 6,750 
0.0009% 750 million and + 8,000 
Note: Entries based on Mathieu Voyer, Responsible de la recherché et des politiques, 
AFMNB, Email to the Author, October 2, 2014.  
 
 
 
UMQ 
Population Membership Fee 
1-300 $71 
301-500 $96 
501-700 $172 
701-900 $344 
901 and more $0.510 per capita 
Note: Entries based on Union des municipalités du Québec, “Devenez membre,” 
www.umq.qc.ca. 
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AMO (2015) 
Lower/Single Tier Municipalities 
Households Flat Fee of Plus 
1-300 $575 - 
301-1,000 $575  0.9586 per household above 300 
1,001-4,000 $1,245 0.5933 per household above 1,000 
4,001-20,000 $3,025 0.4709 per household above 4,000 
Over 20,000 $10,560 0.0931 per household above 20,000 
 
 
Upper Tier Municipalities 
Households Flat Fee of Plus 
1-30,00 - 0.2336 per household up to 30,000 
Over 30,000 $575  0.0183 per household above 30,000 
 
 
Separated Municipalities 
Households Flat Fee of Plus 
1-300 $575 - 
301-1,000 $575  0.9586 per household above 300 
1,001-4,000 $1,245 0.5933 per household above 1,000 
4,001-20,000 $3,025 0.4709 per household above 4,000 
Over 20,000 $10,560 0.0931 per household above 20,000 
Note: Entries based on Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “How 2015 Membership 
Fees are Calculated,” www.amo.ca.  
 
 
 
SUMA 
Base per voting delegate $508.03, plus: 
Population Per Capita Fee 
< 100,000 $0.55 
> 100,00 $0.275 (50% the per capita rate of < 100,000) 
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SUMA – Number of Voting Delegates Per Municipality 
Municipal Population Maximum Number of Voting Delegates 
1-500 1 
501-2,000 2 
2,001-5,000 4 
5,001-10,000 6 
10,001-50,00 7 
50,001-100,000 10 
Greater than 100,000 11 
Note: Entries based on Lindsay Peel, Manager, Financial Services, SUMA, Email to the 
Author, November 12, 2014.  
 
 
 
AUMA 
Population Per Capita Membership Fee ($560 Base Fee) 
0-3,5000 $0.7610 
3,501-10,000 $0.8353 
10,001-20,000 $0.6312 
20,001-30,000 $0.3908 
30,001-600,000 $0.2598 
600,000+ $0.1300 
Note: Entries based on Dan Rude, Chief Financial Officer, AUMA, Email to the Author, 
June 18, 2015.  
 
 
Associations with Flat Fees and Formulas 
Association Fee / Formula 
SARM $500 per municipality. 
AAMDC $2,600 + $5.95 per million and $0.58 above 
$2 billion (based on provincial equalized 
assessment).  
Note: Entries based on SARM 2014 Annual Convention Report and Julie Thibeault, 
Financial Analyst, AAMDC, Email to the Author, September 25, 2014.  
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In summary: 
 
 
Table 3-6. Summary of Associational Membership Fees (2014) 
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MNL X X       
UNSM X  X  X X  HRM calculated 
separately 
FPEIM X X       
AFMNB    X  X X  
UMQ X  X      
AMO X X      Per household; 
regressive within 
legal types 
AMM X  X   X   
SARM       X  
SUMA X X       
AAMDC       X  
AUMA X X       
Note: AMM entry based on Joe Masi, CEO, AMM, Phone Call with the Author, June 10, 
2015.  
 
 
In five associations, the per capita cost of membership decreases as population 
size increases.  More populous municipalities pay higher membership fees, but the 
regressive rates ease the cost of membership for them.  Regressive fee structures allow 
associations to address the wide dispersion of member populations.  Large municipalities 
pay a higher membership fee than smaller units, but they do not bear the majority cost of 
membership.  This structure is used in provinces with large population outliers – St. 
John’s in MNL, Charlottetown in FPEIM, Saskatoon and Regina in SUMA, and Calgary 
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and Edmonton in AUMA.   It is also used in AMO.  AMM and USNM use progressive 
fee structures, but cap the cost of membership for Winnipeg and the Halifax Regional 
Municipalities, respectively.  SARM and AAMDC – both rural associations – have either 
a flat fee or flat formula.  In SARM, all municipalities pay an annual membership fee of 
$500.  AAMDC’s membership fees are calculated by provincial equalized assessment.   
Associations use different fee formulas to address the variations the range of member 
populations.  Other organizational structures are also used to represent internal divisions 
and factions. 
 
3.7 Board of Directors Structures  
 
 One structure that is used to represent different member segments is the board of 
directors.  All municipal associations in Canada have a board of directors composed of 
elected officials from member municipalities.54  Despite this commonality, the size and 
composition of boards varies considerably between associations (Table 3-7).  
                                                
54 Both section and primary associations have boards of directors, but only primary associations are 
compared.  Section associations represent only one legal type or region, so their composition of the boards 
of directors are more straightforward. In AMBM, the Board is comprised of one representative from each 
the seventeen member municipalities.  In CNBA-ACNB, the mayor and deputy mayor from each of the 
eight member cities makes up the board.  PARCS’s board is composed of three at-large members and one 
member from each of its four regions (northwest, southwest, northeast, and southeast).   SANC has a board 
with five members representing its four regions (far north, west, east, and central) plus a member at large.  
Its board of directors Executive has five at large members. Association des municipalités bilingues du 
Manitoba, “Conseil d’administration,” directionmanitoba.com. Cities of New Brunswick Association – 
Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick,“Board of Directors,” www.cnba-acnb.ca. New North – 
Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities, “Board Representation,” www.newnorthsask.ca. 
Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan, “2014 Board of Directors,” 
www.skparcs.com.  There are three exceptions to elected officials as board members.  UNSM and AMM 
have a representative from the province’s association of municipal administrators on their board, and 
AFMNB’s board includes the association’s staff CEO.  Association francophone des municipalités du 
Nouveau-Brunswick, “Conseil d’administration,” www.afmnb.org. Association of Manitoba 
Municipalities, “Executive and Board of Directors,” www.amm.mb.ca. Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities, “UNSM By-Laws,” unsm.ca. 
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Table 3-7. Representation on Associations’ Boards of Directors (2014) 
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MNL 11 2 7 2 0 0 Primarily 
Regional 
Legal type 
representatives: urban 
towns, small towns 
UNSM 13 3 0 9 0 1 Legal type Association of Municipal 
Administrators has a 
representative on the 
Board. Legal types are: 
regional, towns, rural. 
FPEIM 19 2 0 2 15 0 Nested Each county (Kings, 
Queens, Prince) has three 
cities/towns 
representatives and two 
communities 
representatives. 
AFMNB 10 3 5 1 0 1 Primarily 
Regional 
One cities representative. 
CEO of association sits on 
the Board. 
UMNB 16 0 16 * 0 0 Primarily 
Regional 
2 delegates are elected 
from the 8 provincial 
zones represented in 
UMNB. *Between 1 and 7 
delegates must be from 
cities that also belong to 
the Cities Association of 
New Brunswick. 
FQM 44 3 39 2 0 0 Primarily 
Regional 
Type representatives are 
bilingual municipalities 
and municipalities with a 
population > 10,000 
UMQ 43 0 26 10 7 0 Primarily 
Regional 
7 board members are 
cross-appointed as 
regional and legal type 
representatives. 
AMO 40 2 6 32 0 0 Primarily 
Legal type 
Regional reps. are from 
the Northern Caucus. 
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AMM 17 1 3 2 14 1 Nested Each of the 6 regions has 
1 rural director and 1 
urban director.  Northern 
region has 2 directors. The 
City of Winnipeg has 1 
director.  Municipal 
Administrators’ 
Association has 1 
representative. 
SARM 9 3 6 0 0 0 Regional  
SUMA 17 1 8 8 0 0 Equal The 3 VPs are based on 
Cities, Towns, and 
Villages and Resort 
Villages.  There is an 
Executive Member for 
Saskatoon/Regina and 4 
Cities Representatives. 
AAMDC 7 2 5 0 0 0 Regional  
AUMA 20 1 2 11 6 0 Primarily 
Legal type 
Regional representation is 
nested: South, West, and 
East each have 1 Villages 
and 1 Towns 
representative. Calgary 
and Edmonton each have 
their own VP. 
UBCM 21 9 10 2 0 0 Primarily 
Regional 
Regional representation is 
1 member from each area 
association, plus 
representation from 
Vancouver (1 director), 
Metro/Greater Vancouver 
Regional District (2), and 
Vancouver Metro Area 
Representative (2). 
Note: Entries based on associations’ 2014 Annual Reports or websites. 
 
The number of board members ranges from 7 in AAMDC to 44 in FQM.  The mean is 
20.5 and the median is 17.  Positions on Boards of Directors are used to represent 
different groups and factions within an association’s membership.  They recognize and 
give voice to different factions of municipalities.  The two predominant criteria for 
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representation are regional and legal type.  In no association are the majority of directors 
elected at large.  All associations except UMNB elect some at large members, but they 
are a small fraction of the total board.  Most are presidents, vice presidents, and past-
presidents.  In UBCM, 9 of 21 directors are elected at large.  The other 12 associations 
elect between 1 and 3 at large members.   
 Amongst the 14 primary municipal associations, 10 allocate their board positions 
using a combination of regional and legal type representatives.  However, regional is the 
predominant type of representation.  In six of the associations (MNL, AFMNB, UMNB, 
FQM, UMQ, and UBCM) that use both regional and legal type representation, the 
majority of representatives are regionally based.  Two associations (SARM and 
AAMDC) only use at large and regional representation.  SARM only has one legal type, 
rural municipalities, and 65 of AAMDC’s 69 members are municipal districts.55  Their 
memberships do not contain a range of legal types. 
 Two associations (FPEIM and AMM) incorporate both regional and legal type 
representation by nesting director qualifications.  In FPEIM, each county is designated 
three cities/towns representatives and two communities representatives.  AMM’s six 
regions each have one rural director and one urban director.  The Northern region is also 
given two representatives on the board and one is delegated to the City of Winnipeg.   On 
SUMA’s Board of Directors, there are an equal number of regional and legal type 
representatives.   
 Only three associations – UNSM, AMO, and AUMA – have more directors 
representing legal types than regions on their board.  In addition to three at-large 
                                                
55 The other four are special municipalities, which incorporate rural and urban areas.  
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members, UNSM’s three caucuses – regional, towns, and rural municipalities – each have 
three board representatives.   It has no representation of regions within the province on its 
board.  AMO and AUMA do have both regional and legal type representation on the 
board, but the distribution of regional to legal type directors are 6 to 32 and 2 to 11, 
respectively.  AUMA also has six nested seats on its board.  Municipal associations use 
their boards to represent different constituencies and factions within their membership.  
Although 11 of 14 associations incorporate both regional and legal type divisions, 
regional representation is the predominant criterion for board positions.  Only three 
associations designate the majority of their board seats by legal type, compared to eight 
associations that delegate most seats by region.   
In general, associations designate more board seats for regional representation 
than the representation of different legal types for boards of directors.  Most provinces 
have more regions than legal types.  The majority of Municipal Acts set out five or fewer 
legal types, whereas most associations divide themselves into six or more geographic 
areas.   These differences affect the balance of board representation between regions and 
legal types, but most associations ensure that they include representation for both 
regional and legal type cleavages.      
 
3.8 Caucuses, Sub-Associations, and District Meetings 
 
In addition to regional and legal type representation on boards of directors, a number of 
associations have caucuses and sub-associations organized along these lines.  Unlike the 
predominance of regional representation on their boards, the majority of caucuses are 
organized by legal type (Table 3-8).   
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Table 3-8. Municipal Association Caucuses (2014) 
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UNSM 3 0 0 Legal Type Regional, towns, rural.  
FPEIM 2 0 0 Legal Type Cities/towns, communities. 
UMQ 4 1 1 Primarily 
Legal Type 
Municipalités locales, municipalités 
de centralité, cités régionales, grande 
villes, municipalités de la Métropole. 
AMO 5 1 0 Primarily 
Legal Type 
Large urban, northern, regional and 
single tier, rural, small urban, county. 
AMM 1 0 0 Legal Type / 
Mayors 
City Mayors 
SUMA 1 0 0 Legal Type / 
Mayors 
City Mayors 
AUMA 3 0 0 Legal Type  / 
Mayors 
Mayor’s caucuses: populations under 
2,500, populations from 2,501 to 
10,000, populations greater than 
10,000. 
UBCM 0 0 1 Mayors Mayors. 
Note: Entries based on associations’ 2014 Annual Reports or websites.  
 
 
Caucuses are found in 8 of 14 primary associations.  In four associations (UNSM, 
FPEIM, UMQ, AMO), the caucuses are open to all elected officials within the specified 
legal type or region.  In the other four associations (AMM, SUMA, AUMA, and UBCM), 
caucuses are only for mayors.  AMM and SUMA each have one caucus for city mayors, 
and AUMA has three caucuses for mayors from small, medium, and large municipalities.  
UBCM’s one caucus is open to mayors from all municipalities.  
 In addition to caucuses, AMO and UBCM have more formalized sub-associations 
that pass resolutions at their own annual conventions.  In AMO, the resolutions passed by 
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sub-associations are forwarded to the board of directors for their consideration in setting 
lobbying priorities.  UBCM has “area associations” that pass resolutions.  The resolutions 
passed by these associations are forwarded to the annual UBCM convention to be voted 
on by the full, general membership.  AMM passes resolutions at the district level, but 
unlike AMO and UBCM, its districts do not have their own staffs.  AMM staff and 
executives organize and facilitate the district meetings where resolutions are voted on 
before being forwarded to the general membership.  
AMO’s sub-associations are organized along legal type, regional, 
mayoral/warden, and linguistic lines (Table 3-9).  They reflect the extensive complexity 
in AMO’s large membership. 
 
Table 3-9. Sub-Associations in the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (2015) 
Name Type 
Association francaise des municipalités de l’Ontario (AFMO) Linguistic 
Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association (NOMA)56 Regional 
Federation of Northern Ontario Municipalities (FONOM) Regional 
Eastern Ontario Wardens Group Regional / Wardens 
Western Ontario Wardens Group Regional / Wardens 
Large Urban Mayors Caucus Ontario (LUMCO) Legal Type / Mayors 
Regional Chairs Group Legal Type / Chairs 
Rural Ontario Municipal Association (ROMA) Legal Type 
Organization of Small Urban Municipalities (OSUM) Legal Type 
Note: Entries based on Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “AMO Board & 
Executive Committee Structure,” www.amo.on.ca. 
 
                                                
56 The Northwestern Ontario Municipal Association (NOMA) is composed of three of its own sub-
associations: the Thunder Bay District Municipal League, the Rainy River District Municipal Association, 
and the Kenora District Municipal Association.   These associations meet independently and then 
collectively as NOMA.  They are represented as NOMA in AMO’s Board of Directors.  Northwestern 
Ontario Municipal Association, “About NOMA,” www.noma.on.ca.  
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UBCM has five area associations, organized along regional lines (Table 3-10). 
 
Table 3-10. Area Associations in the Union of British Columbia Municipalities 
(2015) 
Name Type 
Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments Regional 
Association of Vancouver Island and Coastal Communities Regional 
Lower Mainland Local Government Association Regional 
North Central Local Government Association Regional 
Southern Interior Local Government Associations Regional 
Note: Entries based on Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “BC Area 
Associations,” www.ubcm.ca.  
 
 
Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador does not have formal caucuses, but its 
governing structure does include an Urban Municipalities Committee and an Ad Hoc 
Rural Secretariat.  Five associations (AFMNB, UMNB, FQM, SARM, and AAMDC) do 
not have caucuses or sub-associations.  
 Caucuses are organized predominantly by legal type, but 9 of the 14 primary 
associations also hold annual meetings that are organized for regions of the province.  In 
UBCM, regional divisions are the area associations.  In other associations, yearly 
meetings are held in the different regions in the province.  Different associations use the 
names regional, zone, district, and division meetings (3-11).   The number of divisions 
within each province ranges from four in AUMA to eight in UMNB.  The mean and 
median are both six. 
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Table 3-11. Annual Meetings for Regions (2014) 
Association Name of Meetings Number of Regions 
MNL Regional Meetings 6 
UNSM Regional Meetings 5 
UMNB Zone Meetings 8 
AMM District Meetings 7 
SARM Division Meetings 6 
SUMA Regional Meetings 7 
AAMDC District Meetings 5 
AUMA Zone Meetings 4 
UBCM Area Associations 5 
Note: Entries based on associations’ 2014 Annual Reports and websites.  
 
 
Associations use their regional meetings as roundtables on regional issues and as 
workshops.  As noted above, AMM members vote on resolutions at their district 
meetings.  In all associations with regional meetings, the meetings are used to 
disseminate information to members in between annual conventions and keep travel costs 
lower for municipalities to attend.  
 Caucuses, sub- and area associations, and district meetings all demonstrate the 
various ways that associations work to accommodate divisions within their memberships.  
The same legal type and regional divisions that constitute board representation are found 
in the organizational structures of caucuses, sub-associations, and meetings.   
 
3.9 Inter-Association Collaboration 
 
Associations use organizational structures to represent and address internal divisions, but 
there are instances of inter-association collaboration.  In provinces with split associations, 
there are varying degrees of collaboration between associations.  In Alberta, AUMA and 
AAMDC hold an annual joint Board of Directors Meeting.  In Saskatchewan, SARM and 
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SUMA are both represented in the Municipal-Provincial Forum, where they meet with 
representatives of the provincial government.  The executive directors of SANC, SARM, 
and SUMA, along with representatives from the province’s two municipal 
administrators’ associations (the Rural Municipal Administrators Association and the 
Urban Municipal Administrators Association of Saskatchewan) meet on a quarterly basis 
with the province’s Municipal Programs and Services Steering Committee.57  In New 
Brunswick, there is little formal collaboration between AFMNB, CNBA-ACNB, and 
UMNB.  However, unlike in Alberta and Saskatchewan, there is considerable overlap in 
their memberships.  Seven of eight CNBA-ACNB members are members of AFMNB and 
two CNBA-ACNB members belong to UMNB.  As noted earlier, both AFMNB and 
UMNB also have formal CNBA-ACNB representation on their boards of directors.   
 The primary municipal associations in Manitoba (AMM), Saskatchewan (SARM 
and SUMA), and Alberta (AAMDC and AUMA) are all members of the Western Canada 
Municipal Association (WCMA).58  Saskatchewan’s section associations (PARCS and 
SANC) are not members.  The association meets annually to discuss common issues and 
share best practices.  WCMA releases joint statements directed to the federal and prairie 
provincial governments on issues of joint concern.  In recent years, meetings have 
focused on infrastructure funding and disaster relief.59  Although all municipal 
                                                
57 Joseph Garcea and Donald Gilchrest, “Saskatchewan,” in Foundations of Governance: Municipal 
Government in Canada’s Provinces, eds. Andrew Sancton and Robert Young (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009), 356-7.  
58 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Western Canada Municipal Association Discuss 
Infrastructure and Flood Flooding,” www.auma.ca.  
59 Pembina Valley Online, “Western Municipalities Discuss Disaster Assistance, Infrastructure, and 
More,” May 2, 2015, www.pembinavalleyonline.com.  Association of Manitoba Municipalities, “News 
Release: Western Canadian Municipalities Find Common Ground,” May 23, 2014, www.amm.mb.ca.  
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associations are members of FCM, WCMA is the most formalized inter-provincial 
associational collaboration. 
 There is also collaboration between francophone associations in Canada.  
Association Francophone des Municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB) and 
Union des Municipalités du Québec (UMQ) have a formal partnership.  They participate 
in one another’s annual conventions and have collectively lobbied the federal government 
on common issues.60  They have also held meetings with Association des Municipalités 
Bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM) and Association française des municipalités de 
l’Ontario (AFMO), the francophone sub-association in AMO.61   
 Inter-associational cooperation is influenced on provincial conditions and types of 
associational memberships.  The close relationship between associations in Saskatchewan 
is typical of the province’s culture of cooperation.  Alberta’s associations are both part of 
the Western Canada Municipal Association.  This encourages them to discuss issues 
common to Alberta municipalities on a regular basis.  In New Brunswick there is no 
external organization that facilitates or encourages its three associations to meet.   New 
Brunswick’s associations differ from those in Alberta and Saskatchewan because they 
formed from a unified association that broke apart, whereas AAMDC/AUMA and 
SARM/SUMA have always been divided.  The split associations in Alberta and 
Saskatchewan also differ from the associations in New Brunswick because they share the 
same language of operation.  
                                                
60 Livre Blanc Municipal, “Congrès de l’Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-
Brunswick.” www.livreblancmunicipal.ca.   Union des Municipalités du Québec, “Transport ferroviaire.” 
www.umq.qc.ca.  
61 Daniel Bourgeois and Yves Bourgeois. “Canadian Municipalities and Official Languages.” Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 44:4 (2011), 789-806.  
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 Like collaboration in Saskatchewan, the existence of WCMA has been attributed 
to the culture of collaboration in Western Canada.62  Finally, the francophone 
associations and sub-associations in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba developed 
much later than the anglophone associations.  The development and sharing of best 
practices between anglophone associations occurred in the early 1900s.  Collaboration is 
now occurring between the more recently established francophone associations.  By 
partnering and collaborating with older and more developed UMQ, AFMNB, AMBM, 
and AFMO are able to share best practices in the language of their members.   
 
3.10 Conclusion  
 
Municipal associations use organization structures to accommodate cleavages in their 
membership.  The diversity amongst municipalities includes the inter-related conditions 
of size, region, legal type, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character. Three divisions – 
size, region, and legal type – are used by associations to represent and give voice to their 
members in boards of directors, caucuses, sub-associations, and district meetings.  The 
following chapters test how different membership compositions affect other aspects of 
associational behaviour: member services, advocacy, and intergovernmental relations. 
                                                
62 Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, “Western Canadian Municipal Associations Meet in 
Regina,” April 24, 2015, www.suma.org.  
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Chapter 4  
4 Associational Restructuring, Rural/Urban Dominance, 
and Issue Representation  
 
Rural/urban character is a major division within the memberships of municipal 
associations.  It can be used as a measure of the dominant municipal type within an 
association.  The separation of rural and urban members in distinct associations changes 
the internal dynamics of membership cohesion, and makes one municipal type more 
explicitly and formally dominant within each group.  Municipalities in four provinces 
have undergone associational restructuring, where the number and type of associations 
formed by a province’s municipalities changes.  During restructuring, a number of 
municipalities move their memberships to a new organization.  Canadian municipal 
associations differ from those in other federal states because the majority of provinces 
either have or had separate associations for rural and urban municipalities.  In most 
federal states, there have only been unified associations at the sub-national level, which 
contain both rural and urban members.  As Andrew Sancton noted in his discussion of 
unified and split associations in Canada, “whether this makes much difference in the 
overall scheme of things is unclear.”1   This chapter examines municipal restructuring 
between unified, rural, and urban associations to test how changes in membership 
composition affect their behaviour.    
When municipalities leave a unified association to form a distinct rural or urban 
organization, the new association institutionalizes a shared sense of place and stronger 
                                                
1 Andrew Sancton, Canadian Local Government: An Urban Perspective (Don Mills, Ont.: OUP Canada, 
2011), 39. 
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membership cohesion.  It is expected these changes will manifest themselves differently 
in rural and urban associations.  1. Rural associations are expected to pursue more socio-
economic issues because of the relative social and economic homogeneity of their 
members, compared to urban municipalities.  2. Urban associations are expected to 
pursue greater jurisdictional control for their members.  The commonality amongst urban 
municipalities is that they must address diverse and complex conditions.  Jurisdictional 
responsibility allows each municipality greater control in addressing its own needs.  3. 
Unified associations are expected to pursue functional, municipal issues that are common 
to all of their members, both rural and urban.  Restructuring creates natural experimental 
case studies to test how changes in membership composition affect the issues pursued by 
associations vis-à-vis the provincial government.  
 
4.1 A Theory of Membership Cohesion and Advocacy 
Requests 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the government association literature has demonstrated that 
membership composition is a determinant of associational behaviour.  This chapter tests 
the effect of rural/urban divisions as the dominant member type measure of membership 
composition: rural/urban dominance.  This measure can be tested empirically and varies 
across Canada’s provinces and municipal associations.  Unlike other measures of 
membership composition, rural/urban dominance has not been tested directly in prior 
research.  The literature on the behaviour of local government associations in other states 
does not have to account for separate rural and urban associations or associational 
restructuring.  Indirect observations of how rural/urban tensions and membership 
cohesion affect association behaviour are therefore used to develop testable hypotheses.  
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 All state municipal leagues in the United States are unified, but Hays’ 
examination of federal level intergovernmental groups identified the different 
compositions of their memberships as a determinant of the issues they pursued.   He used 
testimony before Congress as an indicator of lobbying activity and found a relationship 
between associations’ membership type and their lobbying requests.  State and local 
associations (the National Governor’s Association, the National Association of Counties, 
and the National Association of State Legislators) targeted their lobbying activity where 
they did not want to gain responsibility or involvement.  In particular, they targeted 
redistributive and regulatory policies to push for continued federal control.  City groups 
(the National League of Cities and the United States Conference of Mayors) behaved 
inversely.  They concentrated their lobbying efforts on issues where they sought to gain 
jurisdictional responsibility.  This active lobbying, compared to state and local groups’ 
defensive efforts, was attributed to the more narrow and cohesive interests of members in 
city associations.  State and local associations deflected responsibility due to a lack of 
member cohesion.2  
 Other research on state-level associations in the United States has found that 
internal rural/urban conflict constrains their lobbying activities.  When Beverly Cigler 
examined state-level associations of counties, 31 of 48 associations reported organization 
challenges due to conflicts between rural and urban counties.  These challenges were 
reflected in their policy issue agendas.  High levels were inversely related to the number 
                                                
2 R. Allen Hays, “Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of Issue Priorities,” The 
Western Political Quarterly 44:4 (1991), 1081-1098. 
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of issues on an association’s lobbying agenda.3   Taken with Bertram Johnson’s argument 
that urbanization was a significant factor in the founding of associations, there is a strong 
indication that rural/urban dominance is a key factor in how associations behave.4   
Despite these findings, the impact of rural/urban dominance on associational 
behaviour has not been tested when there are separate urban and rural groups in the same 
geographic territory.  This chapter is used to test the affect of restructuring on rural/urban 
lines.  Hays’ research on intergovernmental groups found that: “Each has a broad 
membership base among the sub-national units which it represents.  To maintain its base, 
each group pursues issues which affect all of the units represented.”5  In unified 
associations, functional municipal issues affect all units represented.  When the scope of 
units represented is narrowed to either rural or urban municipalities, the types of issues 
that affect all members change.   
The separation of rural and urban municipalities into their own associations 
institutionalizes both place distinctiveness and greater membership cohesion.  The 
definitions of rural and urban differ by province, and between provincial Municipal Acts 
and Statistics Canada.  Villages are legislated as urban in Alberta, but may be considered 
rural in Ontario.  No provincial Municipal Act employs the Statistics Canada definition of 
urban as “centres with a population of 1,000 AND with 400 persons per square 
kilometre” (1981-2011) or “centres of 1,000 population” (prior to 1981), or the Statistics 
Canada definition of rural as “persons living outside centres with a population of 1,000 
                                                
3 Beverly A. Cigler, “The County-State Connection: A National Study of Associations of Counties,” 
Public Administration Review 54:1 (1994), 3-11. 
4 Bertram Johnson, “Associated Municipalities: Collective Action and the Formation of State Leagues of 
Cities,” Social Science History 29:4 (2005), 554-56. 
5 Hays, 1084.  
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AND outside areas with 400 persons per square kilometer” (1981-2011) or “populations 
outside centres of 1,000 population (prior to 1981).6  This lack of consistency in 
provincial definitions of rural and urban creates complications in comparative analysis. 
Statistically and legally speaking, what constitutes “rural” in Manitoba is not the same as 
what constitutes “rural” in Ontario.  Despite this, the separations of municipalities into 
distinct rural and urban associations have the shared factor of self-identification.  In all 
provinces that underwent divisions and mergers, a group of municipalities identified as 
rural whereas another group identified as urban.  This self-identification enables 
comparisons between groups of rural, urban, and unified municipalities.  
  In provinces where municipalities self-divided, restructuring is expected to have 
a different affect on groups that identify as urban vs. rural because of different degrees of 
membership heterogeneity.   Two types of heterogeneity are present urban associations. 
First, there is external heterogeneity.  That is, there is a large range of populations 
between urban municipalities, to a greater extent than there is amongst rural 
municipalities.  Second there is more socio-economic heterogeneity in urban 
municipalities than their rural counterparts.  The density and diversity in urban 
environments creates a stronger need for government regulation.  The shared complexity 
of urban municipalities is expected to translate to requests for control over these 
regulations, without the financial responsibility for redistributive programs.  When they 
form their own association, cities, towns, and villages can pursue greater regulatory 
control without compromising on areas of shared interest with of rural municipalities.  
                                                
6 Starting in 2011, Statistics Canada replaced the term “urban” with “population centre, but it continued 
to use the statistical definition of “an area with a population of at least 1,000 and a density of 400 or more 
people per square kilometer.” 
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Rural municipalities have less heterogeneity both externally, in population size, 
and internally, in their political economies.  From their greater cohesion in socio-
economic conditions, associations of rural municipalities are expected to lobby on social 
and economic issues that are of a shared interest to their members, but fall outside 
municipal functions.  In short, urban municipalities are expected to share an interest in 
gaining greater legal powers to address their own conditions, whereas rural municipalities 
are expected to advocate about their shared conditions.  Finally, unified associations are 
expected to pursue functional issues that affect all of their members.  The restructuring of 
associations along rural/urban lines changes the extent and basis of member cohesion 
within an association.  This is expected to change the types of issues they pursue in 
intergovernmental lobbying.    
 
4.2 Types of Associations  
 
Before the expectations of behaviour can be tested, it is important to distinguish between 
the different types of associational memberships that can result from restructuring.  There 
are five types of associations based on rural/urban divisions.  
Unified Association: Any municipality within a geographic territory province is 
eligible to join, and the association incorporates both rural and urban members. Its 
membership is not primarily rural or urban by default due to the existence of 
another association in the province that is formed on an urban or rural basis.   
 
Rural Association: An association that is explicitly rural in name.  It may allow 
urban members to join, but there is minimal urban uptake in membership.  
 
Primarily Rural Association:  An association that is unified in name and allows 
any member to join, but its membership composition is affected by the presence 
of a separate urban association in the province.  Membership uptake in the 
association is much higher amongst rural municipalities than urban municipalities.  
 
Urban Association:  An association that is explicitly urban in name.  It may 
allow rural members to join, but there is minimal rural uptake in membership.  
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Primarily Urban Association: An association that is unified in name and allows 
any member to join, but its membership composition is affected by the presence 
of a separate rural association in the province.  Membership uptake is much 
higher amongst urban municipalities than rural municipalities.  
Membership cohesion and rural/urban dominance are expected to determine associational 
behaviour.  From this, it is predicted that primarily rural and primarily urban associations 
will act like rural and urban associations, respectively.  Instances when groups of 
municipalities reorganized, moving their membership from one type of association to 
another, can be used to test the effect of restructuring and changes in membership 
composition on the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying. 
 
4.3 Selection of Case Studies   
 
Four provinces in Canada have experienced major changes in the number and type of 
associations formed by their municipalities: New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and 
Manitoba.  They are natural case studies for testing how restructuring shapes the 
behaviour of municipal associations.  Quebec’s municipal associations – La Fédération 
québécoise des municipalités (FQM) and l’Union des municipalités du Québec – do not 
make their full records publicly available.  There is insufficient evidence to test how 
restructuring has affect their behaviour.  The historical records of associations in New 
Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba are not complete, but the majority of them are 
available.   Their restructurings are discussed at length in Appendix D, and are 
summarized in Figures 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.   
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Figure 4-1. Municipal Association Restructuring in Manitoba7 
 
Note: Blue denotes a unified association; green denotes a rural or urban association – 
whether primary or explicit.  A dashed line indicates than an association formed after its 
members broke away from another association. 
 
                                                
7 Manitoba uses four classifications of municipalities: city, town, village, and rural municipalities.  The 
province classifies cities, towns, and villages as urban municipalities.  Government of Manitoba, The 
Municipal Act, 427(1) and 427(2), web2.gov.mb.ca. 
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Figure 4-2. Municipal Association Restructuring in New Brunswick8 
 
Note: Blue denotes a unified association.  Purple denotes a rural, urban, or section 
association that has complete membership overlap with a unified association. NBRMA 
required its members to belong to UNBM.  CNBA did not.  The membership 
requirements in the Union of New Brunswick Towns are unknown.  Green denotes a 
rural, urban, or section association without full membership overlap in a unified 
association.  Pink denotes an association formed on a linguistic basis. A green or purple 
arrow indicates than an association formed from the fragmentation of another association.  
                                                
8 Prior to 1966, counties in New Brunswick were classified as rural municipalities.  Cities and towns 
were urban.  After counties were dissolved in 1966, many rural areas became unincorporated, but 
incorporated villages were established.   
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Figure 4-3. Municipal Association Restructuring in Ontario9 
 
 
Note: Blue denotes a unified association; green denotes a rural, urban, or section 
association. A dashed line indicates that an association formed after its members left 
broke away from another association.  
                                                
9 Ontario employs less clear-cut definitions of rural and urban municipalities than Manitoba or New 
Brunswick. In this chapter, the associations’ own definitions are employed to categorize membership 
compositions.  Although there was some membership overlap between OMA when it was primarily urban 
and OARM, the majority of OMA members were cities, towns, and villages and the majority of OARM 
members were townships.  The membership of counties in organization was near parity.  Ontario Municipal 
Association, Proceedings: Sixty-First Annual Convention (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1959), 
83-85.  Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities, Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention 
of Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities (Toronto: Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities, 
1960), 83-85. 
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The complex histories of municipal association restructuring in Quebec, Manitoba, New 
Brunswick, and Ontario stand in stark contrast to the remarkable stability of associations 
in the other provinces.  Four provinces – British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador have only ever had had one unified municipal 
association.  The Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) was founded in 
1905, the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) in 1906, Municipalities 
Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL) in 1951 and the Federation of Prince Edward Island 
Municipalities (FPEIM) in 1957.  Two provinces have had separate rural and urban 
associations since their formation.  The Saskatchewan Association of Rural 
Municipalities (SARM) was founded in 1905, the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities 
Association (SUMA) in 1906, the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) in 
1905 and the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC) in 
1909.10  
Stable cases afford less analytical leverage because there is no longitudinal 
variation, but they offer insights into how membership composition affects issue 
representation.  In particular, the permanently split associations can be used to examine 
the issues pursued by rural and urban associations when they do not have an overlap in 
membership.  The changes in associations in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario 
                                                
10As discussed in Chapter Three, Saskatchewan does have two “section associations,” which represent 
small subsections of municipalities within the province.  They are the Provincial Association of Resort 
Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS), New North – Saskatchewan Association of Northern 
Communities (SANC), and l'Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM) – have 
overlapping memberships with larger municipal associations.  The majority of their members belong to 
SUMA.  Although AUMA was called the Union of Alberta Municipalities until 1966, it excluded rural 
municipalities from membership starting in at least 1918.  Records from 1905-1918 are unavailable.  As 
discussed in Chapter Three, MNL, SARM, SUMA, and AAMDC also underwent name changes after they 
were founded.  
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never resulted in complete breaks in memberships.  Some overlap of rural and urban 
members persisted, although associational memberships were predominantly rural or 
predominantly urban.  
 One unified association and one set of rural and urban associations are used to 
evaluate the issues pursued by stable associations.  The Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities is used as the stable unified association.  UNSM and UNBM shared the 
same legal types of city, town, and county; referred to themselves as “sister 
organizations;” and attended one another’s annual conventions.11  Yet UNBM saw the 
formation of separate cities, towns, and rural associations between 1949 and 1951, 
whereas UNSM remained stable as one unified association.  UNSM can be used to 
evaluate the issues pursued within a unified association where restructuring has not 
occurred.  The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities and the Saskatchewan 
Urban Municipalities Association are used as the case studies for stable separate 
associations.  Saskatchewan and Manitoba share the legal types of city, town, village, and 
rural municipality.  Unlike in Manitoba, as discussed in Appendix D, rural municipalities 
in Saskatchewan have never shared an association with other legal types.  There is also 
no membership overlap between Saskatchewan’s rural and urban associations.  This 
provides insights on how separate rural and urban associations when their membership 
bases are completely separated.  
The associations of municipalities in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario 
have undergone complex restructurings.  All have had at least one association split and 
                                                
11 The New Brunswick Equal Opportunity Program dissolved the province’s county governments, but 
associational restructuring occurred before this change.  
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one merger.  New Brunswick and Ontario have experienced numerous splits and mergers.  
The history of associations in these provinces can become convoluted.  This chapter tests 
whether there is a question that cut through the complexity of the individual cases.  Are 
there patterns in the behaviour of associations across the diversity of restructurings, the 
overlapping memberships, and provincial conditions?  Are there commonalities in how 
mergers and divisions affect issue representation in associations?  
 
4.4 Resolutions as Indicators of Membership Cohesion and 
Interests 
The resolutions passed by municipal associations at their annual conventions can be used 
to measure their behaviour.12  Resolutions are drafted and voted on by association 
members, and directed to the provincial government.  In order to be forwarded to the 
provincial government, a resolution must receive the support of the majority of delegates 
at an annual convention.  This chapter will test whether, and how, membership 
composition affects the content of resolutions that receive majority support.13   
                                                
12 The resolution processes of municipal associations are discussed in greater depth in Chapter Five.  
13 On the matter of resolutions, it is important to note associations’ voting structures.  In a number of 
associations, one vote is given to each elected official from a member municipality in attendance.  This is 
not always the case.  The records of voting structures of this chapter’s case studies are incomplete, but 
different structures have been used amongst the cases where records are available.  OMA’s voting structure 
was based on municipal type and population, with more populous municipalities receiving more votes.  The 
voting structures in OARM and the Association of Mayors and Reeves (AOMR) are unknown, but when 
AMOR and OMA merged to form the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) in 1972, the new 
voting structure was based purely on population, rather than a combination of municipal type.  When 
OARM and the Association of Ontario Counties and Regions joined AMO in 1982, the voting structure 
was amended to set separate population requirements for counties, and metropolitan, regional, and district 
municipalities. In Manitoba, the Union of Manitoba Municipalities’ (UMM) voting structure allotted one 
vote per elected official from each member municipality, both before and after the Manitoba Urban 
Association (MUA) formed.  There are no known records of MUA / MAUM’s voting structure, but after it 
merged with UMM to form the Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM), UMM’s structure of 
voting was used.  Under AMM’s constitution, each elected official and municipal administration in each 
municipality is given a vote. The Union of New Brunswick Municipalities’ records do not contain any 
descriptions of past voting procedures.  The records of the Cities of New Brunswick Association and the 
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Passed resolutions address issues with majority support amongst associational 
members and they are pursued through collective intergovernmental lobbying.  Again, it 
is expected that when a rural association breaks away from a unified association, it will 
pursue more socio-economic issues.  An urban association is expected to pursue more 
jurisdictional issues than the unified association it left.  Unified associations are expected 
to pursue functional issues because they are of common interest to all members.  
 
4.5 Methodology 
 
This chapter tests how changes in membership composition, caused by municipal 
association restructuring, affect the issues pursued in collective intergovernmental 
lobbying.  To test these changes, the resolutions passed ten years prior to, and ten years 
following, instances of restructuring are analyzed.  However, in analyzing these time 
periods, the issue of incomplete records must be addressed. Some years of records are 
missing from the associations, provincial archives, and the AMICUS Canadian National 
Catalogue of libraries and archives.  In other years, the available association records 
contain all resolutions voted on at an association’s annual convention, but do not indicate 
which resolutions passed or failed.  These years are not included for analysis.  Passed 
                                                                                                                                            
 
New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association both indicate, but do not explicitly state, that they gave 
one vote to each elected official of a member municipality in attendance.  Ontario Municipal Association, 
Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association,1938), 8.  Ontario 
Municipal Association, Resolutions Adopted at the 72nd Annual Convention (Toronto: Ontario Municipal 
Association, 1970), 18.  Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 1st Annual Convention (Portage la Prairie: 
Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 1999), 46.  
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resolutions are indicators of where a majority of members were willing to support a 
common interest and they are submitted to the province.  The inclusion of all resolutions, 
including some that may have failed, would skew the results of membership cohesion and 
interest representation vis-à-vis the province.  
Manitoba has the most complete association records.  Passed resolutions are 
available for 50 of 60 time-period years.  In each ten-year time period, at least seven 
years of passed resolutions are available.  In New Brunswick, every year is available for 
the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities (UNBM) and only one year is missing for 
the Cities of New Brunswick Association (CNBA).  However, only two years are 
available for the New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association (NBRMA) and all 
Union of New Brunswick Towns (UNBT) records are missing.    
In Ontario, the majority of records are available for the designated time periods of 
the Ontario Municipal Association (OMA) and the Association of Municipalities of 
Ontario (AMO).  AOMR’s records of resolutions are also available, but it has been 
excluded as a case study because its membership composition is unknown.  The time 
periods of OMA and AMO are not complete, but there is an average of six years 
available for each of their ten-year periods (Table 4-1).  
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Table 4-1. Resolutions Passed by Associations by Time Period  
Province: Association (Years) Total Passed Years Available Average/Year 
Manitoba:        
UMM (1940-1949) 245 10 24.5 
UMM (1950-1959)  228 9 25.3 
MUA/MAUM (1950-1959)  133 9 14.8 
UMM (1989-1998) 225 7 32.1 
MUA/MAUM (1989-1998) 179 8 22.4 
AMM (1999-2008) 384 7 54.9 
    
New Brunswick:        
UNBM (1939-1948) 85 10 8.5 
CNBA (1949-1958) 35 9 3.9 
UNBM (1949-1959) 125 10 12.5 
UNBM (1940-1949) 90 10 9.0 
NBRMA (1950-1959) 10 2 5.0 
UNBM (1950-1959) 132 10 13.2 
    
Ontario:        
OMA (1923-1932) 149 4 37.3 
OMA (1933-1942) 167 6 27.8 
OARM (1945-1967, odd years) 148 10 14.8 
AMO (1972-1981) 650 9 72.2 
AMO (1982-1991) 478 4 119.5 
    
Saskatchewan:       
SARM (1946-2011, fifth years) 399 9 44.3 
SUMA (1946-2011, fifth years) 145 6 24.2 
    
Nova Scotia:    
UNSM (1946-2011, fifth years) 280 11 25.5 
    
Average 214 8 29.6 
    
Total  4,287   
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The Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities (OARM) formed in 1933 and 
merged with AMO in 1982.  The desired years of analysis are 1933–1942 and 1972-1981, 
but records of passed resolutions are only available from 1945 to 1967.  In order to get a 
sense of the resolutions passed by OARM during its existence, every other year from 
1945 to 1967 is analyzed.  Finally, the records of the Association of Ontario Counties 
(and Regions) are missing.  
For the control cases of Saskatchewan and Nova Scotia, the intent is to have an 
overview understanding of the issues pursued by permanently rural, permanently urban, 
and permanently unified associations.  To establish these overviews, a sample of the 
resolutions passed since the Second World War is taken for each association.  The 
associations’ resolutions are analyzed in every fifth year, starting in 1946.  
 In order to analyze how restructuring affected the resolutions passed by 
associations, each resolution is coded as functional, socio-economic, jurisdictional, 
specific-location, or federal.  The following criteria were employed in coding: 
Functional: The resolution addresses a municipal responsibility that is 
common to all members.  
 
Example: Union of New Brunswick Municipalities – 1949: #1  
 
WHEREAS the cost of education is placing an extremely 
heavy burden on Municipalities; 
 
AND WHEREAS such costs are steadily increasing; 
 
AND WHEREAS the Municipalities have suffered to a 
very large extent in vacating to the Federal and Provincial 
Governments certain fields of taxation previously held by 
them. 
 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Union of 
New Brunswick Municipalities views with considerable 
alarm the present heavy tax burden resulting from 
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educational costs and urgently represents to the 
Government of the Province of New Brunswick the 
necessity of making provision for increased financial aid to 
the municipalities for education.14  
 
Socio-Economic:  The resolution addresses an issue that is concentrated in 
parts of the province, along social or economic lines.  The issue is not a 
functional responsibility of municipal governments.  
 
Example: Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities – 
1976: Group No. 4 #12 
THAT the Saskatchewan Department of Agriculture 
purchase bulls for community pastures from Saskatchewan 
breeders.15 
 
Jurisdictional: The resolution asks for a change in regulatory, but not 
financial, responsibility for a specific category of municipalities.  The 
resolution can apply to more than one category (e.g., cities and towns), but 
is not applicable to all municipal types in the province.  
 
Example: Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association – 1961: 
5 
THAT SUMA request the Provincial Government to amend 
the City Act provisions respecting power to pass bylaws 
adopting the National Building Code to spell out clearly a 
City’s power to pass a bylaw adopting the National 
Building Code in whole, or in part, with or without 
amendments to the Code as the City sees fit.  
 
Specific-location: The resolution addresses a particular municipality, 
region, or geographic portion of the province.  
 
Example: Manitoba Urban Association (Manitoba Urban 
Municipalities Association) – 1957: 9  
 
WHEREAS flooding of the Assiniboine River has caused 
adversity to many residents of the City of Brandon;  
 
 
AND WHEREAS residents have suffered damage to their 
homes; 
                                                
14 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Convention 
(Fredericton: Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, 1949), 19.  
15 Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “Report of the 1976 Convention Resolutions,” 
Seventy-Second Annual Convention (Regina: Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 1977), 86.  
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AND WHEREAS residents have suffered loss by virtue of 
flooding of garden property and thereby been deprived of 
their livelihood; 
 
NOW THEREFORE the Council of the City of Brandon in 
meeting assembled enacts as follows: That the Government 
of the Province of Manitoba be urgently requested to 
consider a policy of relief for flood victims and suggests 
and appraisal and payment thereof be made by the 
Provincial Government in a manner similar to policy 
adopted in the year 1955.16  
 
Federal: The resolution is directed to only the federal government and/or 
the Federation of Canadian Municipalities.  A resolution that is directed to 
the federal government and the provincial government is categorized as 
one of the other codes because it does address an issue vis-à-vis the 
province.  
 
Example: UNSM – 1996: 6A Northumberland Ferry Subsidy and 
Service 
 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Union of 
Nova Scotia Municipalities request the Federal 
Government take whatever action is necessary to ensure 
that there is no significant diminution of Nova Scotia/PEI 
ferry service from the 1995 levels.17  
 
Specific-location and federal resolutions are removed for the purpose of examining how 
association restructuring affects the resolutions passed by member municipalities.  Most 
specific-location resolutions are reactions to natural disasters or economic crises (for 
example, the closure of the Sydney Steel Corporation in Sydney, Nova Scotia).  Their 
inclusion skews the relative distribution of resolutions across the other issue types.  
Federal resolutions are excluded because they do not address the core question of how 
restructuring affects association behaviour vis-à-vis the province.  With the specific-
                                                
16 Manitoba Urban Association, 1957 [Carried Resolutions Only] (Winnipeg: Manitoba Urban 
Association, 1957), 3.  
17 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolution Responses,” The Municipal Open Line (Halifax: 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, January 1997), 5.  
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location and federal resolutions removed, the effect of restructuring on the distribution of 
functional, socio-economic, and jurisdictional resolutions can be observed and compared.  
There is a considerable range in the number of resolutions available for analysis 
from each pre- and post-restructuring time period (Table 4-1).18  There are only 10 
resolutions available from the New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association 
(NBRMA) between 1949 and 1954.  As discussed in Appendix D, they maintained 
stronger ties with UNBM than CNBA.  UNBM continued to be the main association for 
resolutions amongst NBRMA members.  This, and incomplete records, account for the 
low number of NBRMA resolutions.  The largest number of resolutions within an 
associational time period is 650, passed by the Association of Municipalities of Ontario 
(AMO) between 1972 and 1981.   
The incomplete records of associations account for part of the variation between 
time periods, but there are differences by province.  Amongst New Brunswick 
associations, the number of resolutions passed by time period ranges from 10 (NBRMA, 
1949 –1954) to 132 (UNBM, 1950-1959).  In Manitoba, the number of resolutions passed 
per time period ranges from 179 (Manitoba Urban Association, 1950–1959) to 384 
(Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 1999-2008).  Ontario’s range is 149 (Ontario 
Municipalities Association, 1923–1932) to 650 (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 
1972-1981).  In the control cases, where every fifth year was counted between 1946 and 
2011, the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) 399 resolutions are 
available for analysis, with 145 from Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association 
                                                
18 The calculations of the number of passed resolutions available from each time period exclude legal and 
federal resolutions.  Only those germane to the hypotheses are counted as available for analysis.   
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(SUMA), and 280 from the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM).  The average 
number of resolutions available for analysis from each association’s time periods is 214.  
There is a weak, but positive relationship between the number of municipalities in an 
association and the number of resolutions passed by that association.  
The average number of resolutions passed by associations within each time period 
is also calculated.  The total number of resolutions within a time period is divided by the 
number of years for which passed resolutions were available.  The range of average 
number of resolutions per year is from 3.9 (Cities of New Brunswick, 1949-1958) to 
119.5 (Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 1982–1991).  Here too, there is 
provincial variation.  Amongst the New Brunswick Cases, the average number of 
resolutions passed per year is 7.8.  In Manitoba it is 29.0 and in Ontario it is 54.3.  For the 
control cases, SUMA’s average is 24.2, UNSM’s 25.5, and SARM’s 44.3.  For all cases, 
the average number of resolutions passed per year is 29.6.  In nearly every association, 
there is a growth in the average number of resolutions passed per year over time.   In 
total, there are 4,287 resolutions available for analysis.   
 
4.6 Analysis 
 
The case studies allow each hypothesis to be tested at least once.  The hypotheses and 
cases are: 
1. Unified to Rural 
a. When rural municipalities form their own association, they will pass a 
higher percentage of socio-economic resolutions than the unified 
association they left. 
i. OMA (1923-1932) to OARM (1945-1967, odd years) 
ii. UNBM (1940-1949) to NBRMA (1950-1959) 
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b. When a unified association becomes primarily urban, the percentage of 
jurisdictional resolutions passed by the unified association will increase.19 
i. OMA (1923-1932) and OMA (1933-1942) 
2. Unified to Urban 
a. When urban municipalities form their own association, the new urban 
association will pass a higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than 
the unified association its members left.  
i. UMM (1940-1949) to MUA (1950-1959) 
ii. UNBM (1939-1948) to CNBA (1949-1958) 
b. When a unified association becomes primarily rural, its percentage of 
socio-economic resolutions will increase. 
i. UMM (1940-1949) and UMM (1950-1959) 
3. Unified  
a. When a unified association is formed from a merger of rural and urban 
associations, it will pass a higher percentage of functional resolutions than 
the associations that preceded it. 
i. OARM (1945-1967, odd years) and AMO (1972-1981) to AMO 
(1982-1991) 
ii. UMM (1989-1998) and MAUM (1989-1998) to AMM (1999-
2008) 
 
The results of the case comparisons are as follows:  
 
1. Unified to Rural 
a. When rural municipalities form their own association, they will pass a 
higher percentage of socio-economic resolutions than the unified 
association they left. 
i. OMA (1923-1932) to OARM (1945-1967, odd years) 
 
                                                
19 The formation of rural, cities, and towns associations did not change the membership composition of 
UNBM.  The effect of their formation on UNBM is discussed later in the chapter, but the association did 
not become primarily rural or primarily urban after the other associations formed.  
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Figure 4-4. Distribution of Resolutions: OMA to OARM 
 
Hypothesis: supported. 
 
ii. UNBM (1940-1949) to NBRMA (1950-1959) 
 
Figure 4-5. Distribution of Resolutions: UNBM to NBRMA 
 
Hypothesis: insufficient data (only 2/10 years are available, 
totaling 10 resolutions).  
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b. When a unified association becomes primarily urban, its percentage of 
jurisdictional resolutions will increase.20 
i. OMA (1923-1932) and OMA (1933-1942) 
 
Figure 4-6. Distribution of Resolutions: OMA and OMA 
 
Hypothesis: not supported.  
2. Unified to Urban 
a. When urban municipalities form their own association, they will pass a 
higher percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than the unified association 
they left.  
i. UMM (1940-1949) to MUA (1950-1959) 
 
                                                
20 The formation of rural, cities, and towns associations did not change the membership composition of 
UNBM.  The effect of their formation on UNBM is discussed later in the chapter, but the association did 
not become primarily rural or primarily urban after the other associations formed.  
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Figure 4-7. Distribution of Resolutions: UMM to MUA 
 
Hypothesis: supported.  
 
ii. UNBM (1939-1948) to CNBA (1949-1958) 
 
Figure 4-8. Distribution of Resolutions: UNBM to CNBA 
 
Hypothesis: supported.  
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b. When a unified association becomes primarily rural, its percentage of 
socio-economic resolutions will increase. 
i. UMM (1940-1949) and UMM (1950-1959) 
 
Figure 4-9. Distribution of Resolutions: UMM and UMM 
 
Hypothesis: not supported.  
3. Unified  
a. When a unified association is formed from a merger of rural and urban 
associations, it will pass a higher percentage of functional resolutions than 
the associations that preceded it. 
i. OARM (1945-1967, odd years) and AMO (1972-1981) to AMO 
(1982-1991) 
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Figure 4-10. Distribution of Resolutions: OARM and AMO to AMO 
 
Hypothesis: mixed results.  
 
ii. UMM (1989-1998) and MAUM (1989-1998) to AMM (1999-
2008) 
 
Figure 4-11. Distribution of Resolutions: UMM and MAUM to AMM 
 
Hypothesis: not supported.  
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The findings give mixed support to the hypotheses:  
 
Table 4-2. Summary of Hypotheses by Case Study 
           Case Hypothesis 
1.A.i. Supported 
1.A.ii. Insufficient Data 
1.B. Not Supported 
2.A.i. Supported 
2.A.ii. Supported 
2.B. Not supported 
3.A.i. Mixed 
3.A.ii. Not Supported 
 
 
When the cases are collapsed into the individual hypotheses, the results are still mixed.  
 
Table 4-3. Summary of Hypotheses  
           Case Hypothesis 
1.A. Supported 
1.B. Not Supported 
2.A. Supported 
2.B. Not Supported 
3.A. Mixed 
 
 
Two hypotheses receive support from the data: 
 
• When rural municipalities form their own association, they will pass a higher 
percentage of socio-economic resolutions than the unified association they left.  
• When urban municipalities form their own association, they will pass a higher 
percentage of jurisdictional resolutions than the unified association they left.  
 
When a group of municipalities, either rural or urban, breaks away from a unified 
association to form their own organization, they act differently than the association they 
left.  When they are in their own association, rural municipalities pass a higher 
percentage of socio-economic resolutions.  Urban municipalities pass a higher percentage 
of jurisdictional resolutions when they are in their own, independent association. These 
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findings support the argument that greater membership cohesion manifests itself 
differently in rural and urban associations.  
 The findings also support the idea that rural and urban municipalities formed 
independent organizations because their interests were not being well represented in 
unified associations.  Their formations had little effect on the associations they left. The 
unified associations reflected the interests of the more numerous municipal type, whether 
rural or urban.   The formation of OARM did not change the distribution of resolutions 
pursued by OMA, and the formation of MUA resulted in only minor changes in UMM’s 
behaviour (Figure 4-10 and Figure 4-11).   
 It was expected that unified associations would pass more functional resolutions 
than urban or rural associations because functional issues are common to all members, 
but the distributions of resolutions give little support to this hypothesis.  Unified AMO 
passed a much higher percentage of functional resolutions than OARM, but its 
distribution of resolutions was almost identical to AMO during its first ten years, when it 
was still primarily urban.  In Manitoba, the hypothesis receives no support from the 
findings.  The distribution of resolutions in AMM was nearly identical to the distribution 
in primarily rural UMM, and the percentage of functional resolutions was almost 10% 
lower in AMM than in MAUM.  In these cases, unified associations reflected the interests 
of predominant member type rather than interests that were common to all members. The 
minority municipal type is drowned out in unified associations.  
 The two hypotheses about rural and urban associations are supported, but the 
hypotheses about the behaviour of unified associations were either not supported or had 
conflicting results.  Unified associations did not act as expected.  In considering why 
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these hypotheses were not supported, it is important to identify other patterns in the 
results and consider alternative explanations of associational behaviour.  
 
4.7 Consideration of Alternative Hypotheses 
In all cases and time periods, the majority of the resolutions passed are functional in 
nature.  All associations advocate for common interests, but there are distinct differences 
in how rural and urban associations act.  The control cases provide further evidence of 
this. 
 
Figure 4-12. Distribution of Resolutions: SARM, SUMA, and UNSM 
 
 
More than a third of SARM’s resolutions are socio-economic and more than a third of 
SUMA’s resolutions are jurisdictional.  In UNSM, which has always been unified, 
neither jurisdictional nor socio-economic resolutions account for more than 10% of the 
total resolutions, but both types did receive some attention.  UNSM pursued a slightly 
higher percentage of socio-economic resolutions (7.4%) compared to jurisdictional 
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resolutions (4.9%), even though its membership is more urban than rural.   In 1946, 
UNSM membership was composed of 2 cities, 42 towns, and 13 rural municipalities.   In 
2015, it is composed of 2 regional municipalities, 30 towns, and 22 rural municipalities.21 
UNSM has more urban than rural members, but socio-economic and jurisdictional issues 
have both received attention from its members.  UNSM’s behaviour differs from the 
unified associations that underwent restructuring.   
 In OMA, AMO, UMM, and AMM, the minority municipal type, whether rural or 
urban, was drowned out in unified associations.  These findings may explain why rural 
and urban municipalities formed independent associations in Manitoba and Ontario, but it 
raises questions of why these patterns of behaviour occurred in these provinces, but not in 
others.  Eight provinces started with a unified municipal association, but only four 
underwent restructuring.  In Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward 
Island, and British Columbia the original unified associations have remained stable.   
 Have Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, the Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities, the Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, and the Union of 
British Columbia Municipalities been successful at balancing rural/urban tensions, where 
their counterparts in New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba failed?  Or have 
they persisted as a unified association despite the minority municipal type being drowned 
out?   These differences also raise the question of why remerged associations in Ontario 
and Manitoba have persisted, despite the priorities of their minority memberships being 
overshadowed.  The answers to these questions are harder to infer than how restructuring 
                                                
21 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention (Halifax: 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1946), 27-28.  Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Membership 
Directory,” unsm.ca.  
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has changed associational behaviour, but comparisons of associational structures and 
memberships provide some insights. 
 In UNSM, both jurisdictional and socio-economic issues have received attention, 
with relative parity.   And unlike UMM and OMA, UNSM has a long history of explicitly 
balancing rural/urban representation within its structure.  UNSM’s 1946 Annual 
Convention Proceedings report that there was a suggestion “that it would be well to have 
at the Convention, for part of the time, separate meetings of rural delegates, and the same 
time for urban delegates, so that they could discuss their problems respectively by 
themselves.”22  Other delegates at that meeting thought the sections would be a mistake, 
and that “separate meetings would tend to disunity, while joint meetings would inform 
everyone of all problems, rural and urban, and so promote understanding and unity, and 
as well sympathetic co-operation.”23  The motion on sections was referred to the Union’s 
Executive. 
 At the next annual convention, the UNSM Executive reported that they had 
“unanimously and decidedly of the opinion that [rural and urban sections] would be a 
mistake.”24  They argued that “ample time could be arranged for dealing with all 
problems,” rather than implementing separate meetings that could cause disunity.   The 
Executive decided against rural and urban sections, but the issue of rural/urban 
differences did not go ignored.  Starting that year, in 1947, the Union’s Constitution 
mandated that: “In alternate years there shall be a President from an urban municipality 
                                                
22 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Convention, 64.  
23 Ibid., 64.  
24 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention (Halifax: 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1947), 98. 
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and a President from a rural municipality.  One Vice-President shall be from a rural 
municipality and the other Vice-President from an urban municipality.”25  UNSM chose 
to use its executive structure to represent rural and urban interests within its executive.  It 
addressed rural/urban differences by ensuring that both voices were at the same table, 
rather than meeting at different tables.  
  In 1957, UNSM made the seats on its Executive Committee “fairly apportioned 
between rural and urban municipalities.”26  Seven years later, the Executive Committee 
structure was changed to give equal representation to cities, towns, and rural 
municipalities.”27  At present, UNSM’s Board of Directors has equal representation for 
regional municipalities, towns, and rural municipalities, but in 2004 it added a caucus 
structure – akin to the sections proposed in 1946.  The three caucuses, Regional, Towns, 
and Rural “meet at least twice annually to discuss issues of mutual interest and bring 
them forward to the UNSM for action.”28   UNSM has added internal sections, but it has 
maintained equal representation for each legal type on its Board.  In addition, members 
representing regional municipalities, towns, and rural municipalities must fill the 
Executive positions of President, Vice President, and Past President.29   
                                                
25 Ibid., 98. 
26 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, Proceedings of the Fifty-Second Annual Convention (Halifax: 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1957), 148. 
27 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, Proceedings of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Convention (Halifax: 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1964), 175.  
28 A 2013 Halifax Regional Municipality report on the UNSM caucus structure stated that caucuses were 
“an attempt to address the varying priorities of municipalities of different sizes and areas, without breaking 
apart into multiple associations as other provinces have done.  UNSM grapples with rural/urban 
differences, but it has been able to maintain associational cohesion.  Halifax Regional Municipality, 
“Executive Committee Report on UNSM Caucus Structure,” July 22, 2013, www.halifax.ca.  
29 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Board of Directors,” unsm.ca. Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities, “By-Laws,” unsm.ca.  
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 AMO and AMM now balance representation for rural and urban municipalities 
in their organizational structures and boards, but these accommodations were not in place 
in OMA, UMM, or UNBM when they fractured.30   During times of restructuring in 
Ontario, Manitoba, New Brunswick, UNSM was striving to balance rural and urban 
representation.  The distribution of UNSM’s resolutions between jurisdictional and socio-
economic issues is closer than in other unified associations.  This gives support to the 
argument that UNSM’s longstanding, careful attention to balancing rural and urban 
interests is reflected in the passage of resolutions.   
 In the case of Manitoba, it is worth noting the shift from rural/urban to Greater 
Winnipeg vs. non-Greater Winnipeg as the province’s predominant municipal tension.  
This shift is reflected in the distribution of resolutions from when the MUA formed 
compared to the years before it remerged with UMM to form AMM.   
 
                                                
30 AMM elects one Vice-President Rural and one Vice-President Urban, and there is one urban 
representative and one rural representative from each of its geographic districts on the association’s Board 
of Directors.  AMM explicitly seeks to balance rural and urban members within the association.  Such steps 
were not taken in the UMM prior to MAUM’s formation.  In the decades prior to MAUM’s formation, the 
officers of UMM included one vice-president, as well as one representative from each of the geographic 
districts.  There was no guarantee of rural/urban distribution on the Board. Union of Manitoba 
Municipalities, Programme and Hand Book for the Forty-Fourth Annual Convention (Portage la Prairie: 
Union of Manitoba Municipalities, 1947), 1.  Prior to the formation of OARM, OMA had rural and urban 
sections, but they had minimal powers.  They could vote on whether a resolution should be passed by the 
general membership, but did not determine the ultimate outcome.  In AMO, the caucuses and sub-
associations are more formalized.  They account for both rural/urban and geographic divisions and meet 
independently from the AMO annual convention.  Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings of the 
Thirty-Third Annual Convention, 2 and 144.  
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Figure 4-13. Distribution of Resolutions: MUA and MAUM 
 
 
There was a small increase in the percentage of socio-economic resolutions and a 
moderate drop in the percentage of jurisdictional resolutions.  Despite this change, there 
were still differences between MAUM and the primarily rural and unified associations 
(Figure 4-11).  This indicates that the behaviour of associations is influenced not only by 
membership restructuring, but also by shifts in the distribution of provincial populations.  
The factors that affect the distribution of resolutions are complicated, but the outcomes of 
restructuring indicate that there are patterns of behaviour that cut through this 
complexity. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
In summary, there were several patterns of associational behaviour in the data. 
• When a rural or urban association forms, it acts differently than the unified 
association it left. 
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o Rural associations pass a greater percentage of socio-economic resolutions 
than the unified associations they leave. 
o Urban associations pass a greater percentage of jurisdictional resolutions 
than the unified associations they leave. 
• Unified associations reflect their predominant municipal type, whether rural or 
urban, when restructuring occurs. 
o A minority municipal type leaving a unified association does not change 
its pattern of behaviour. 
o Unified associations formed by mergers reflect the predecessor 
organization that became the majority municipal type, rather than 
prioritizing functional resolutions. 
o Unified associations that have not undergone restructuring appear to better 
balance rural and urban interests.  
• In all case studies and time periods, the majority of resolutions passed were 
functional.  
 
Unified associations that experienced restructuring were not affected by the presence or 
absence of the minority municipal type, whether rural or urban.  Municipal associations 
use organizational structures to represent different divisions within their membership, but 
there is evidence that these structures do not always translate to the passage of 
resolutions, where voting outcomes are dependent on majority interests.  The distribution 
of resolutions in UNSM, compared to the other unified cases, indicates that strong 
representative structures may translate into the passage of resolutions, but further 
research is needed to support this finding.  
 Hays’ research on federal level associations in the United States found that 
associations pursued issues common to all members, but the Canadian experience belies 
Hays’ U.S. findings.  Canadian provincial level associations show two different patterns 
of behaviour.  1. The majority municipal type in an association drowns out the interests 
of the minority type and 2. When a group of municipalities forms an independent 
association, they act differently than the unified association they left.  Restructuring along 
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rural/urban lines changes the extent of cohesion of an association’s membership and the 
distribution of resolutions along functional, socio-economic, and jurisdictional lines.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Member Populations and the Jurisdictional Aspect of 
Policy Requests 
Earlier research on government associations has established that it is important to identify 
the jurisdictional component of associations’ policy requests.  Chapter Four found that 
urban associations were more likely to request legal changes to their province’s 
Municipal Act.  This chapter considers another aspect of jurisdiction in municipal 
association behaviour: which level of government associations request to carry out 
proposed policies.  Do associations request provincial programs or resource transfers in 
order to enact programs at the municipal level?  A key variation between provinces, and 
subsequently their municipal associations, is the relative heterogeneity of their 
municipalities’ populations.   
This chapter examines the expectation that the dispersion of municipal 
populations affects how associations approach the jurisdictional aspect of 
intergovernmental lobbying.    Two hypotheses are tested: 
• Associations with homogeneous member populations will lobby primarily for 
provincial programs. 
• Associations with heterogeneous member populations will lobby primarily for 
the resources to enact municipal programs.  
 
Associations with relatively homogeneous member populations are expected to lobby for 
provincial programs to meet their requests, as they see the interests of other members as 
similar to their own.  In associations with significant dispersion in member populations, it 
is expected that members will request the resources or authority to institute programs at 
the municipal level, as they are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share 
their interests.  These hypotheses are tested by comparing the dispersion of member 
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municipalities’ populations and the level of government identified in associations’ 
lobbying requests.  
 
5.1 A Theory of Membership Cohesion and Jurisdictional 
Requests  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the U.S. literature on government associations has 
demonstrated that composition of membership is a determinant of associational 
behaviour.  Although there are a number of ways to conceptualize membership 
composition, this chapter continues to build on one measure of heterogeneity: the 
differentiation of municipal population sizes.  This measure is rooted in the literature, can 
be tested empirically, and varies across Canada’s municipal associations.  However, 
while membership composition has emerged as a common factor in the government 
associations literature, this literature is still small.  Research on business associations 
offers natural parallels for municipal associations.  Both municipal and business 
associations are institutionalized groups: they have stable and limited memberships, 
enjoy close relationships with government, and employ professional staffs.  As well, their 
members are organizations, rather than individuals.  Therefore, the government and 
business association literatures are used in the formation of a research question and 
hypotheses on how population size dispersion affects approaches to jurisdictional 
responsibility in collective intergovernmental lobbying.  
Population dispersion is expected to influence the jurisdictional aspect of policy 
requests.  That is, the distributions of member populations will affect which level of 
government they want to meet their needs.  As Cammisa discussed, “while government 
lobbies are interested in particular policies, they, unlike other groups (or at least to a 
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greater extent than other groups), are also interested in the spatial dimension of any 
policy, that is, who will have the authority in implementation and control of funds.”1  In 
lobbying senior levels of government, municipal associations are concerned with whether 
their interests are met through programs at the provincial level, or through transfers to 
fund municipal programs.  Hays shed some light on how the dispersion of member 
populations influences the jurisdictional aspect of associations’ policy requests.  In his 
analysis of Congressional testimony by state, local, and urban groups, he found that state 
and local groups sought to evade jurisdictional responsibility, while urban groups sought 
to gain control over policy areas.  He attributed this difference to the greater cohesiveness 
of members in city associations.  State and county associations have broader inter-
member differences in populations than city leagues.2  However, the relationship between 
the shape of size distributions and jurisdictional responsibility can be considered in the 
inverse.   
 If a narrow dispersion of member populations translates into more cohesive 
interests, it can be expected that cohesive associations would lobby for provincial 
programs to meet their needs, as they see the interests of other members as similar to 
their own.  In associations with a high variation in member populations, it can be 
expected that members will request the resources to institute programs at the municipal 
level.  They are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share their interests. 
In their analysis of trade associations, Bombardini and Trebbi pinpointed dispersion of 
                                                
1 Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal 
System (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 25. 
2 R. Allen Hays, “Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of Issue Priorities,” The 
Western Political Quarterly, 44:4 (1991), 1081-1098. 
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membership as a factor in collective lobbying.  They found that the less differentiated an 
industry, the more likely its members were to pursue lobbying through their trade 
association, as opposed to individually.  Although they measured differentiation by firms’ 
ranges of products, rather than their size, their findings still present strong evidence that 
whether actors see the interests of other members as similar to their own influences their 
approach to associational lobbying.3   
Cammisa and Hays recognized that jurisdictional responsibility is an important 
aspect of government associations’ concern, but we need to know whether this concern is 
influenced by dominant member type and membership heterogeneity.  Bombardini and 
Trebbi provided insight into how the heterogeneity of associations influences members’ 
perceptions of shared interests.  From these insights, heterogeneous and homogeneous 
municipal associations are used to examine how the perception of shared interests affects 
their behaviour in collective intergovernmental lobbying.  
 
5.2 Selection of Case Studies  
 
Four municipal associations are used to test for a relationship between municipal 
population dispersion and the level of government they request to have jurisdiction over 
policy formation and implementation.  Each association in Canada varies in its degree of 
member heterogeneity, but two homogeneous and two heterogeneous associations have 
been selected as case studies.  These four cases are drawn from three provinces: two with 
unified associations (Nova Scotia and British Columbia), and one with split rural and 
urban associations (Alberta).  They account for structural differences in split and unified 
                                                
3 Matilde Bombardini and Francesco Trebbi, “Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone 
in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics 87:1 (2012), 18.  
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associations.  There is one homogeneous unified association – and one homogeneous 
split association – as well as one heterogeneous unified association and one 
heterogeneous split association.  This accounts for the institutionalization of place-
distinctiveness in split associations as an alternative explanation for the jurisdictional 
aspect of policy requests.  Comparing a heterogeneous association and a homogeneous 
association within the same province also controls for provincial conditions as an 
explanatory variable.4  
The Alberta Urban Municipal Association (AUMA), with 274 members, has a 
heterogeneous membership.   Its members are dispersed among six legal types: cities 
(17), towns (108), townsite (1), villages (94), summer villages (49), and special 
municipalities (5).5  There is considerable variation in member populations both within 
and between legal types (Table 5-1).   The association also lacks a majority legal type.  
                                                
4 The Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) is, arguably, the most diverse unified association 
in Canada.   Its 412 members are mix of large and small; upper-, lower-, and single-tier municipalities and 
are divided into six caucuses: county, large urban, small urban, regional and single tier, rural, and northern.  
However, AMO’s process of setting the intergovernmental lobbying agenda differs considerably from other 
municipal associations. While the other municipal associations pass resolutions at their all-member annual 
conventions, AMO’s members pass resolutions at the annual conferences of their caucuses, which are then 
forwarded to the Board of Directors for consideration in its policy development process.  Since the 
resolutions are not voted on by the membership at large, it does not have a comparable tension between 
member heterogeneity and the perception of shared interests in its resolutions process.  For this reason, the 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities is used as the unified heterogeneous case study. Ontario Small 
Urban Municipalities, “Policy Statement,” www.osum.ca. Like Alberta, Saskatchewan has a homogeneous 
rural association and heterogeneous urban association, but these two associations (the Saskatchewan 
Association of Rural Municipalities and the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association) were used as 
case studies in chapter four.  
5 In 2013, three summer villages were not members of AUMA.  These populations of these non-member 
municipalities are very small: Gull Lake, pop.  122; Whispering Hills, 109; and Mewatha Beach, 79. While 
the full membership of other legal types – cities, towns, townsite, villages, and special municipalities – 
remained constant over the time period, the number of summer villages remains just under total 
participation.  The three summer villages that were not members in 2013 were members as recently as 2011 
(Whispering Hills and Gull Lake) and 2010 (Mewatha Beach).  Due to their recent membership in AUMA, 
they are included in analysis of member populations. Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Annual 
Report 2013,” www.auma.ca. Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Annual Report 2011,” 
www.auma.ca.“ Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Annual Report 2010,” www.auma.ca.  
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Although there are more towns than any other legal type, they make up less than 40 per 
cent of the total membership.  
 
Table 5-1. Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA), Member Population 
Statistics by Legal Type 
Legal Type N Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
All Members 274 10 1,096,833 11,313 803 
Cities 17 11,707 1,096,833 144,632 26,171 
Towns 108 447 24,511 4,184 2,398 
Townsite 1 983 – – – 
Villages 94 25 1,090 408 331 
Summer 
Villages 
49 10 243 90 82 
Special 
Municipalities 
5 4,051 92,490 35,719 10,927 
Note: Entries based on AUMA 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.  
 
 
Conversely, the membership of Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and 
Counties (AAMDC) is largely homogeneous.  A single legal type, municipal districts, 
makes up 64 of AAMDC’s 69 members (Table 5-1).6  Its other five members are 
composed of four specialized municipalities, which contain both rural and urban areas, 
and the rural Special Areas Board.7  The membership of the Union of Nova Scotia 
                                                
6 Although some municipal districts in Alberta continue to use the label of “county,” this term is 
anachronistic and no longer distinguishable from municipal districts in legal terms. As Lesage and 
McMillan explain: “Alberta has only one formal classification of rural municipality – the municipal district 
(MD).  Another form, the Alberta ‘county’ was established in the early 1950s and abolished with the school 
and municipal reforms of 1994.” Edward C. LeSage, Jr. and Melville L. McMillan, “Alberta,” in 
Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, eds. Andrew Sancton and 
Robert Young (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 387. 
7 The four of Alberta’s specialized municipalities are members of both AAMDC and AUMA.  
Specialized municipalities in Alberta are eligible for membership in both associations as they contain both 
rural and urban areas.   The specialized municipality of Jasper is only a member of AUMA.  Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association, Annual Report 2013. Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, 
Membership Map, www.aamdc.com.  The Special Areas Board is a designated rural municipality, but its 
elected advisory council is overseen by three provincially-appointed officials.  The provincial oversight 
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Municipalities (UNSM) is also relatively homogeneous.  As a unified association, it 
represents all municipalities in Nova Scotia, but its 55 members come from just three 
legal types: towns (31), rural municipalities (22), and regional municipalities (2).8  Like 
AAMDC, UNSM also has a majority legal type.  Towns account for 56.3% of its 
membership.  The relative homogeneity of AAMDC and UNSM is evident in the 
populations of their members (Tables 5-2 and 5-3). 
 
Table 5-2. Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC), 
Member Population Statistics by Legal Type 
Legal Type N Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
All Members 69 79 92,490 9,218 5,299 
Municipal Districts 64 79 36,461 7,138 5,098 
Special 
Municipalities 
4 5,565 92,490 43,637 38,246 
Special Areas Board 1 4,729 – – – 
Note: Entries based on AAMDC 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
began in 1938, when the area was particularly hard-hit by drought.  In response to the drought, the province 
began to provide municipal services and supports to the region, in order to assist in its recovery.  The 
provincial oversight of service provision has remained to this day.  Alberta Municipal Affairs, “Types of 
Municipalities in Alberta,” municipalaffairs.gov.ab.ca. 
8 In 2012, the Town of Canso dissolved and its citizens became part of the Municipality of the District of 
Guysborough.  However, it was still a town during the 2011 census, and was for thirteen of the previous 
fifteen years examined.  It is therefore included for the purpose of measuring the dispersion of UNSM 
members.  “Town of Canso to dissolve July 1,” CBC News, January 19, 2012, www.cbc.ca/news.  
Although the Region of Queens Municipality is a regional municipality, within UNSM, it is treated as a 
rural municipality.  The Halifax Regional Municipality and Cape Breton Regional Municipality make up 
the entirety of UNSM’s Regional Caucus.  Therefore, Queens is treated as a rural municipality for 
statistical purposes.  Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “UNSM By-Laws,” unsm.ca. Finally, rural 
municipalities are divided between nine counties incorporated to cover an entire county and six counties 
split into two municipal districts each.  In both cases, counties and municipal districts do not have 
jurisdiction over the towns situated within their geographic area. David M. Cameron with Paul A.R. 
Hobson, “Nova Scotia,” in Foundations of Governance: Municipal Government in Canada’s Provinces, 
eds. Andrew Sancton and Robert Young (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009), 138. Union of Nova 
Scotia Municipalities, “Membership Directory,” unsm.ca. 
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Table 5-3. Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM), Member Population 
Statistics by Legal Type 
Legal Type N Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
All Members 55 481 390,096 16,639 4,505 
Regional 
Municipalities 
2 97,398 390,086 243,747 – 
Towns 31 481 12,059 3,464 2,454 
Rural 
Municipalities 
22 2,354 47,814 14,558 10,758 
Note: Entries based on UNSM 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.  
 
 
The fourth case study, the Union of British Columbia (UBCM), is also a unified 
association.  It represents all municipalities in British Columbia, but its membership is 
more heterogeneous than UNSM.  Its 194 members come from seven legal types: cities 
(49), district municipalities (52), towns (14), villages (43), regional districts (27), First 
Nations (6), and special municipalities (3).9  District municipalities are the most 
predominant legal type, but account for only 26.8% of UBCM members.  Similar to 
AUMA, there is also considerable variation between the populations of legal types (Table 
5-4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Local Government Membership Listing,” www.ubcm.ca. 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “First Nations Member Listing,” www.ubcm.ca. Union of 
British Columbia Municipalities, “Regional Districts,” www.ubcm.ca. 
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Table 5-4.  Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM), Member Population 
Statistics by Legal Type 
Legal Type N Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
All Members 194 125 603,502 22,249 5,021 
Cities 49 708 603,502 59,716 18,609 
District 
Municipalities 
52 245 109,752 16,308 4,642 
Towns 14 2,505 13,627 6,251 5,076 
Villages 43 125 3,398 1,054 944 
Regional 
Districts 
27 1,017 37,750 14,720 14,629 
First Nations 6 201 806 451 365 
Special 
Municipalities 
3 819 4,987 3,069 3,402 
Note: Entries based on UBCM 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.  
 
The diversity of legal types and descriptive population statistics indicates that 
UBCM and AUMA have heterogeneous memberships, while the memberships of 
AAMDC and UNSM are relatively homogeneous.  These initial findings are reinforced 
when the Gini coefficient is employed.  Although most often used to measure income 
inequality, the Gini coefficient can be used to measure the dispersion of member 
populations.  When applied to population statistics, it measures inequality in the 
distribution of population between municipalities.  A higher Gini coefficient indicates a 
more heterogeneous membership.  0 = all equal. 1 = totally unequal.  
The Gini coefficient for the full membership of each association produces mixed 
results.  The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties has the lowest score 
(54.0), and therefore greatest equality between member populations.   The Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association has the highest coefficient (91.5), while the Union of Nova 
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Scotia Municipalities (74.0) and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (77.0) fall 
in the middle (Table 5-5).   
 
Table 5-5. Gini Coefficients of Associations’ Member Populations 
Association Gini Coefficient 
AUMA 91.5 
UBCM 77.0 
AAMDC 54.0 
UNSM 74.0 
Note: Entries based on Associations’ 2013 Annual Reports and 2011 Census data. 
  
 
However, here it is important to remove outliers from two associations – the 
Halifax Regional Municipal (HRM) (pop. 390,096) and Cape Breton Regional 
Municipality (CBRM) (97,398) from the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, and 
Calgary (1,0968,833) and Edmonton (812,201) from the Alberta Urban Municipalities 
Association.  First, these municipalities are statistical outliers.   When they are removed, 
the average member population in each association decreases by more than 50 per cent 
(AUMA: 60.6%, UNSM: 51.5%) (Table 5-6).10  Second, and more importantly, they are 
also governance outliers.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 The removal of these two case studies has a dramatic effect on the average population of members, 
even with an N of 274 in the AUMA and an N of 55 in UNSM.  
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Table 5-6. AUMA and UNSM Member Population Statistics with and without 
Outliers 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Median 
AUMA – All 
Members 
274 10 1,096,833 11,313 803 
AUMA without 
Calgary and Edmonton 
272 10 92,490 4,453 797 
UNSM – All Members 55 481 390,096 16,639 4,505 
UNSM without HRM 
and CBRM 
53 481 47,814 8,069 4,485 
Note: Entries based on AUMA and UNSM 2013 Annual Report and 2011 Census data.  
 
 
In their discussion of Alberta’s municipal associations, LeSage, Jr. and McMillan 
note that while “AUMA is the accepted voice for the province’s urban municipalities … 
the two largest cities often work separately in the promotion or defence of their 
interests.”11  Edmonton and Calgary often collaborate in efforts to increase financial 
transfers from the province and pursue joint lobbying efforts.  Edmonton and Calgary are 
also given special status, separate from AUMA, in provincial-municipal relations.  On the 
2001 Minister’s Provincial/Municipal Council on Roles and Responsibilities in the 21st 
Century, membership included the mayors of Edmonton and Calgary in addition to the 
presidents of AUMA and AAMDC.12  In 2014, the Government of Alberta signed a 
framework agreement with the mayors of Edmonton and Calgary on developing charters 
for their cities.  The charters, which are to be finalized by 2016, will give the two cities 
stronger powers than other municipalities and change their fiscal frameworks.13   
                                                
11 LeSage, Jr. and McMillan, 427. 
12 Membership on the Council also included the Minister of Municipal Affairs, a representative from the 
Alberta Economic Development Authority, and three members of the Legislative Assembly. Ibid., 394-444. 
13 CBC News, “City Charter Framework Agreement for Calgary, Edmonton Sets 2016 Deadline,” 
October 7, 2014, www.cbc.ca/news.  
130 
 
Edmonton and Calgary are well represented within the governance structure of AUMA, 
but they enjoy a closer, more direct relationship with the province than other urban 
municipalities in Alberta and will have a different legal status than other urban 
municipalities in the near future.  
There is also close collaboration between the Halifax Regional Municipality and 
the Cape Breton Regional Municipality in Nova Scotia.  Cameron and Hobson note that 
much of this cooperation occurs within the regional caucus of the Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities, but the collective weight of their populations affords them a special 
relationship with the province.14  The HRM and CBRM account for 53.0% of the 
provincial population.15  The Halifax Regional Municipality, in particular, has a unique 
status within the province.  The municipality operates primarily under The Halifax 
Regional Municipality Charter, passed in response to lobbying by the HRM.  The 
Municipal Governance Act is the primary legislation for all other municipalities in the 
province.16  However, the close relationship between the HRM and CBRM within the 
UNSM and in intergovernmental relations demonstrates that they share unique status 
within the province.  The municipalities of Edmonton and Calgary, and the Halifax and 
Cape Breton Regional Municipalities represent both governance and statistical outliers 
within their respective associations.  If their primary interactions are with the provincial 
government directly, rather than collectively through their municipal association, their 
populations should not be counted when measuring membership heterogeneity.  For this 
                                                
14 Cameron and Hobson, 153.  
15 Statistics Canada, “Population and Dwelling Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories, and 
Census Subdivisions (Municipalities), 2011 and 2006 Censuses,” www.statscan.gc.ca. 
16 Government of Nova Scotia, Halifax Regional Municipality Charter, 2nd Session, 60th General 
Assembly, Nova Scotia, 2008, nslegislature.ca.   Government of Nova Scotia, “New Legislation to 
Establish Halifax Charter,” 23 May 2008, novascotia.ca. 
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reason, they are removed when calculating the population dispersion of associational 
members.  
When the four outliers are removed, the case studies’ Gini coefficients 
demonstrate a clear divide between the heterogeneity of AUMA and UBCM’s member 
populations and the relative homogeneity of AAMDC and UNSM’s memberships.  The 
coefficients of AAMDC (54.0) and UNSM (52.8) indicate that there is not complete 
homogeneity in member populations, but they do have greater equality than the 
population dispersions of AUMA (80.6) and UBCM (77.0) members (Table 5-7).   
 
Table 5-7. Gini Coefficients of Associations’ Member Populations with Outliers 
Removed 
Association Gini Coefficient 
AUMA without Calgary/Edmonton 80.5 
UBCM 77.0 
AAMDC 54.0 
UNSM without HRM/CBRM 52.8 
Note: Entries based on Associations’ 2013 Annual Reports and 2011 Census data. 
 
 
This divide reinforces the appropriateness of using these case studies to examine the 
relationship between the dispersion of member populations and the jurisdictional aspect 
of municipal associations’ intergovernmental lobbying.   It is expected that AUMA and 
UBCM will lobby primarily for the resources to enact municipal programs, while 
AAMDC and UNSM will lobby primarily for provincial programs to meet member 
needs.  
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5.3 Resolutions as Indicators of Jurisdictional 
Responsibility 
 
Resolutions passed by four municipal associations are used to test whether there is 
support for these hypotheses.   The resolutions that associations pass at their annual 
meetings are the foundation of their policy making and agenda setting.  Resolutions are 
drafted and voted on by members, and most are directed at the provincial government.  
They reflect which level of government municipalities want to be responsible for the 
implementation of policy requests. Associations also require resolutions to contain 
explicit instructions on how municipalities want the issue in question to be addressed.  
The language related to jurisdictional responsibility is clear and straightforward. Nearly 
all associations vote on resolutions at their annual meetings, and while there are slight 
variations in their resolutions processes, the majority of them follow a remarkably similar 
pattern of how resolutions are drafted, reviewed, and voted upon.  This enables a valid 
comparison between different associations’ resolutions.    
 
Background on the Resolutions Processes of Municipal Associations  
Municipal associations have passed resolutions at their annual conventions since 
their formation, and the resolutions process remains a critical part of their activities.17  
The Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties states: “Resolutions act as 
marching orders for the AAMDC.  They provide formal guidance for AAMDC advocacy 
                                                
17 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “The Official Report of the First Annual Convention of the 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities at the City of New Westminster, B.C. September 27, 28, 1905,” 
in Minutes Book 1905 – 1908 (Victoria: Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1908), 3.  Union of 
Nova Scotia Municipalities, Proceedings of the Union: 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909 (Halifax: Union of Nova 
Scotia Municipalities, 1909), 103.   Union of Alberta Municipalities, Report of the Proceedings of the 
Fifteenth Annual Convention (Edmonton: Union of Alberta Municipalities, 1954), 84.  Alberta Association 
of Municipal Districts, Programme and Handbook: 47th Convention (Edmonton: Alberta Association of 
Municipal Districts, 1955), 83.  
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efforts by highlighting issues of local importance that have province-wide impacts.”18  
The Union of British Columbia Municipalities echoes a similar sentiment:  “The main 
forum for UBCM policy-making is the annual resolutions cycle.”19  The Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association describes its resolution process as “a comprehensive, 
inclusive, and pragmatic framework for identifying, prioritizing, and addressing issues 
important to members.”20  Finally, in explaining how its priorities are set, UNSM 
explains that the resolutions process “identifies areas of concern for [the] majority of 
municipalities.”21  Resolutions are a core aspect of association activity, but they also 
reflect how municipalities approach collective intergovernmental lobbying.  
In short, resolutions indicate priority areas and propose solutions of what to do 
about problems.  The language and scale used in proposing solutions to meet these 
priorities areas is expected to influence the relationship between membership 
heterogeneity and jurisdictional responsibilities.  All four associations are explicit in their 
expectation that resolutions should be provincial in scope.   AAMDC’s Resolutions FAQ 
explains to members: “as an association that represents all municipal districts and 
counties in Alberta, having resolutions that are provincial in scope supports the advocacy 
process.”22  In its Writing Guidelines for Resolutions, UBCM suggests “the issue 
identified in the resolution should be relevant to other local governments across the 
province [as] this will support productive debate and assist UBCM to represent your 
                                                
18 Alberta Association of Districts and Counties, “Resolutions: Your Path to Provincial Change,” 
www.aamdc.com. 
19 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Resolutions Procedures,” www.ubcm.ca. 
20 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association. “Annual Report 2011.” 
21 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Presentation to Municipal Councilor Orientation: Newly 
Elected Officials,” unsm.ca.  
22 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Resolutions: Your Path to Provincial 
Change.” 
134 
 
concern to the provincial or federal government on behalf of all BC regional districts and 
municipalities.”23  AUMA’s Resolutions Policy and UNSM’s By-Laws share the same 
expectation – that resolutions “should strive to address a topic of concern to 
municipalities throughout the Province”24 and “should address a topic of general concern 
to municipalities on a provincial level and not deal with local concerns.”25   When 
drafting resolutions, municipalities have to frame local issues or concerns as provincial in 
nature – and consider whether the majority of members share their interests.  This 
perception of shared interests is expected to influence how they propose the issue in 
question to be addressed.  
 
The Resolutions Process 
 The majority of resolutions originate at the municipal level, and associations 
provide writing guidelines for their members.26  After resolutions are drafted, considered, 
and passed by a municipality, they must be received by the association before being 
admitted for debate at an annual meeting.  As discussed earlier, these processes vary, 
from specific Resolutions Committees, to a committee that has other responsibilities, to a 
two-step process of review, where resolutions are first considered at the district level or 
by an area association.   Despite the variations in process, they share a common purpose: 
                                                
23 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Writing Guidelines for Resolutions,” www.ubcm.ca. 
24 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “2012 Convention Policy and Resolutions Handbook,” 
www.auma.ca.  
25 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “UNSM By-Laws.”  
26 Although municipalities draft most resolutions, associations’ Boards of Directors do have the ability to 
draft their own resolutions.  These resolutions follow the same process of review and all-member voting as 
those submitted by municipalities. Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Writing Guidelines for 
Resolutions.”  Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Resolution Writing Tips,” 
www.aamdc.com.  Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “UNSM By-Laws.”  Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association, “Resolutions Writing Guide,” www.auma.ca.  
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to review the proposed resolutions for format and content, and to categorize them prior to 
consideration by the membership at large.  
In the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, the Board of Directors appoints a 
fourteen-member Resolutions Committee.  The committee can make editorial changes 
that do not alter the intent of the resolution or can make recommendations for altering the 
intent of the resolution.  It then categorizes them as: issues of provincial interest, issues of 
primarily of local concern, matters that have been considered at any of the three previous 
annual conferences, or matters of internal, UNSM concern.  Finally, the Committee offers 
a recommendation for each resolution, including the rationale for its recommendation in 
favour of or against passage.   This report of recommendations is distributed to all 
member municipalities prior to the annual conference.27   
The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association does not appoint a specific 
Resolutions Committee, but its nine-member Municipal Governance Committee serves as 
the Resolutions Committee of the Association.  Like UNSM, the committee reviews the 
content and format and content of resolutions and categorizes them as: AUMA 
Strategic/Business Plan Priorities, Provincial Scope, Targeted Scope, Endorsement 
Requests, or Non-Municipal Matters.  It also produces a resolutions report that 
recommends whether the Board of Directors should admit each resolution for debate.  
These recommendations may include comments from the Committee on the background 
of the resolution.28 
                                                
27 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “UNSM By-Laws.”  
28 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “2012 Convention Policy and Resolutions Handbook.” 
Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Standing Committees,” www.auma.ca.  
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AAMDC and UBCM are amongst the associations that follow a two-step review 
process.  AAMDC recommends members vet resolutions within their district, to allow 
“for resolution wording to be clarified and endorsed at the district level.”29  The six-
member Resolutions Committee reviews all resolutions endorsed at the district level and 
those submitted individually.  The core function of the Committee is to determine the 
order in which endorsed and submitted resolutions are considered.   Unlike other 
associations, AAMDC has biannual conventions – one in the spring and one in the fall – 
and votes on resolutions twice per year.30  
The two-step process followed by UBCM is similar to the one carried out by 
AAMDC.  UBCM outlines:   
Members are urged to submit resolutions first to Area Associations for 
consideration.  Resolutions endorsed at Area Association annual meetings are 
submitted directly to UBCM for consideration and do not need to be re-submitted 
to UBCM by the sponsor.  Both UBCM and its member local governments have 
observed that submitting resolutions first to Area Associations results in better 
quality resolutions overall.  If absolutely necessary, however, local governments 
may submit council- or board-endorsed resolutions directly to UBCM prior [to the 
annual general meeting].31 
 
Each area association has its own Resolutions Committee and procedures for handling 
resolutions, but they work in close collaboration with UBCM.  As the Constitution of the 
Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments states, “The Role of the 
Resolution Committee is to examine, comment and make a recommendation on all 
resolutions submitted to the Annual General Meeting, after it has received comment back 
                                                
29 Alberta Association of Districts and Counties, “Resolutions: Your Path to Provincial Change.”  
30 Ibid.  
31 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Resolutions Procedures.” 
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from UBCM.”32  UBCM also refers resolutions to area associations for their 
consideration.33 
The resolutions endorsed by area associations are forwarded to the four-member 
UBCM Resolutions Committee, which reviews, organizes, and makes recommendations 
on all Area-endorsed and individually submitted resolutions.  They are also categorized 
as: “priority issues relevant to all local governments; “resolutions that support established 
UBCM policy;” “resolutions on new issues or issues considered previously but not 
endorsed, within the jurisdiction of local government;” “resolutions on new issues or 
issues considered previously but not endorsed, outside the jurisdiction of local 
government;” and “resolutions that are referred to similar resolutions in the Resolutions 
Book; to policy papers, reports, or special sessions at Convention; or to Area 
Associations.”34  Resolutions that are categorized as similar to other resolutions or 
UBCM work are not admitted for debate at annual conventions.  
In all four associations, resolutions are forwarded to annual meetings for 
consideration.  The full membership debates and votes on each forwarded resolution.  In 
each, when resolutions are voted on, one vote is given to each elected official from a 
member municipality in attendance.  Motions that are passed at the annual meetings 
become official positions of the association and are used to set lobbying priorities.  In 
addition to setting internal agendas, the resolutions passed by associations are forwarded 
to all relevant government ministries, provincial and/or federal.   
                                                
32 Association of Kootenay and Boundary Local Governments, “Constitution and Bylaws,” 
akblg.civicweb.net.  
33 Association of Vancouver Island and Coastal Communities, “AVICC Conference Rules and 
Procedures for Handling Resolutions,” avicc.ca 
34 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Resolutions Procedures.” 
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Provincial Government Responses to Resolutions  
 The governments of Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia all offer official 
responses to the resolutions passed by the municipal association(s) in their province.  The 
formality of these responses, and associations’ reactions to them, vary by province and 
association, but that responses are offered is relevant to the issue of jurisdictional 
responsibility in collective intergovernmental lobbying.  The fact that all four case studies 
receive written responses to their resolutions strengthens the validity of using resolutions 
to measure how members approach jurisdictional responsibility.  Municipalities draft 
resolutions with the knowledge that, if they are passed at the association level, they will 
be seen and responded to by the relevant government ministry. 
 In Nova Scotia and Alberta, associations receive ministry responses on a rolling 
basis.  The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities publishes them in its newsletter as they 
are received.35  The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association collects responses and 
then distributes a report detailing the government response to each resolution, published 
in the spring following each annual convention.36  The Alberta Association of Municipal 
Districts and Counties also collects the responses it receives and then releases an 
Advocacy Report twice annually that reports on active resolutions (those passed within 
the past three years).  Each active resolution is assigned one of four statuses:  
• Accepted – The intent of the resolution has been met fully and the 
AAMDC does not need to formally advocate further on this issue.  
• Accepted in Principle – Either the response or actions from 
government or appropriate organizations have made steps towards 
                                                
35 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolution Responses,” The Municipal Open Line (Halifax: 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, December 2009), 4.  
36 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “2013 Status of Resolutions,” www.auma.ca.  
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meeting the intent of the resolution but there is still work to be done. 
Resolutions with this status are continually monitored. 
• Unsatisfactory – Either the government response or actions do not 
address the request in the resolution. The AAMDC will continue to 
advocate on this issue.  
• Incomplete Information – The AAMDC requires further information 
from the provincial or federal government, or targeted organization to 
determine a status for the resolution.37  
 
AAMDC also provides a written update for each resolution in the Report Card that details 
the rationale for its assigned status.   
 The Government of British Columbia offers the most formalized response of the 
three provinces.  Whereas responses in Nova Scotia and Alberta are given to municipal 
associations on an individual and rolling basis, the Government of British Columbia 
releases a single, formal document that details its response to every resolution passed by 
the Union of British Columbia Municipalities.   Relevant ministries separate responses to 
specific resolutions.  They are then collected and published by the Local Government 
Policy and Research Branch of the Ministry of Community, Sport, and Cultural 
Development.38  Although the response process varies by province and association, 
member municipalities in all four cases have the common experience of receiving 
responses to their resolutions. 
 
5.4 Methodology 
 
Resolutions capture how municipalities approach collective intergovernmental lobbying, 
and can therefore be used to analyze the relationship between membership heterogeneity 
and jurisdictional responsibility.  To test this relationship, the resolutions passed by the 
                                                
37 Alberta Association of Districts and Counties, “Resolutions: Your Path to Provincial Change.” 
38 Government of British Columbia, “Provincial Response to the Resolutions of the 2013 Union of 
British Columbia Municipalities Convention,” www.ubcm.ca. 
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four case studies over a fifteen-year period, 1999 – 2013, are examined.  The fifteen-year 
time period creates a database of over 3,200 resolutions (Tables 5-8 and 5-9).   
 
Table 5-8. Number of Resolutions Passed by Association per Year, 1999-2013 
Year AUMA UBCM AAMDC UNSM 
1999 75 106 24 31 
2000 79 94 35 16 
2001 67 86 36 20 
2002 54 93 40 22 
2003 43 119 48 14 
2004 45 99 36 12 
2005 35 135 52 11 
2006 41 146 43 5 
2007 37 181 39 – 
2008 37 124 27 14 
2009 30 145 33 3 
2010 24 137 32 18 
2011 22 135 32 32 
2012 24 136 29 26 
2013 12 122 23 25 
 
Table 5-9. Average Number of Resolutions Passed by Association per Year, 1999-
2013 
Resolutions AUMA UBCM AAMDC UNSM 
Total 625 1,858 529 249 
Average 42 124 35 18 
 
The number of resolutions passed by each association in this time period ranges from 249 
from the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities to 1,858 from the Union of British 
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Columbia Municipalities.39  From 1999-2013, The Alberta Association of Municipal 
Districts and Counties passed 529 resolutions and the Alberta Urban Municipalities 
Association passed 625.  Although there are significant differences in the number of 
resolutions passed by each association, there are still a large number of resolutions from 
each association within the selected time period.  There are differences in the average 
number of resolutions passed by associations per year, but this does not prevent valid 
comparisons between the distributions of resolutions by requested jurisdictional 
responsibility.  
 In order to compare the distribution of resolutions by requested jurisdictional 
responsibility, each resolution is coded as municipal, provincial, federal, municipal-
provincial, municipal-federal, municipal-provincial-federal, provincial-federal, or non-
jurisdictional.   The following criteria are employed in coding: 
• Municipal: The resolution requests sole municipal responsibility to act on 
an issue.  This may or may not include a request for financial support to 
carry out its actions.  
 
o Example of non-financial municipal resolution:  Union of Nova 
Scotia Municipalities, 2013: 3C – Off-Highway Vehicle Use:   
 
WHEREAS Off-Highway Vehicles are a source of 
economic prosperity to many rural Nova Scotia 
communities; and 
 
WHEREAS other provinces have bestowed upon their 
municipalities the ability to regulate the use of Off-
Highway Vehicles on the shoulders of municipal roads; 
 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the UNSM call 
upon the province to grant municipalities the authority to 
legislate, through bylaw, if, where and when Off- Highway 
                                                
39 The 2007 UNSM resolutions are unavailable.  Tracy Verbeke, Receptionist, Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities, Email to the Author, July 9, 2013.  
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Vehicle use is appropriate on the shoulders of municipal 
and provincial roads.40  
 
o Example of financial municipal resolution: Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association – 2002: P12 – Ambulance Services: 
 
WHEREAS Municipalities under the Municipal 
Government Act have the right to provide Ambulance 
Services; and 
 
WHEREAS Municipalities may pass by-laws with respect 
to safety, health, and the welfare of their communities; and 
 
WHEREAS Municipalities have provided high quality and 
affordable services to their communities for many years; 
and 
 
WHEREAS many Alberta Municipalities have combined 
ambulance and fire fighting services; and 
 
WHEREAS many combined ambulance and fire services 
have fully integrated personnel doing both duties equally; 
and 
 
WHEREAS this creates efficiencies for their Municipalities 
in the delivery of ambulance and fire services; 
 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the 
Alberta Urban Municipalities Association request the 
Government of Alberta to ensure that municipalities 
continue to have the responsibility in the delivery of 
Ambulance Services; and 
 
FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association request the Government of 
Alberta to provide funding for these services.41 
 
• Municipal-Provincial:  The resolution requests that municipalities and 
the province share responsibility on an issue:  
 
o Example: AUMA – 2006: C.v.4 – Support of Trail Systems:  
                                                
40 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolutions – 108th Annual Conference,” unsm.ca. 
41 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, 2002 Convention Resolutions (Edmonton: Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association, 2002), 134-35.  
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WHEREAS trails provide an important mode of active 
transportation for Alberta citizens both within and among 
our communities and regions, enabling walking and the use 
of bicycles and other active forms of transportation on safe 
routes as an alternative to motor vehicles; 
 
AND WHEREAS the use of trails promotes health and 
wellbeing among our citizens, providing an opportunity for 
inexpensive, easily accessible all season physical activity 
and enjoyment; 
 
AND WHEREAS trails promote tourism and economic 
benefit for communities along regional train systems; 
 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the 
Alberta Urban Municipalities Association encourage the 
Government of Alberta to recognize trails as an important 
part of the local and provincial transportation infrastructure 
and develop, in conjunction with municipalities, a policy 
framework that will facilitate and encourage the 
development of trail networks in a local, regional and 
provincial context.42  
 
• Municipal-Provincial-Federal: The resolution requests that all three 
levels of government share responsibility in addressing an issue: 
 
o Example: Union of British Columbia Municipalities – 2004: B48 
– Police Governance: 
 
WHEREAS while policing agencies are moving towards 
integration of services to better respond to public safety and 
security needs, there as been no collaboration between 
levels of government (federal, provincial and municipal) to 
reform current methods of policing; 
 
AND WHEREAS in addition to providing policing needs at 
a local level municipalities cannot sustain increased 
policing costs as a result of the demands of the integrated 
policing approach that is required today:  
 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Union of BC 
Municipalities request that the Province and the federal 
                                                
42 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, 2006 Convention Policy and Resolutions Handbook 
(Edmonton: Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, 2006), 99-100.  
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government establish a task force (with municipal police 
input) to develop a model for a national unified police 
governance that will clearly identify the roles and funding 
responsibilities of each level of government and ensure a 
process that will work effectively and efficiently across the 
three levels of government.43 
 
• Municipal-Federal: The resolution requests that municipalities share 
responsibility with the federal government in addressing an issue. 
 
o Example:  AUMA – 2012: A1 – Advocacy in Support of New 
Long Term Federal Plan for Municipal Infrastructure Funding: 
 
WHEREAS, The Building Canada Plan and a number of 
important federal-provincial transfer agreements vital to 
Canada’s municipalities will expire in March 2014; 
 
WHEREAS, Federal investments over the last few years 
have helped to slow the decline of our cities and 
communities, and the Government of Canada has 
committed to develop a new long-term plan for municipal 
infrastructure funding in consultation with municipal and 
provincial/territorial governments; 
 
WHEREAS, a seamless transition from the Building 
Canada Plan to a new long-term plan is necessary to ensure 
that municipalities can continue planning their capital 
spending effectively; 
 
WHEREAS, The Federation of Canadian Municipalities 
(FCM) has launched a campaign to ensure the new plan 
reflects municipal priorities across the country and asks its 
members to support this campaign; and 
 
WHEREAS, AUMA has been a strong advocate for the 
need for stable and flexible, long-term municipal 
infrastructure funding for Alberta’s urban municipalities; 
 
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that AUMA 
endorses the FCM campaign and urges the Minister of 
Transport, Infrastructure and Communities to work with 
                                                
43 Government of British Columbia, “Provincial Response to the Resolutions of the 2004 Union of 
British Columbia Municipalities Convention,” www.ubcm.ca.  
145 
 
FCM to ensure the new long-term infrastructure plan meets 
the core needs of cities and communities; 
 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT AUMA urges the 
Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities to 
ensure that the new long-term plan is fully in place when 
existing programs expire in 2014.44  
 
• Provincial:  The resolution requests that the provincial government have 
full responsibility for addressing an issue.  
 
o Example: Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties 
– 2007: 12-07F – Provincial River Management: 
WHEREAS jurisdiction for rivers, lakes and other water 
bodies is the responsibility of the Provincial or Federal 
Governments;  
WHEREAS prior to 1996 Alberta Environment planned, 
managed and undertook work necessary for the 
management of riparian issues and “training” of rivers, 
which program has been discontinued; and  
WHEREAS municipalities are now being pressured to 
address riparian issues following major flooding, erosion, 
or other significant rainfall/flow events;  
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Alberta 
Association of Municipal Districts and Counties urge the 
Province of Alberta to establish a policy framework for 
evaluating river management issues within Alberta as well 
as developing a financial program for addressing problems 
associated with river flooding and erosion, and that the 
responsibility for the program be assigned to Alberta 
Environment.45  
 
• Federal: The resolution requests that the federal government have full 
responsibility for addressing an issue. 
 
o Example: UNSM – 2011: 34A  - Removal of M.V. Miner by 
Federal Government – Town of Canso: 
 
                                                
44 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “2012 Convention Policy and Resolutions Handbook.”  
45 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Resolutions Database,” www.aamdc.com. 
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WHEREAS the M.V. Miner was grounded on Scatarie 
Island during the month of September; and 
 
WHEREAS the ship is considered a clear and present 
danger to Nova Scotia’s coastal environment and regional 
fishery; and 
 
WHEREAS the Federal Government has not accepted any 
legal or financial responsibility for salvage or removal costs 
leaving same at the hands of Nova Scotia taxpayers;  
 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Union of 
Nova Scotia Municipalities support the Province of Nova 
Scotia in removing this potential danger to our environment 
and fishery at the earliest possible date at no cost to Nova 
Scotia taxpayers; and  
 
FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED that the Union of Nova 
Scotia Municipalities support the efforts of Nova Scotia to 
have the Government of Canada accept legal and financial 
responsibility for similar navigational tragedies in the 
future.46  
 
• Provincial-Federal:  The resolution requests that the provincial and 
federal governments share responsibility in addressing an issue, without 
responsibility for policy enactment. 
 
o Example:  AAMDC – 2001: 25-01F – Joint Lobbying: 
 
WHEREAS local rural and urban municipalities presently 
cooperate on many services and initiatives successfully, 
such as mutual fire protection, ambulance authorities, waste 
management authorities, emergency services, recreation 
and library services, water and sewer agreements and 
seniors housing;  
 
AND WHEREAS the Province of Alberta has reduced its 
debt and tax rates by placing more of the burden of services 
and financing on the backs of municipalities, creating 
significant financial hardships for both rural and urban 
municipalities;  
 
                                                
46 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolutions – 106th Annual Conference,” unsm.ca. 
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AND WHEREAS this situation has resulted in rural/urban 
conflict, which the Government of Alberta has attempted to 
address by promoting/providing mediation assistance and 
regional initiatives to resolve cost/revenue sharing 
solutions, rather than assuming responsibility for funding 
programs of a provincial nature; 
 
AND WHEREAS the Alberta Association of Municipal 
Districts and Counties as invited the Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association to participate in a joint member 
advisory committee to examine intermunicipal cost-sharing 
issues;  
 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Alberta 
Association of Municipal Districts and Counties work 
together with the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association 
to do what it is best for all Albertans;  
 
AND FURTHER BE IT RESOLVED that the AAMDC 
work together with the AUMA to jointly lobby the 
Government of Alberta and the federal government to take 
back their responsibilities in funding and/or providing 
programs which are provincial or federal in nature.47  
 
• Non-Jurisdictional: The resolution does not request action that is 
jurisdictional in nature.  
 
o Example: UNSM – 2009: 18A – Resolution to Increase 
Participation in FCM Conferences by Using Audio-Visual 
Teleconferencing and Electronic Voting Systems  
 
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the Union of Nova 
Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) petition FCM to consider 
opening up the FCM conferences via teleconference and 
webinar technology to all members across the country; 
furthermore, that electronic voting methods that have been 
tried and proven, by (sic) utilized voting on resolutions thus 
allowing significantly greater participation in this 
democratic process.48 
 
                                                
47 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Resolutions Database.” 
48 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolutions Responses,” Municipal Open Line (Halifax: Union 
of Nova Scotia Municipalities, December 2009), 6. 
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Non-jurisdictional resolutions are removed for the purpose of comparing the frequency of 
resolution types by association.  Although they can be indicative of associational 
behaviour, they do not indicate how members understand and approach jurisdictional 
responsibility in collective intergovernmental lobbying.49  With these resolutions 
removed, the relationship between membership heterogeneity and the distribution of 
resolution types can be examined and compared.  
 
5.5 Analysis 
 
The distributions of resolutions by jurisdictional responsibility by association support 
both hypotheses.  In the two homogeneous associations, AAMDC and UNSM, the 
majority of resolutions request a higher level of government action without municipal 
responsibility.  In the heterogeneous associations, AUMA and UBCM, a plurality of the 
resolutions request sole municipal responsibility and a majority request either sole or 
shared responsibility.  Associations with homogeneous member populations lobby 
primarily for provincial programs, and associations with heterogeneous member 
populations lobby primarily for the resources or authority to enact municipal programs 
(Figure 5-1).  
                                                
49 The four associations passed a similar number of non-jurisdictional resolutions during the time period. 
The average annual number of resolutions passed by association ranged from 2.8 by UNSM to 6.2 by 
UBCM.   
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Figure 5-1. Requested Jurisdictional Responsibility in Municipal Associations’ 
Resolutions (1999-2013) 
 
In the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and the Association of Alberta 
Municipal Districts and Counties, the majority of resolutions request no municipal 
responsibility.  This percentage is higher in UNSM (62.1%) than AAMDC (53.1%), but 
both are distinct from AUMA (35.2%) and UBCM (38.6%).  The majority of AUMA and 
UBCM’s resolutions request some form of municipal responsibility, either sole or shared.  
There is also a clear difference in the frequency of “provincial” resolutions between the 
heterogeneous and homogeneous associations.  Less than one-third of resolutions in 
AUMA (30.5%) and UBCM (31.7%) request that the province have sole jurisdictional 
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responsibility, compared to 41.7% of resolutions in AAMDC and more than half of 
UNSM resolutions (53.6%) (Tables 5-10 and 5-11).   
 
Table 5-10. Frequency of Associations’ Resolutions by Jurisdictional Responsibility 
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AUMA 41% 
(234) 
22% 
(126) 
1% 
(10) 
0% 
(1) 
31% 
(174) 
2% 
(12) 
3% 
(15) 
H
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UBCM 42% 
(755) 
16% 
(280) 
3% 
(53) 
0% 
(4) 
32% 
(544) 
2% 
(23) 
5% 
(90) 
AAMDC 36% 
(165) 
11% 
(51) 
0% 
(2) 
0% 
(0) 
41% 
(194) 
8% 
(35) 
4% 
(18) 
H
om
og
en
eo
us
 
UNSM 22% 
(47) 
14% 
(30) 
1% 
(3) 
0% 
(0) 
54% 
(113) 
3% 
(6) 
6% 
(11) 
Note: Entries are percentage of each association’s resolutions with number of resolutions 
in parentheses.  
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Table 5-11. Distribution of Resolutions by Aggregated Jurisdictional Responsibility 
	   Association Sole Municipal 
Responsibility 
Shared 
Responsibility with 
Another Level of 
Government 
No Municipal 
Responsibility 
AUMA 41% 
(234) 
24% 
(137) 
35% 
(201) 
H
et
er
og
en
eo
us
 
UBCM 42% 
(755) 
19% 
(337) 
39% 
(657) 
AAMDC 36% 
(165) 
11% 
(53) 
53% 
(247) 
H
om
og
en
eo
us
 
UNSM 22% 
(47) 
16% 
(33) 
62% 
(130) 
Note: Entries are percentage of each association’s resolutions with number of resolutions 
in parentheses.  
 
 
A chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between the 
type of associational membership (homogeneous or heterogeneous) and the distribution 
of resolutions by jurisdictional responsibility.  The relationship between these variables is 
significant, X2 (6, N = 2,996) = 113.31, p = < .001.  
Resolutions that are either municipal or provincial total more than 70% of 
resolutions in all four associations – and there is a clear divide between how these two 
types of resolutions are distributed between the homogeneous and heterogeneous 
associations (Figure 5-2).  In the simplest terms, the two homogeneous associations pass 
more resolutions requesting provincial responsibility than municipal responsibility, and 
the two heterogeneous associations pass more resolutions requesting municipal 
responsibility than provincial responsibility.  
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Figure 5-2. Municipal and Provincial Resolutions by Association (1999-2013) 
 
Comparisons between associations on the frequency of municipal responsibility 
resolutions produce less distinct results.  While AUMA and UBCM have the highest 
percentage of municipal resolutions – 40.9% and 42.1%, respectively – the percentage of 
municipal resolutions in AAMDC (35.5%) is closer to the heterogeneous associations 
than to UNSM (22.3%).   However, AAMDC has the lowest percentage of resolutions 
that request shared responsibility with the province, 11.4% compared to 15.6% in UNSM, 
19.3% in UBCM, and 23.9% in AUMA.   This low level of requested collaboration helps 
to explain the fact that less than half of AAMDC’s resolutions ask for some form of 
municipal responsibility, whether sole or shared.   The relationship between 
homogeneous and heterogeneous associations and the distribution of municipal 
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populations and resolutions is also significant.  The results of a chi-square test are, X2 (1, 
N = 2,224) = 47.90, p = < .001.  We can reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between dispersion of member populations and the frequency of resolutions 
by requested jurisdictional responsibility.  
Although there are significant differences between the heterogeneous and 
homogeneous associations on the frequency of municipal and provincial resolutions, 
there are similarities between them.  In all four associations, less than 12% of resolutions 
request federal involvement.  Where resolutions ask for action by the federal government, 
there is little request for federal collaboration with municipalities.  More resolutions 
request that the federal government act unilaterally or in collaboration with the province 
than request shared municipal responsibility.  
There are other similarities between the associations.  In all four cases, more than 
27 per cent of resolutions are “municipal” and at least 30 per cent of resolutions are 
“provincial.”  Homogeneous associations pass more provincial resolutions than 
municipal, and heterogeneous associations pass more municipal resolutions, but all 
associations do pass both municipal and provincial resolutions.  Examples of specific 
issues also highlight where commonalities exist within policy areas.  
On the issue of library funding, AAMDC, AUMA, AAMDC, UNSM all passed 
resolutions requesting that the provincial government provide funding for libraries, but to 
maintain responsibility for library operations at the municipal level.50  AAMDC 
                                                
50 The Alberta Libraries Act “recognizes the municipality as the foundation for public library service,” 
and establishes municipal and community boards at the local level, as well as system boards at the regional 
level that have resource sharing agreements with other boards throughout the province.  Government of 
Alberta Municipal Affairs, “Structure of Alberta Library Services,” www.albertalibraries.ca.   Under the 
British Columbia Libraries Act, libraries are established and operated by municipalities.  Once established, 
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requested that “the Government of Alberta increase their financial support to fully fund 
libraries for all Albertans,”51 while AUMA requested that the Government “make an 
annual increase in the per capita grant to libraries to equal the Canadian Consumer Price 
Index.”52   In British Columbia, where the provincial library budget line item had been 
subsumed into the overall education budget, UBCM passed a resolution asking the 
province to “recognize the broader mandate of libraries in British Columbia and reinstate 
the line item for library funding in the provincial budget.”53   The UNSM 2000 resolution 
“Library Operating Costs,” requested that the province commit to library costs being born 
“equally by the Province and all of the municipal funding partners.” 54  In all four cases, 
association members requested financial support from their respective provincial 
government, but wanted to maintain the status quo of library operations as a municipal 
responsibility.  
 In the area of community-based seniors’ care, AAMDC and UBCM both passed 
resolutions that sought provincial responsibility for the issue.  AAMDC urged the 
Province of Alberta to “maintain auxiliary extended care beds, assisted and designated 
assisted care living beds, within their communities so that seniors can feel secure and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
they can file a request with the province to assume responsibility for providing library service in the 
municipality.  If granted, they are then eligible for provincial funding.  Government of British Columbia, 
“Library Act,” www.bded.gov.ca.  In both provinces, the library funding comes from both municipal and 
provincial sources.  
51 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Provincial Library Funding,” 2004: 11-04F, 
“Resolutions Database.”  
52 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Library Support – Provincial Library Funding,” 2008: 
c.ii.11, “Resolutions,” www.auma.ca  
53 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Reinstatement of Dedicated Line Item for Library Funding 
in BC,” 2012: B71, “Resolutions Database,” www.ubcm.ca.  
54 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolution Responses,” The Municipal Open Line (Halifax: 
Union Of Nova Scotia Municipalities, January 2001), 4.  
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comfortable and receive proper care and compassionate health care, as well as 
maintaining a connection with their family, friends, and home communities.”55   The 
UBCM’s “Community-Based Care for Seniors” resolution echoed a similar sentiment.  
The resolution asked the province to “significantly enhance BC’s system of community-
based seniors’ care, in order to ensure timely access to the full range of public services 
that support seniors to age and die with dignity.”56  The two associations took similar 
positions on how community-based programs should be addressed, despite the difference 
the dispersion of their member population sizes.  
 How municipal associations address shared issues can indicate commonalities, but 
they also demonstrate the varied approaches to jurisdictional responsibility between 
heterogeneous and homogeneous memberships.   The issue of Family and Community 
Support Services is one such example.  The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association’s 
2010 resolution “Funding to Family and Community Support Services (FCSS)” requested 
that “the Government of Alberta increase provincial funding to municipalities for Family 
and Community Supports Services (FCSS) to $100 million dollars (currently $75.7), 
thereby relieving the pressure on crisis intervention and prevention services.”57  The 
Union of Nova Scotia’s 2002 “Funding for the Early Intervention Project for Action 
                                                
55 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Seniors Facilities Remaining in their Home 
Communities,” 2009: 05-09F, “Resolutions Database.” 
56 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Community-Based Care for Seniors,” 2012: B40, 
“Resolutions Database.” 
57 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “Funding to Family and Community Support Services 
(FCSS),” 2010: Provincial Scope 18, “Resolutions.”  In 1999, the Government of Alberta established an 
80/20 cost-sharing agreement between itself and municipal governments for FCSS organizations.  
However, the amount of FCSS grants has remained stagnant, despite the population growth in many 
communities.  By 2015, nearly 140 of Alberta’s 320 municipalities were over-contributing “in order to 
keep their FCSS programming sustainable.”  The Lacombe Globe, “FCSS Fighting Losing Battle for More 
Government Funding,” January 22, 2015.  
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Against Family Violence” resolution also sought to reduce family crises, but through 
provincial action.  The motion requested that the province’s Minister of Finance and 
Minister of Justice “establish the Department’s commitment for Action Against Family 
Violence by including in the Provincial Budget funding for the Early Intervention Project 
for Action Against Family Violence on an ongoing basis.”58  Both sought to address the 
same policy area through increased funding, but only AUMA’s members sought 
jurisdictional responsibility in program implementation.   
It is expected that perceptions of shared member interests factored into the 
associations’ different approaches to the issue of family violence prevention.  Whereas 
the majority of UNSM members are small towns or rural municipalities, with relatively 
homogeneous populations, it is probable that most members would perceive other 
municipalities as having similar needs in addressing family violence.  If needs are 
perceived as similar, municipalities would be well served by a uniform provincial 
program that addressed their common needs.  However, the greater heterogeneity in 
AUMA’s membership would likely create a perception of varied need between 
municipalities.  It is expected that this perception factored into the decision of AUMA 
members to request provincial funding to carry out family services at the municipal level.  
The issue of watershed management demonstrates a similar divide in how issues 
are approached by heterogeneous and homogeneous associations.  In 2007, the Alberta 
Association of Municipal Districts and Counties requested that the Province of Alberta 
“establish a policy framework for evaluating river management issues within Alberta as 
                                                
58 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolution Responses,” The Municipal Open Line (Halifax: 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, January 2003), 2.  
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well as developing a financial program for addressing problems with river flooding and 
erosion, and that the responsibility for the program be assigned to Alberta 
Environment.”59  When the Union of British Columbia Municipalities addressed 
watershed management in 2011, its focus was more narrow – related to local government 
acquisition of management control – but it requested municipal jurisdictional 
responsibility.   Its “Control of Watersheds” resolution argued that “watersheds are not 
recognized in legislation, leaving local governments without adequate tools to enact 
measures for the protection of watersheds” and requested that the provincial government 
“develop a funding program that facilitates local government acquisition of both the 
watershed and adjacent land for those local governments with water systems on privately 
owned land.”60  In Alberta, with similar watershed needs in relatively homogeneous, 
rural municipalities, AAMDC’s members requested a broad program of watershed 
management under provincial control.  UBCM’s members – heterogeneous in population 
and therefore in watershed use and impact – requested a transfer of authority in order to 
control their own watersheds.  
Renewable energy is a third such area.  In 2006, the Union of British Columbia 
Municipalities passed a resolution requesting that the provincial government afford 
municipalities the “opportunity to participate in the creation of new green, renewable 
energy projects.”61  The resolution also requested that the provincial government make it 
mandatory for BC Hydro to purchase power “created by BC local government-supported, 
                                                
59 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Provincial River Management,” 2007: 12-
07F, “Resolutions Database.” 
60  Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Control of Watersheds,” 2011: B129, “Resolutions 
Database.” 
61 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Encouraging Local Government Involvement in Electricity 
Production,” 2006: LR14, “Resolutions Database.” 
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green, renewable power projects.”62  Six years prior, the Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities passed a resolution that symbolically supported the creation of a Nova 
Scotia Power Incorporated Green Energy Program – but did not request municipal 
involvement in its development or operation.63   UNSM members were content to have a 
program operated at the provincial level, whereas municipalities in BC wanted to control 
the development of green energy projects at the local level.  
Municipal associations address a wide array of issues in the resolutions passed at 
their annual conventions.  These issues are often specific to provincial events or 
conditions.  However, comparisons of how different associations address common issues 
are indicative of the broader pattern in the relationship between membership 
heterogeneity and jurisdictional responsibility.  While all four associations pass 
resolutions that request sole, shared, or no responsibility, there are distinct differences in 
the approaches taken by homogeneous and heterogeneous associations.  
 
5.6 Consideration of Alternative Hypotheses 
 
The two hypotheses tested in this chapter receive support from the evidence.   However, 
as this is a bivariate analysis, there is the possibility of alternative explanations or 
confounding variables.  Two possible alternative explanations are worth careful 
consideration: 1. That the smaller memberships in the homogeneous associations create a 
greater sense of interest cohesion and 2. That there is a lower demand for municipal 
services in rural areas, which make up a significant portion of the homogeneous 
                                                
62 Ibid.  
63 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Resolution Responses,” Municipal Open Line (Halifax: Union 
of Nova Scotia Municipalities, January 2001), 4. 
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members.   Group size could be a factor in the perception of shared interests, while the 
expected level of service provision in rural vs. urban areas could contribute to whether 
there is pressure on municipal governments to request greater powers or resources to 
provide services for their citizens.  Both have the potential to be alternative explanations 
for the results of requested jurisdictional responsibility by association.  
If the relationship between member populations and jurisdictional responsibility is 
expected to rest on the perception of shared interests, it is important to question whether 
the number of members within an association influences how shared interests are 
perceived.  The two homogeneous associations have smaller memberships than the 
heterogeneous associations.   UNSM and AAMDC have 55 and 69 members, compared 
to 194 and 274 members in UBCM and AUMA, respectively.  But is the difference in 
membership size large enough to account for differences in how municipalities view the 
interests of other members?  Are the differences in size enough to explain for differences 
in behaviour?  
 In his taxonomy of groups, Olson distinguishes between small and large groups 
by their relationships between members.  He states: “If, in a reasonably small 
organization, a particular person stops paying for the collective good he enjoys, the costs 
will rise noticeably for each of the others in the groups.”64  Under this definition, 
AAMDC and UNSM, while smaller than AUMA and UBCM, are still considered large 
groups.  The relationships between members are not close enough that the removal of one 
would result in a considerable increase in the costs for others.  This distance in member 
                                                
64 Mancur, Olson Jr. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 43.  
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relationships is expected to translate to perceptions of shared interests.  The 
homogeneous associations have fewer members than the heterogeneous associations, but 
all four have enough members to follow the behavioural patterns of large groups.  
 Chapter Four found that urban associations pass a higher percentage of 
jurisdictional resolutions than rural associations.  The second alternative hypotheses – 
that there is a lower demand for municipal services in rural areas – implies that citizens in 
urban areas place a higher demand on municipalities to deliver services, which translates 
into more requests for transfers of funds or authority for municipalities to carry out 
services at the local level.   Here, though, the definitions of rural and urban in the context 
of service delivery need close consideration, particularly in the case of the Alberta Urban 
Municipalities Association.   It is not clear that “urban” in the context of AUMA 
translates into a greater expectation of services for most its members, even thought of its 
members act differently from their counterparts in the Association of Municipal District 
and Counties on approaches to jurisdictional responsibility.  Rather, it is the diversity of 
member sizes and conditions, the external heterogeneity of members as discussed in 
Chapter Four, that drives the higher rate of jurisdictional resolutions.   
 The Alberta Municipal Government Act defines urban municipalities as those 
where “a majority of the buildings are on parcels of land smaller than 1850 square 
metres.”65  This definition varies from the one employed by Statistics Canada – which 
defines urban, or a population centre, as “an area with a population of at least 1,000 and a 
                                                
65 Government of Alberta, Municipal Government Act. Revised Statues of Alberta 2000, Chapter M-26, 
66.  
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density of 400 or more people per square kilometre.”66  Only 42% of AUMA members 
have population greater than 1,000.  More than 88% of AAMDC members have a 
population of at least 1,000.   In addition, of a random sample of 50 Alberta urban 
municipalities with a population under 1,000, less than two-thirds had a website – 
compared to 100% of the rural members of the AAMDC.67   
 These can be taken as indicators that there is not a higher demand for services 
among AUMA members than in municipalities that belong to AAMDC.  Yet requests for 
municipal jurisdiction still dominate AUMA’s resolutions – at a rate comparable to 
UBCM, where only 18% of members have a population of less than 1,000.  This pattern 
of behaviour provides further support for the hypothesis that member heterogeneity and 
the diversity of member conditions – to a greater extent than expectations of service 
delivery in rural vs. urban areas – are determinants of municipal and associational 
behaviour on jurisdictional responsibility.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
The two hypotheses tested in this chapter are supported by the evidence.  Associations 
with homogeneous member populations lobbied primarily for provincial programs and 
associations with heterogeneous member populations lobbied primarily for the resources 
to enact municipal programs.   Analysis of the resolutions passed by the four associations 
produced distinct differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous associations.  
In Alberta, where both associations operate under the same provincial institutions and 
                                                
66 Statistics Canada, “From Urban Areas to Population Centres,” www.statcan.gc.ca.  
67 A Google search was conducted for a random sample of 50 of the 158 AUMA members with 
population under 1,000.  Of 50 sample municipalities, 32 had a website.  Four sample municipalities did 
have a community profile on the website of a tourism bureau or neighbouring municipality.  
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government, the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties and the Alberta 
Urban Municipalities Association had different patterns of behaviour.  When the Gini 
coefficients are compared to the distribution of resolutions, the results demonstrate a 
clear relationship between the heterogeneity of member populations and the jurisdictional 
responsibility that municipal associations pursue through resolutions and collective 
intergovernmental lobbying.  It is not just norms or external conditions that drive 
influence how associations approach jurisdictional responsibility, but also their internal 
composition of membership.  As provincial governments review, respond, and sometimes 
act upon, the resolutions passed by municipal associations, the relationship between 
member heterogeneity and requested jurisdictional responsibility has important 
implications for municipal-provincial relations and divisions of power.  
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Chapter 6  
6 How Municipal Associations Choose to Allocate 
Collective Resources  
 
The core functions of municipal associations are advocacy and the provision of member 
services.  Advocacy refers to the promotion of common objectives, usually by lobbying 
senior governments.  Member services are provided to member municipalities, normally 
at a lesser cost than self provision by local governments.  It is unclear which function 
associations prioritize, and how resource allocation may vary by association.  Do 
associations view advocacy as their primary focus, or are more resources allocated to 
member services?  This chapter investigates whether membership composition 
determines how associations prioritize their functions and allocate their collective 
resources.  
The collective action literature is employed to develop testable hypotheses of 
whether membership composition determines municipal associations’ choice between 
services and advocacy.  Two variables are drawn from the literature: the presence of 
small members and the presence of large members.  Small municipalities are reliant on 
the services associations provide due to their limited internal resources and capacity.  
Large municipalities, that have the human and financial capital to provide most services 
for themselves, join associations for their collective weight in lobbying senior levels of 
government and advocacy more generally.  Associations must balance these competing 
demands on their collective resources.   Their responsiveness to demands is measured in 
two aspects of association behavior: the number of services they provide and the 
percentage of their budgetary expenditures that is allocated to service provision.  The 
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findings provide strong support for the proposition that membership composition 
determines associational behavior.  
 
6.1 A Theory of Group Behaviour and Collective Action  
 
Mancur Olson’s theory of public goods and group behavior identifies two core functions 
of groups.  These are the achievement of common goals and the provision of selective 
incentives; that is, goods or services that are only available to members of the group.  
Olson argues that although groups form on the basis of common interests, they are only 
able to cohere because of the selective incentives they provide to their members.  He 
argues that associations provide public goods, but:  
Just as a state cannot support itself by voluntary contributions, or by selling its 
basic services on the market, neither can other large organizations support 
themselves without providing some sanction, or some attraction distinct from the 
public good itself, that will lead individuals to help bear the burdens of 
maintaining the organization.  
 
This is because potential members have an incentive to free ride.  Any individual’s 
efforts “will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of his organization, and he can 
enjoy any improvements brought about by others whether or not he was working in 
support of his organization.”1  The problem of collective action means that a shared 
purpose among members is not enough for a group to form and to pursue a common 
interest.  Members must be motivated to adhere to the association through individual, 
selective incentives.  These incentives enable groups to treat “those who do not join the 
organization working for the group’s interest [to be] treated differently than those who 
                                                
1 Mancur Olson, Jr. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 2nd Edition 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 15-16.  
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do.”2  Selective incentives make it valuable for members to join a group regardless of 
whether collective action is carried out on their behalf.  They are effective in motivating 
individuals to join a group, but they create an inherent tension in how groups allocate 
collective resources.  Groups need members in order to carry out advocacy, but they must 
use services to attract and retain these members.  Groups must split their resources 
between these two functions of service provision and advocacy.  
 The tension between advocacy and services is inherent in municipal associations. 
All associations carry out both functions, but they must choose how much of their 
resources they allocate to each. There is a diversity of allocative strategies among 
municipal associations in Canada.  This diversity is explored before hypotheses are 
drawn from the collective action literature to test whether there are explanatory variables 
that can make sense of this complexity.  
 
6.2 Member Services  
 
The number and type of services offered by municipal associations vary considerably 
from association to association.  At the extremes, the Association of Manitoba 
Municipalities (AMM) offers four services and the Saskatchewan Association of Rural 
Municipalities (SARM) offers 21.  Some services – municipal insurance, fuel 
procurement, and employee benefits – are offered by the majority of associations.  
Others, like discounted rat and gopher poisons, and a wild boar control program, are 
association specific and reflect provincial conditions (in this case, those particular to 
Saskatchewan).    
                                                
2 Ibid., 51.  
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Figure 6-1. Municipal Association Member Services (2013)3 
 
 
 
The delivery of services can also be complex.  A few of them, such as commercial 
discounts and legal services, are automatically available to members, without any cost 
above membership fees.  Other services are offered as optional, quasi-commercial 
programs.  These are only available to member municipalities, but their costs are 
additional to membership fees.  They include insurance and benefits for municipal 
employees.  Finally, there are services that combine elements of the automatic and opt in 
structures.  Members can receive discounts on fuel and other products through bulk 
                                                
3 Associations where budgetary data is not available – UNBM, FQM, UMQ – are excluded.  
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purchasing and fuel procurement, but they must opt in to cooperation with other members 
in order to receive premium rates.  The discounted rate that members receive is 
dependent upon how many other members choose to participate.4  The diversity in the 
number, type, and structure of services provided by associations demonstrates 
considerable complexity in how associations deploy selective incentives to attract and 
maintain members.   
 The selective incentives offered by associations are largely static.  They have 
certainly evolved – SARM once offered its members a discounted rate on DDT – but 
most are firmly established and stable from year to year.5  The fact that some are offered 
by all provincial level associations in Canada is evidence of their status as a core function 
of associational behaviour.  However, the range of services offered indicates that 
associations adapt their core functions to attract and maintain members. There are 
common services, but there is also considerable diversity in how selective incentives are 
provided by associations.   The diversity is found in how associations deliver selective 
incentives to their members and the mix of associational-specific services that are 
offered.  
 
Common Services 
 Municipal associations use member services to respond to local conditions and 
member needs.  Still, there are a number of common services.   All municipal 
associations hold annual conventions.  Municipal insurance, fuel supply, bulk purchasing, 
and employee benefits are common to the majority of associations.  Municipal insurance 
                                                
4 A full list of services by association can be found in Appendix C.  
5 Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, Sixty-Third Annual Convention (Regina: 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 1968), 118. 
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is offered to members in eleven of the fourteen primary, provincial level associations in 
Canada.6  Bulk fuel supply is a selective incentive in eight of the fourteen, and non-fuel 
bulk purchasing and municipal employee benefits are both offered by seven.  Only one 
primary association (UMNB) does not offer any of these services, while three (MNL, 
UMQ, and SARM) offer all four. 
 
Table 6-1. Common Member Services 
Association Insurance Fuel Supply Bulk 
Purchasing 
Employee 
Benefits 
UBCM    X 
AAMDC X X X  
AUMA X X   
SARM X X X X 
SUMA X  X X 
AMM X X X  
AMO  X   
FQM X   X 
UMQ X X X X 
AFMNB X  X  
UMNB     
FPEIM X X   
UNSM X   X 
MNL X X X X 
Total: 11 8 7 7 
Note: Entries based on associations’ 2013 Annual Reports.  
 
                                                
6 The term “primary association” is used to distinguish from the four “section associations” that represent 
small subsections of municipalities within a province.  These associations – the Cities of New Brunswick 
Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick (CNBA-ACNB), the Provincial Association of 
Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS), New North – Saskatchewan Association of Northern 
Communities (SANC), and L'Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM) – have 
overlapping memberships with larger municipal associations.   The majority of members in SANC, 
PARCS, CNBA-ACNB, and AMBM belong to another, larger municipal association in their province, and 
can access that association’s member services.   
169 
 
The commonality of these services indicates that there are shared municipal needs across 
provinces.  However, there are variations in the delivery methods of these these services, 
providing further evidence of associations’ flexibility and adaptability in meeting 
member needs.  A key difference between associations is the extent to which the services 
are legally institutionalized within the broader organizational structure.   
 
Wholly Owned Subsidiaries for Service Provision  
 
 The structure of selective incentives varies by associations, but the Association of 
Ontario Municipalities (AMO) and the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association 
(AUMA) have the most institutionalized method of service delivery.  These associations 
have separate, wholly owned subsidiaries that provide services to their members.  The 
Local Authority Services Company (LAS) was established by AMO in 1992 and AUMA 
established the Alberta Municipal Services Corporation (AMSC) in 2005.7  In evaluating 
these bodies, it is noteworthy that AMO and AUMA are two of the larger municipal 
associations in Canada.  AMO has 413 members, and AUMA has 272.  Only two 
associations have more members than AMO – Fédération québécoise des municipalités 
(FQM), with 1,000+ members, and the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association 
(SUMA) with 451.8  The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM, 296 
members) and l’Union des municipalités du Québec (UQM, 300+) have slightly more 
members than AUMA, but AMO and AUMA still have a large number of member 
municipalities.  In addition to the size of their memberships, it can be surmised that the 
                                                
7 Local Authority Services, “What is LAS?” www.las.on.ca.  Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, 
“AMSC,” www.auma.ca. 
8 It should also be noted that AMO founded LAS before the Ontario amalgamations, when it had 673 
members.  Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Annual Report 1992-93 (Toronto: Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario , 1993), 40-48. 
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number of services offered by AMO and AUMA was a factor in their decisions to form 
wholly owned subsidiaries.  The LAS offers 14 member services and AMSC 15, 
compared an the average of seven.9  Of the fourteen primary associations, only the 
Fédération québécoise des municipalités, Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador 
(MNL), and Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities offer more services than 
AMO and AUMA.  FQM and MNL each offer 17 member services, and SARM offers 
21.10  
 
Service Divisions  
 
 In addition to the wholly owned subsidiaries under AMO and AUMA, a number 
of municipal associations have distinct service bodies.  As discussed, eleven of the 
fourteen primary associations offer municipal liability insurance to their members.  Three 
associations – the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC), 
the Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA), and the Saskatchewan 
Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) – own and operate their own insurance 
programs.  They are Jubilee Insurance Agencies, AAMDC’s member-owned non-profit 
insurance agency; MUNIX, AUMA’s reciprocal insurance exchange between 
associational members; and the SARM Liability Self-Insurance Plan.11  The 
                                                
9 Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, Making All Matters Local: 2013 Annual Report (Edmonton: 
Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, 2013), 24-29.  Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, 
AMSC. Local Services Authority, “Services,” www.las.on.ca. 
10 Fédération québecoise des municipalités, “Services,” fqm.ca. Fédération québecoise des municipalités, 
Rapport d'activité: 2013-2014 (Québec: Fédération québecoise des municipalités, 2014), 17-20. 
Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, Benefits of Belonging – 2013 (St. John's: Municipalities 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2013), 2-7. 
11 Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, “Jubilee Insurance Agencies,” 
www.aamdc.com. Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, Making All Matters Local: 2013 Annual 
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Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association co-manages the SUMAssure Program 
with an independent insurance company to provide a hybrid program of self-funded and 
traditional insurance coverage for its members.12   The other associations that have 
municipal insurance as a selective incentive – MNL, UNSM, FPEIM, AFMNB, UMQ, 
FQM, and AMM – provide discounted group rates with private insurance companies.13   
The Association of Municipalities of Ontario and the Union of British Columbia 
Municipalities do not offer municipal insurance programs to their members.14  Municipal 
insurance is a common service, but its delivery varies.  
Another common, but varied, selective incentive is bulk purchasing.  MNL, 
AFMNB, UMQ, AMM, SARM, SUMA, and AAMDC all offer bulk purchasing to their 
members, and four others have distinct trade divisions.15  AMM operates the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Report, 59. Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “SARM Liability Self-Insurance Plan,” 
sarm.ca. 
12 Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, “SUMAssure: Protection and Ownership for Urban 
Municipalities,” www.suma.org. 
13 Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, Benefits of Belonging – 2013, 2.  Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities, “General Insurance,” unsm.ca.  Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, 
“Membership Benefits,” www.fpeim.ca.  Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-
Brunswick, 2013 – Cahier du Congrès (Petit-Rocher, NB: Association francophone des municipalités du 
Nouveau-Brunswick, 2013), 21.  Union dés municipalités du québec, “Assurances collectives,” 
www.umq.qc.ca.  Fédération québecoise des municipalités, Rapport d'activité: 2013-2014, 17-20. 
Association of Manitoba Municipalities, “Insurance Program,” www.amm.mb.ca. 
14 Local Services Authority, “Services.”  Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Services,” 
www.ubcm.ca.  In 2011 AMO surveyed its members on the costs of municipal insurance, and found that its 
members used a mix of insurance companies, and non-profit insurance reciprocals and pools.   In its report 
on the survey, AMO stated that its next step for action on municipal insurance was to lobby the provincial 
government to “change [its] legal environment and explore alternatives such as proportional liability.”  
Association of Municipalities of Ontario, AMO's Municipal Insurance Survey Results (Toronto: 
Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 2011), 2. 
15 Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, Benefits of Belonging – 2013, 7. Association francophone 
des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick, 2013 – Cahier du Congrès, 21.  Union dés municipalités du 
Québec, “Approvisionnement produits et services,” www.umq.qc.ca.  Association of Manitoba 
Municipalities, “Municipalities Trading Company of Manitoba Ltd. (MTCML),” www.amm.mb.ca.  
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “Trading Department,” sarm.ca.  Saskatchewan 
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Municipalities Trading Company of Manitoba Ltd. (MTCML), SARM runs a SARM 
Trading Department, SUMA offers bulk purchasing to its members under 
SUMAdvantage, and AAMDC runs a Trade Division through its Aggregated Business 
Services.16   A few examples of supplies available through these trade divisions include 
office supplies, pest controls, and dog tags through MTCML; office and election 
supplies, maps, and pest control products through SARM; tires, traffic signs, janitorial 
supplies, sporting goods, and office supplies under SUMAdvantage; and paint and 
supplies, tires, fencing and posts, and office supplies through AAMDC’s Trade Division 
Suppliers. Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador’s bulk purchasing is narrow – it is 
offered for tires only – and UMQ has four bulk purchasing groups: dust control, water 
treatment chemicals, fire safety products, and tires.17  The bulk purchasing offered by 
Association Francophone des Municipalitiés du Nouveau-Brunswick is flexible and ad 
hoc.  It coordinates purchasing groups for common-use items when a need arises amongst 
its members.18  Like insurance, there is considerable diversity in how bulk purchasing is 
delivered.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Association of Urban Municipalities, “SUMAdvantage,” www.suma.org.  Alberta Assocation of Municipal 
Districts and Counties, “Trade Division,” www.aamdc.com. 
16 Association of Manitoba Municipalities, “Municipalities Trading Company of Manitoba Ltd. 
(MTCML).”  Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “Trading Department.”  Saskatchewan 
Association of Urban Municipalities, “SUMAdvantage.”  Alberta Assocation of Municipal Districts and 
Counties, “Trade Division.”  
17 Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, Benefits of Belonging – 2013, 7. Union dés municipalités 
du Québec, “Approvisionnement produits et services.”  
18 Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick, 2013 – Cahier du Congrès, 21.  
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Association-Specific Services 
 
 Wholly owned subsidiaries and service divisions demonstrate associations’ 
flexibility in how they meet common needs, but the variety of association services further 
demonstrates the complexity of selective incentives.  In order to achieve common goods, 
groups must offer services that incentivize membership – and the services provided 
indicate that there are varied needs across provinces and associations.  Association-
specific services include a closed meeting investigator for Association of Municipality of 
Ontario members, discounts at the Halifax Westin Hotel for members of the Union of 
Nova Scotia Municipalities, and a commercial vehicle program for Union of British 
Columbia Municipalities members.19  The extreme of tailored member services is the 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM).  Many of its services are 
tailored to the agricultural industry, and include a Feral Wild Boar Program, Beaver 
Control Program, Invasive Plant Management, and a Provincial Rat Eradication Program.  
SARM even has its own brands of rat and gopher poisons (see Image 6-1).20  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
19 Local Services Authority, “Services.” Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, “Preferred Hotel Rate,” 
unsm.ca.  Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Services.”  
20 Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 2013 SARM Annual Programs Report (Regina: 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 2013), 1-6.  Saskatchewan Association of Rural 
Municipalities, Trading Department Report (Regina: Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 
2013), 1. 
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Image 6-1. Advertisement for SARM Gopher Poison (1953) 
 
Note: Advertisement is from the 1953 SARM Annual Convention Handbook.21  SARM 
Gopher Poison is still sold through the association’s trade division.  
 
Association-specific services indicate the success of associations in developing programs 
that member municipalities are interested in accessing.   
 Although a number of association-specific services are unique to provincial or 
regional circumstances, others could be by any municipal association.  These include 
consolidated energy billing, offered by the Association of Municipalities of Ontario; the 
election work training available to the members of the Alberta Urban Municipalities 
Association; and the Telephone Parliamentary Procedures Advisory Service run by 
Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador.22  These further demonstrate the complexity 
                                                
21 Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, Forty-Eighth Annual Convention (Regina: 
Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 1953), 106. 
22 Local Services Authority, “Services.”  Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, “AMSC.”  
Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, Benefits of Belonging – 2013 (St. John's: Municipalities 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2013), 3.   
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of selective incentives – a complexity reinforced by the services offered in section 
associations.  
 
Services in Section Associations  
 
 As discussed in Chapter Three, the term “section associations” is used to denote 
associations that represent a particular type of municipality within a province, but are not 
the largest municipal association available for these municipalities to join.  In provinces 
where there are split rural and urban associations, these associations are the broadest, 
largest provincial level association available to either rural or urban municipalities.  
Section associations represent more niche memberships.  They differ from sub- or area 
associations, like the the Association française des municipalités de l’Ontario (AFMO) 
and the Association of Vancouver Island and Coastal Communities (AVICC) that are part 
of the broader structures of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario and the Union of 
British Columbia Municipalities, respectively.  Sub-associations represent caucuses 
within a larger municipal association.  Municipalities are part of AFMO by virtue of their 
membership in the Association of Municipalities in Ontario.  They receive member 
services from their AMO membership and their interests as francophone municipalities 
are represented with AFMO and on AMO’s board structure.  The Chair of AFMO is a 
member of the AMO Board of Directors.23  In addition to its linguistic sub-association, 
AMO has sub-associations organized by municipal size.  For example, the Rural Ontario 
Municipal Association (ROMA) describes itself as “the rural arm of the Association of 
                                                
23 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “Board of Directors 2014 - 2016,” www.amo.on.ca.  
Association française des municipalités de l'Ontario, “Nos partenaires et collaborateurs,” www.amfo.on.ca. 
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Municipalities of Ontario” and “an integral part of AMO.”24  UBCM has five area 
associations, including AVICC.  Their relationship with UBCM is akin to AMO and its 
sub-associations.  They are organized along geographic, rather than population or 
linguistic lines, but they are part of UBCM.25   
Section associations are distinct entities, rather than part of a larger organization.  
However, the membership overlap between section associations and larger municipal 
associations affects the member services these distinct entities provide.  The four section 
municipal associations in Canada are the Cities of New Brunswick Association – 
Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick (CNBA-ACNB), the Provincial 
Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan (PARCS), New North – 
Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities (SANC), and L'Association des 
municipalités bilingues du Manitoba (AMBM).   All of their members are eligible to join 
a larger municipal association.  This means that their members can join the larger 
associations to access their services.  The majority of CNBA-ACNB, PARCS, SANC, 
AMBM members belong to a larger municipal association, but the section and the 
primary associations do not have formal, legal relationships.26  This lack of formal 
                                                
24 Rural Ontairo Municipal Association, “What is ROMA?” www.roma.on.ca. 
25 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, Union of British Columbia Municipalities Bylaws 
(Richmond, BC: Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 2006), 9. 
26 Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Members,” 
www.cnba-acnb.ca.  Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Municipalités 
membres,” www.afmnb.org.  Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick, “Zone Listings,” www.umnb.ca.  
Lynne Saas, Coordinator of Member Services, PARCS, Email to the Author, October 30, 2014.  New North 
– Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities, “The Communities,” www.newnorthsask.org.  
Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, “SUMA Members,” www.suma.org.  Association des 
municipalités bilingues du Manitoba, “Nos municipalités,” directionmanitoba.com.  Association of 
Manitoba Municipalities, 2013 Annual Report (Portage la Prairie: Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 
2013), 5.  The one exception to this is is SANC-SUMA.  SANC is a member of SUMA – which gives its 
executie the right to attend SUMA conventions – but SANC members must join SUMA indepdently.  They 
do not automatically receive SUMA benefits through their membership in SANC.  
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relationships means that municipalities do not automatically receive primary association 
services through section association membership.  However, the ability of municipalities 
to join both associations discourages section associations from offering services that 
duplicate primary associations.  And, in fact, none of the section associations offer 
services that duplicate those offered by the primary association their members are eligible 
to join, with the exception of annual conventions.  Instead, services in section 
associations focus on the conditions unique to their subset of municipalities.   
In AMBM, the association’s staff support the development of municipal policies 
in favour of bilingualism.  They also provide, and help municipalities to develop, the 
resources required for bilingual municipal services.27  In PARCS and SANC, where 
member municipalities are small communities, the service is capacity building through 
member education workshops.28  Excluding its annual convention, CNBA-ACNB does 
not offer any member services.29  The members of CNBA-ACNB are like PARCS, 
SANC, and AMBM members in their ability to receive services through another 
municipal association, and seven of CNBA-ACNB’s eight members belong to 
Association Francophone des Municipalitiés du Nouveau-Brunswick and/or the Union of 
Municipalities of New Brunswick.  However, CNBA-ACNB differs from other section 
associations with respect to the internal capacity of its members.  PARCS and SANC 
members are small and/or isolated communities.   Neither association has a member with 
                                                
27 Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba, “Mandat,” directionmanitoba.com.  
28 Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan, “Home,” www.skparcs.com.  New 
North – Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities, “Events,” www.newnorthsask.org. 
29 Cities Association of New Brunswick – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick, 
“Communicaitons,” www.cnba-acnb.ca. 
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more than 3,000 residents.30  They address this by providing capacity building 
workshops.  AMBM was formed on the shared need of bilingual municipalities to 
provide services and resources in French, and it has worked to support its members in 
meeting these challenges.  With the exception of the City of Winnipeg, all AMBM 
members have a population under 5,500.31  However, the eight members of CNBA-
ACNB have populations that range from 7,400 to 70,000, with an average of 34,000.32  
CNBA-ACNB members have the biggest populations, largest bureaucracies, and biggest 
tax bases of New Brunswick municipalities.  Their members have the capacity to provide 
services internally.   The mix of services in section associations reinforces the broader 
complexity of service provision amongst municipal associations.  
 
6.3 Advocacy 
 
There is also diversity in the advocacy tactics employed by associations.  Lobbying 
tactics have been the primary focus of research on government associations in the United 
States, and the range of tactics they employ has been well documented.  There is 
consensus that direct contact with elected officials in senior levels of government is the 
predominant lobbying strategy of groups that represent elected officials.  The 
predominance of direct tactics has been attributed to the status afforded to elected 
                                                
30 Government of Saskatchewan, “Census and Population,” stats.gov.sk.ca. 
31 Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba, “Nos municipalités.”  Government of 
Saskatchewan, “Census and Population.”  The entire City of Winnipeg is a member of AMBM, but 
councillors representing the neighborhoods of St. Boniface, St. Vital, and St. Norbert, the main 
francophone communities in Winnipeg, are most heavily involved with the association. These 
neighborhoods are officially bilingual under the Winnipeg City Charter.  Association des municipalités 
bilingues du Manitoba, “Quartier Riel,” directionmanitoba.com.  Site for Language Management in 
Canada, “City of Winnipeg Charter (2002),” slmc.uottawa.ca.  
32 Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cities du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Members.”  
Statistics Canada.  
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officials as elected officials.  From this status, government associations enjoy access to, 
and personal relationships with, senior government officials.33  
In the context of the United States, Donald Haider argued that gubernatorial and 
mayoral groups are effective in using direct tactics – contacting senior officials directly 
and testifying before committees – because of the geographic overlap of state and federal 
politicians’ constituencies.  State politicians share a common constituency base with 
federal officials, and they can draw on this overlap for legitimacy and persuasion.34  
Patricia Freeman and Anthony Nownes and Anne Marie Cammisa expanded on this 
argument by comparing the lobbying techniques of government associations with 
nongovernmental interest groups.  At the state level, Freeman and Nownes found that 
government lobbyists used more direct tactics than their nongovernmental counterparts.35  
They attributed this to their “closer relationship with public officials than lobbyists who 
represent other types of groups.”36  Cammisa’s interviews with Congressional 
representatives and their staffs confirmed that state and local interest groups had more 
access in the legislative branch than other interest groups. She also found that 
government associations used rather conciliatory, direct tactics, such as testifying and 
personally contacting members of Congress, whereas other groups used more indirect 
                                                
33 Donald H. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington: Governors, Mayors, and 
Intergovernmental Lobbying (New York: Free Press, 1974). Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as 
Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal System (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1995). 
Patricia K. Freeman and Anthony J. Nownes, "Intergovernmental Lobbying in the States," Southeastern 
Political Review 27:4 (1999), 619-634.  Bertram Johnson, "Associated Municipalities: Collective Action 
and the Formation of State Leagues of Cities," Social Science History 29:4 (2005), 549-574.  
34 Haider, 652.  
35 Freeman and Nownes. Cammisa.  
36 Freeman and Nownes, 634.   
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tactics, such as attracting media attention and organizing grassroots movements.  She 
argued that their superior access facilitates associations’ direct lobbying.37   
 The advocacy strategies employed by municipal associations in Canada reinforce 
these findings.  As the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) has 
reflected: “We have worked to establish a respectful ‘government-to-government’ 
relationship with both the provincial and federal governments.  We know that much can 
be achieved by keeping the lines of communication open and working together.”38  
Municipal associations use the legitimacy afforded to them by virtue of their status as the 
representatives of elected officials to lobby provincial governments directly.  The most 
common advocacy strategies are methods of direct contact with senior officials.  These 
include: resolutions, questioning cabinet ministers in “bear pit sessions” at annual 
conventions, appearing before committees, and meeting regularly with the government.  
Some associations have occasionally “gone public” when they are in disagreement with 
the provincial government, but direct contact and quiet persuasion are the predominant 
method of advocacy.    
 
Face-to-Face Access   
 
 In addition to resolutions, which were discussed in Chapter Five, there are other 
common tactics of direct advocacy employed by associations.  Conventions offer 
municipalities the opportunity to vote on resolutions, but they also afford them direct 
access to government officials.  As part of their conventions, associations hold ministers’ 
forums – often called “bear pit sessions” – that give municipal officials the opportunity to 
                                                
37 Cammisa.  
38 Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, “Our Issues,” www.suma.org. 
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question the premier, cabinet ministers, and parliamentary assistants about issues in their 
community and the province.  Resolutions allow municipalities to forward their concerns 
to the provincial government, but bear pit sessions give them the opportunity to voice 
their concerns face-to-face.39  These allow municipal officials to voice concerns that do 
not receive support from the general membership through a resolution, as well as to 
reinforce passed motions through direct contact with ministers.    
In addition to contact with cabinet members during ministers’ forums, 
conventions often afford municipal officials contact with the leaders of opposition and 
third parties.  Elected officials from outside the government frequently attend 
conventions, and opposition leaders are often given the opportunity to address 
delegates.40  The Association of Municipalities of Ontario also organizes Ministers’ and 
Parliamentary Assistants’ Delegations as an avenue for direct advocacy.   Municipal 
officials apply through AMO for a fifteen-minute meeting with a minister or 
parliamentary assistant.41   In this time, they are able to discuss any local issue that falls 
under the minister’s portfolio. The presence of cabinet ministers, party leaders, and 
political staff at associations’ annual conventions demonstrates both the ability of 
associations to attract the attention of provincial governments and the direct access 
afforded to municipal officials through membership in associations.  
 
                                                
39 Morgan Modjeski, "SUMA convention wraps up in Saskatoon with Cabinet bear pit," Metro 
Saskatoon, February 6, 2013. 
40 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “Opposition Leaders Address Municipal Delegates at AMO 
Conference (August 21, 2012),” www.amo.on.ca.  Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, Delegate 
Brochure: AUMA Convention and AMSC Trade Show 2014 (Edmonton: Alberta Urban Municipalities 
Association, 2014), 3. 
41 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “Process for Ministers’ and PAs' Delegations,” 
www.amo.on.ca. 
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Other Methods of Direct Advocacy  
 
In addition to the contact at annual conferences, associations engage in other 
forms of direct advocacy.  A common method of direct input at the provincial level is 
annual meetings held between the executives of associations and provincial cabinets.  
These meetings offer associations the opportunity to reiterate the issues passed as 
resolutions, as well as to express other concerns and priorities of their members.   The 
frequency of these meetings varies by province, but they afford association executives 
regular, direct access to government officials.42  In addition to formal annual or semi-
annual meetings, the executives of associations often seek meetings with ministers on 
particular issues throughout the year.   
Associations also convey the interests of their members through submissions to 
provincial committees, commissions, and reports.  Examples include the Federation of 
Prince Edward Island’s Submission to the PEI Task Force on Land Use and Local 
Government and the Union of British Columbia Municipalities’ submission to the 
Government of British Columbia’s Report on Gaming Legislation and Regulation.43  
                                                
42 For example, UNSM’s Memorandum of Understanding with the Province of Nova Scotia guarantees it 
three meetings with cabinet per year.  Saskatchewan associations are guaranteed quarterly opportunities for 
advocacy – although advocacy in these meetings must be in collaboration or competition with other 
associations in the province. The executive directors of SUMA, SARM, SANC, and the province’s two 
municipal administrators associations (Rural Municipal Administrators Association and the Urban 
Municipal Administrators Association of Saskatchewan) meet on a quarterly basis with the province’s 
Municipal Programs and Services Steering Committee.  Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and The 
Province of Nova Scotia, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU) between: The Union of Nova 
Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) and The Province of Nova Scotia (Halifax: The Province of Nova Scotia, 
2005), 2.  Joseph Garcea and Donald Gilchrist, "Saskatchewan," in Foundations of Governance: Municipal 
Government in Canada's Provinces, eds. Andrew Sancton and Robert Young (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2009), 357.  
43 Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, Planning for a Better Future – Submission to: The 
Task Force on Land Use Policy (Charlottetown: Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, 2013).  
Union of British Columbia Municipalities, UBCM Response to Bill 30: Gaming Control Act (Vancouver: 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 2000). 
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Resolutions provide short descriptions of member interests, and executives must 
prioritize issues in their meetings with ministers, but submissions allow associations to 
convey the concerns of their membership in detail.  These submissions are more ad hoc 
than annual meetings, and they are in response to government initiatives, rather than 
grassroots concerns brought forward by members, but they demonstrate that municipal 
associations utilize numerous methods of direct advocacy. 
 
Formal Advocacy: Memorandum of Understanding  
 
 In some provinces, the input of municipal associations at the provincial level has 
been formalized through memoranda of understanding.  These memoranda commit the 
provincial government to consult with municipalities on all issues that affect local 
governance, or in specific areas of municipal jurisdiction.  These commitments provide 
formal avenues for associations to represent their members’ interests and advocate on 
their behalves.   The first comprehensive memorandum of understanding was signed 
between the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) and the Government of 
Ontario in 2001.44  In 2005, the AMO-Ontario Memorandum of Understanding was 
enshrined in the province’s Municipal Act, through Bill 92, the Municipal Amendment 
Act.45  At present, the Memorandum commits the province to consult with AMO on: 
Proposed changes to legislation and regulations that will have a significant 
financial impact on municipalities, 
 
Negotiation of agreements with the federal government on specific matters that 
have a direct municipal impact.46 
                                                
44 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “First Joint Annual MOU Statement,” www.amo.on.ca. 
45 Ibid.  
46 Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, “Joint Annual Memorandum of Understanding 
Statement - 2013,” www.mah.gov.on.ca. 
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In 2007, AMO and the Province of Ontario agreed to release an annual public report on 
the MOU.  The AMO-MOU annual report details meetings between the association and 
government in the preceding year.  These include formal working groups, task forces, 
consultations, policy reviews, and table discussions.  Although the issues change from 
year to year, the regular meetings and collaborations between AMO and the provincial 
government demonstrate that the MOU has created a formalized, entrenched process for 
AMO advocacy at the provincial level. 
 Memoranda of understanding between other municipal associations and 
provincial governments have occurred on a more ad hoc basis.  The Union of Nova 
Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) and the Province of Nova Scotia signed a Memoranda of 
Understanding in 2005 that recognized the role of the UNSM as the “single, unified voice 
of municipalities in Nova Scotia.” The MOUs committed the Province to consulting with 
UNSM “in a timely manner on any municipally related legislative, regulatory, policy or 
financial proposal that has any specific impact on the Province or on municipalities.”47  
The 2005 MOU also committed to provincial-municipal roundtables three times 
annually.48  However, UNSM and the Government of Nova Scotia have signed 
subsequent, issue-specific MOUs.  These have included “Promoting and Developing 
Age-Friendly Communities,”49 climate change,50 and municipal contributions to 
                                                
47 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and The Province of Nova Scotia, MEMORANDUM OF 
UNDERSTANDING (MOU) between: The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) and The Province 
of Nova Scotia.  
48 Ibid.  
49 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and The Province of Nova Scotia – Department of Seniors, 
Memorandum of Understanding between The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and The Province of 
Nova Scotia – Department of Seniors (Halifax: The Province of Nova Scotia, 2007). 
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services.51  The Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) has signed eight 
memorandums of understanding with the Government of British Columbia since 1996 
and fifteen other protocols of recognition, memorandum of agreement, and consultation 
agreements.52  The foci of these MOU have included independent power projects, 
offshore oil and gas development, resort development, and local government participation 
in the negotiation of Aboriginal Treaties and Agreements.  The Federation of Prince 
Edward Island Municipalities has been working towards a formal MOU with the 
Provincial Government for several years, but has not been successful in getting one 
signed.  The openness of provincial governments to institutionalized associational input is 
not universal across Canada.53 
 
Going Public: Media Strategies and Public Campaigns  
 
 The literature on government associations has found that they are less likely than 
other groups to turn to the media and public as an advocacy strategy.54   This trend has 
                                                                                                                                            
 
50 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and The Province of Nova Scotia, Memorandum of 
Understanding on Climate Change between The Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities and The Province of 
Nova Scotia (Halifax: The Province of Nova Scotia, 2009). 
51 The MOU on financial responsibility of services was intended to provide savings to the municipalities 
in three key areas over seven years.  The province committed that it would not increase municipal 
contributions to education by more than the consumer price index; not increase municipal contributions to 
corrections for the first three years, and then phase them out by year seven; and phase out municipal 
contributions to public housing between years three and five.  However, in year four of the agreement, the 
Province announced that it would unilaterally change the MOU, and require municipalities to continue to 
make contributions to public housing.  As UNSM summarized, there was “no legal recourse for 
municipalities to force the Province to honour their commitments under the MOU.”  Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities, UNSM Briefing Note to Municipalities: Provincial Dismantling of UNSM-Provincial MOU  
(Halifax: Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 2011), 1-6.  
52 Union of British Columbia Municipalities, “Agreements Listed by Partner,” www.ubcm.ca. 
53 Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, Executive Director's Report 2012-2013 
(Charlottetown: Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities, 2013), 1. 
54 Cammisa, 28-32. 
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been attributed to two characteristics of government associations: 1. As elected officials, 
they have more direct access to higher levels of government than other groups, and 2. 
The personal connections between municipal officials and provincial governments make 
them unwilling to undertake measures that would hurt or embarrass higher levels of 
government.  In the context of the United States, David Berman attributes the direct 
forms of lobbying to municipal officials’ unwillingness to denounce higher levels of 
government publically, lest they need their support in the future.55  Resolutions, bear pit 
sessions, meetings with government, and memoranda of understanding all provide 
evidence that municipal associations undertake significant direct lobbying, afforded to 
them by close relationships with provincial governments.  However, there is also 
evidence of associations “going public” in recent years, particularly on issues where there 
is strong disagreement between municipalities and the province.  
 When the Province of Nova Scotia unilaterally changed its 2007 Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, reneging on a promise to 
eliminate municipal contributions to public housing costs, UNSM went public with its 
disagreement with the provincial government.  The association sought to increase public 
pressure on government to uphold its commitments.  This strategy proved unsuccessful, 
but it demonstrated a willingness by UNSM to try to embarrass the province.56  The 
Association of Manitoba Municipalities has also fought a public battle against the 
                                                
55 Ibid. Peter Johnson, "Relations between the Government of Nova Scotia and the Union of Nova Scotia 
Municipalities: 1906-1966" (Halifax: Unpublished MA Thesis: Dalhousie University, 1968), 80-85.  
56 Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities, UNSM Briefing Note to Municipalities: Provincial Dismantling 
of UNSM-Provincial MOU.  "Change in deals leaves municipalities in trouble: UNSM," New Glasgow 
News, January 30, 2012. 
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Province of Manitoba on the issue of forced amalgamations.57  After a year of lobbying 
against the amalgamations, AMM took the Province to court “in an attempt to block what 
it calls the ‘forced nature’ of the Selinger government’s plan to get small municipalities 
to merge.”58  AMM lost the lawsuit, and has continued to walk a careful line of speaking 
against government actions and recognizing the importance of provincial access for 
advocacy.  In the association’s 2013 Annual Report, President Doug Dobrowolski 
summarized: 
Throughout the year, the AMM met with both Cabinet Ministers and the Premier 
individually, and with the Premier and Cabinet as a whole. These meetings are 
invaluable in order to build relationships and to ensure the AMM’s issues are 
communicated and understood. While some of these relationships have been 
tested this year, I do thank Premier Greg Selinger and his team for always being 
open to meeting with us.59 
 
However, Dobrowolski also made harsher public statements against the Selinger 
government.  At the 2013 AMM Convention, in front of Manitoba’s Minister of 
Municipal Government, Stan Struthers, Dobrowolski stated: “Last year I said I know the 
province wants to see municipalities grow and prosper.  It angers me that I can no longer 
make that statement one short year later.  The relationship has eroded over the past year 
                                                
57 Bill 33, The Municipal Modernization Act, required any municipality with fewer than 1,000 residents 
to amalgamate with another municipality with whom it shares a boundary by January 1, 2015.  At their 
2013 convention, 65 percent of AMM members voted to “oppose forced amalgamation through legal 
proceedings, representing those municipalities that did not wish to amalgamate.”  "AMM legally challenges 
Amalgamations Act," Steinbech and Area Community News, December 13, 2013. 
58 "Municipalities Taking Province to Court Over Amalgamation," The Winnipeg Free Press, December 
11, 2013. 
59 Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 2013 Annual Report (Portage la Prairie: Association of 
Manitoba Municipalities, 2013), 6.  
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and trust has been lost.”60  Most association advocacy is direct, but associations are 
willing to go to the public on major issues of municipal-provincial disagreement.   
 In addition to “going public,” a number of municipal associations have 
undertaken media campaigns and social media strategies in recent years.  In 2011, AMM 
ran its first paid media campaign to drive awareness of its “Putting Communities First” 
campaign and attract attention to municipal issues during the provincial election.61  
Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador undertook a public campaign, “What’s the 
Plan?,” in 2013.  MNL’s 2013 Annual Report stated that the purpose of the campaign 
was to “place our issues front and centre with the media, our [Members of the House of 
Assembly], and Cabinet Ministers.”62  MNL has also adapted a Communications Plan 
and Social Media Plan to expand the association’s media presence.63  The core of 
association advocacy continues to be direct contact with officials in higher levels of 
government, but the growth of media strategies and “going public” on areas of municipal-
provincial disagreement complicates how associations pursue common goods.  Like 
service provision, there is significant variation in the methods of advocacy employed by 
associations.  It is evident that municipal associations can provide a range of services and 
can use different advocacy strategies, but it is less clear how associations prioritize their 
                                                
60 Lorraine Stevenson, "Struthers says amalgamation could have been handled better," Manitoba Co-
operator, December 5, 2013. 
61 "Put Communities First campaign tour comes through Portage," Portage Daily Graphic (August 26, 
2011). Strategic Media Solutions Inc., Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 
www.strategicmediasolutions.ca. 
62 Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, "63rd Annual Convention and Trade Show: 
Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador Annual General Meeting," in 2013 Annual Convention (St. 
John's: Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, 2013), 5.  
63 Ibid., 6.  
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work.  All associations carry out both functions, but what determines the choice each 
association makes when choosing how to allocate their collective resources? 
 
6.4 Prioritization of Association Activities 
 
In his discussion of group behavior and collective action, Mancur Olson identified group 
size as the primary determinant of behavior.  Larger groups need selective incentives to 
motivate members to act collectively because in large groups, individual member 
contributions are not perceptible, and individuals benefit even when they did not 
contribute to the collective effort.  The limitation of Olson’s theory is that he focused 
primarily on group members as individuals.  He did not give full consideration to the 
greater range of internal capacity of members when they represent populations.  
Individuals must be motivated by selective incentives if their contributions to a common 
goal are negligible, but does the same hold true for groups made up of organizations?  Do 
members of such groups prioritize advocacy and selective incentives differently than 
individuals?  The group behavior literature provides some insights on these questions.  
Two measurable concepts from this literature – the presence of small members and the 
presence of large members – can be used to develop testable hypotheses.  
 As discussed in Chapter Two, Pamela Goldsmith-Jones found that there were 
differences in how members of the Union of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM), 
prioritize its functions.  When asked whether they viewed advocacy or member services 
as UBCM’s top priority, 40% of municipal officials chose lobbying, compared to 56% 
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who gave the two activities equal weight.64  Goldsmith-Jones did not correlate responses 
with characteristics of the participating municipalities, but respondents were clearly 
divided.  William Browne’s research investigated further.  He found that smaller 
municipalities value member services more than intergovernmental lobbying.  He 
interviewed officials in nine suburban municipalities in St. Louis County, Missouri and 
found that those in smaller cities perceived associations as big-city oriented.  This 
perception translated into ambivalent attitudes about associations’ lobbying activities.  
Although officials in small municipalities did not feel well represented in collective 
advocacy, the services offered by associations made their membership cost-effective.   
Small municipalities valued the services associations offered; they expressed that services 
better met their needs than collective lobbying.65  
 In her research on European associations of employers, Alessia Vatta examined 
the motivations for group membership of different sized firms.  She found that small and 
medium enterprises belonged to these organizations because of the services they provide.  
Smaller firms relied on collective resources, whereas larger employers could afford the 
services offered by associations independently.  Larger firms were motivated to join 
because of the collective weight organizations offered when lobbying.  The political clout 
afforded to groups that spoke for an entire sector was higher than that of an individual 
firm.  This clout bolstered the legitimacy of larger firms in their interactions with 
                                                
64 Pamela J. Goldsmith-Jones, "A Reevaluation of Local Government Associations: A Case Study of the 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities” (MA, University of British Columbia, 1988).  
65 William P. Browne, "Municipal Interest Groups: What Role for Smaller Cities?" State & Local 
Government Review 10:2 (1978), 51-55.  
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government.  Larger members were not motivated by groups’ selective incentives, but by 
the advantages of collective advocacy.66   
 Browne and Vatta identified how a member’s size determines its motivation for 
group membership.  But they did not trace how these preferences translate into 
organizational behavior.  How responsive are groups to the various needs and demands of 
their members?  Martin Perry has theorized on how the dispersion of member sizes 
affects group behavior.  In his research on trade associations in Ireland and New Zealand, 
Perry identified eight characteristics of associational structures and hypothesized how 
each would influence group behavior.  One of these variables was the mix of members’ 
sizes, in particular whether larger or smaller enterprises were predominant.  He argued 
that this would influence the balance of associational activity between lobbying and 
providing member benefits.  If an association was dominated by small enterprises that 
had a greater need for the services they were unable to provide autonomously, then the 
association would focus the majority of its collective resources on service provision.  If 
large firms that could self-provide services dominated an association, then the association 
would allocate most of its resources to lobbying efforts.67   Matilde Bombardini tested 
this theory on trade associations in the United States, and found that industrial sectors 
characterized by a higher share of larger firms exhibited greater levels of political 
intensity.  That is, they allocated more resources for lobbying.68   These findings provide 
support for the proposition that the extent of small members and the presence of large 
                                                
66 Alessia Vatta, "Employers’ Organizations and Concertation: Internal Dynamics and Institutional 
Influence," European Journal of Industrial Relations 5:3 (1999), 245-264. 
67 Martin Perry, "Trade Associations in Ireland and New Zealand: Does Institutional Context Matter for 
Collective Action?" The Irish Journal of Management 31(2): 2012, 19-44. 
68 Matilde Bombardini, "Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation," Journal of International 
Economics 75:2 (2008), 329-348. 
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members within an association can influence the allocation of collective resources 
between service provision and lobbying.  
 This line of research builds on Olson’s arguments about how group size 
influences collective action.  Browne, Vatta, Perry, and Bombardini argue that it is not 
just the size of a group, but the size of members within a group, that determines how it 
behaves.  Terry Moe extends this idea further by considering how the demands of small 
and large members interact within an association.  He theorizes about how internal group 
dynamics influence the goals that associations pursue.  As discussed in Chapter Two, he 
argues that groups offer services to gain members, but they sell these services at a profit.  
Hence, they can use these profits to carry out advocacy.  Group membership gives large 
members legitimacy in government relations because the association lends numbers and 
unity when it advocates for larger members’ interests.69     
 Moe argues that the service demands of small members and the advocacy 
demands of large members can create “a disjunction between member goals and group 
goals.”70  Members who belong to a group for its selective incentives may continue to 
belong even when they disagree with the policies advocated by group leaders.  The 
selective incentives can make it cost effective for them to stay within the group, as long 
as the association does not spend too many resources on advocacy.  When large members 
make demands for advocacy, a group can pursue this advocacy as long as small members 
are receiving sufficient service provision.  It is of key importance for groups to maintain 
large organizations as members because their presence and membership fees make the 
                                                
69 Vatta.  
70 Moe, 75.  
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provision of services more economical.  Without them, groups weaken their lobbying 
power and the provision of services for smaller members becomes more difficult and 
costly.  If they leave a group, it impacts that group’s ability to advocate and to provide 
services.  Because of this, groups must pay careful attention to attracting and maintaining 
large organizations as members.   
 Olson argued that large group “are those where ‘no single individual’s 
contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a whole, or the burden or 
benefit of any single member of the group,” but this does not account for the greater 
influence of large organizations as members.   The presence or absence of small 
organizations as members would not make a perceptible difference to a group, but the 
presence or absence of very large organization does affect a group’s ability to have 
weight in advocacy and provide services cost-effectively.  For this reason, groups must 
tailor to their behaviour to the advocacy interests of large organization members.   
 If their service provision is valuable to small members, group leaders do not have 
to respond to their lobbying demands.  Small members do not place significant 
constraints on lobbying efforts.  However, the presence of large members has a different 
effect on how associations allocate their resources.  Large members have the financial 
and human capital to provide the services that motivate small members themselves.  
Large members place demands on group leaders to pursue their interests through 
advocacy.  They join groups with the aim of achieving collective goods, and therefore 
“group leaders must take action to see that these goods are supplied or risk losing these 
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members and their contributions.”71  Group leaders have an incentive to dedicate 
collective resources to pursuing advocacy on behalf of large members. 
Olson and Moe’s theories of group behavior appear to be in competition with one 
another.  Olson argues that, in large groups, the focus of group behavior is on the 
provision of member services.  As he states, large groups need selective incentives 
because “the larger the group, the less the likelihood that the contribution of any one will 
perceptible.”72  However, Olson does not consider the case when members are not 
individuals but instead represent populations.  Large groups need selective incentives to 
motivate small members, but large members place different demands on groups.  As Moe 
states, Olson does not attempt to analyze internal politics.  Moe addresses this gap by 
considering how the presence of large members shapes internal group dynamics.  He 
states: “The only members that leaders have an incentive to represent are those that join 
out of an interest in collective goods, for their contributions are rationally contingent 
upon political considerations.”73  In order to represent the interests of large members, and 
therefore retain their membership, group leaders must allocate collective resources for 
advocacy.  The question, then, is how do associations balance these competing member 
needs?  Associations must balance demands for advocacy and for services, but how do 
they make decisions of resource allocation?  
This chapter tests the idea that Olson and Moe’s theories are complementary.  
Municipal associations must offer selective incentives in order to attract and retain 
members, but the extent to which they prioritize services or advocacy is dependent on 
                                                
71 Ibid., 74-5.  
72 Olson, 45.  
73 Moe, 78.  
195 
 
their membership composition.  Selective incentives are needed in all large groups, but as 
Browne, Vatta, Perry, and Bombardini argue, services are most needed by small 
members.  Due to their limited internal capacity, small municipalities or firms in an 
association have a high demand for services.  If these demands are not met, group 
membership is no longer rational for them.  So, the more small members there are, the 
greater is the pressure to provide services.  Moe specifies an inverse, yet complementary, 
force in the internal dynamics of associations.  The rationale for large members to join 
groups is based on political, rather than service, considerations.  The greater the presence 
of large members, the more responsive associations must be to their demands for 
advocacy.  That is, the higher the percentage of group size that is accounted for by large 
members, the more resources will be devoted to advocacy work.   
The two internal pressures arise from membership characteristics that can be 
categorized as high or low.  Table 6-2 displays the resulting matrix of service provision 
levels.  All municipal associations carry out both service and advocacy.  This chapter 
tests the expectation that how they choose to allocate their collective resources between 
the two functions depends on the composition of their membership.  
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Table 6-2. Matrix of Service Provisions74 
  
Presence of Large Members 
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High Service Provision 
(SARM, MNL) 
 
Medium Service Provision 
(AUMA, SUMA, AMM, AFMNB, 
FPEIM) 
Note: Municipal associations are placed within matrix quadrants, in parentheses, based 
on their presence of small members and presence of large members, detailed in section 
6.6. 
 
6.5 Selection of Case Studies  
 
Eleven of Canada’s eighteen provincial level municipal associations are used to test how 
membership composition affects associations’ behavior.  Two of the eighteen 
associations – l’Union des Municipalitiés du Québec (UMQ) and Fédération Québécoise 
des Municipalitiés (FQM) – are excluded because their membership lists are not 
                                                
74 When predominance of small members is divided into three categories – low, medium, and high – as 
discussed later in the chapter, three associations have medium predominance of small members and a high 
predominance of large members (AUMA, AMM, and AFMNB).  No association has a medium 
predominance of small members and a low predominance of large members. 
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publically available.75  The Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick (UMNB) is 
excluded because its financial statements are not available to the public.76  Finally, the 
four section associations in Canada are excluded.  Removing section associations and the 
associations with missing data leaves eleven cases in nine provinces.  Six of these 
provinces – Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Ontario, 
Manitoba, and British Columbia – have one association that all municipalities are eligible 
to join.  Saskatchewan and Alberta have separate rural and urban associations.  All four 
are included, as is the association of francophone municipalities in New Brunswick.   
Taken with the six unified associations, the cases account for nine of ten provinces and a 
range of membership sizes.     
When considering membership size, it is important to ask whether all municipal 
associations fit within Olson’s definition of large groups.  The number of members in the 
eleven associations ranges from 40 in the Federation of Prince Edward Island 
Municipalities (FPEIM) to 450 in the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association 
(SUMA).  According to Olson’s taxonomy of groups, large groups are those where “no 
single individual’s contribution makes a perceptible difference to the group as a whole, or 
the burden or benefit of any single member of the group,” and where, “it is certain that a 
collective good will not be provided unless there is coercion or some outside inducements 
that will lead the members of the large group to act in their common interest.”77  Seven of 
                                                
75 Ester Berryman, Adjointe exécutive et Agente - service aux members, UMQ, Email to the Author, 
October 31, 2014.   Claudia Trudel, Adjointe administrative – affaires corporatives et direction générale 
adjointe, FQM, Email to the Author, October 1, 2014.  
76 Raymond Murphy, Executive Direct UMNB, Email to the Author, October 30, 2014.  The financial 
records of UMQ and FQM are also not available.  
77 Olson, 44.  
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the eleven associations fall clearly within the category of large groups.78  These all have 
at least 191 members – large enough that no single municipality’s contribution makes a 
perceptible difference to the group.  It is therefore expected that these associations must 
provide incentives to attract and retain small municipalities as members.  
 Whether the four smallest associations can be considered large groups is less 
obviously clear.  In addition to FPEIM’s membership size of 40, the Association 
Francophone des Municipalitiés du Nouveau-Brunswick (AFMNB) has 52 members, the 
Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) has 54, and the Alberta Association of 
Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC) has 69.  In his taxonomy of groups, Olson 
argues that a small group is one in which “one or more members gets such a large 
fraction of the total benefit that they find it worthwhile to see that the collective good is 
provided, even if they have to pay the entire cost.”79  In Prince Edward Island, where 
only 40 of the province’s 72 municipalities belong to FPEIM, it could be argued that the 
larger municipalities are willing to shoulder the cost of action in order to achieve 
common goods.   FPEIM also differs from other municipal associations because it only 
represents 55.6% of eligible members.  The membership rates in all other associations are 
above 90%.  The Federation works to attract new members through selective incentives 
and new member discounts.  Larger municipalities within FPEIM may be willing to carry 
the majority of cost of working towards common goods, but they believe that having a 
larger number of municipalities as members increases their chance of achieving them.  In 
                                                
78 Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador (MNL), Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO), 
Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM), Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities 
(SARM), SUMA, Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA), and Union of British Columbia 
Municipalities (UBCM).  
79 Olson, 46.  
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response, FPEIM allocates its collective resources to both advocacy and service 
provision.  The Federation acts as a large group, despite its small membership size.   
 A second aspect of Olson’s taxonomy of groups, one discussed in Chapter Five, 
must be considered when asking if AFMNB, UNSM, and AAMDC are large groups.  
Would one member leaving the group raise the cost considerably for other members?  
Olson argues that, “if, in a reasonably small organization, a particular person stops paying 
accordingly, the cost will rise noticeably for each of the others in the group.”80  In both 
AFMNB and UNSM, all eligible municipalities are members. The question of whether 
one member leaving the group would raise the cost for others has not been tested in 
AFMNB and UNSM, but the case of AAMDC can be examined.  One municipality that 
is eligible for AAMDC membership does not belong, but it does not place a considerable 
burden on other members.  In this way, AAMDC functions as a large group.  AFMNB 
and UNSM draw legitimacy from the fact that they represent all eligible members, but it 
appears unlikely that the cost of collective action would rise considerably for 
municipalities if one member left either association.   
6.6 Selection of Variables and Methodology  
 
Now the effect of membership composition on service provision is tested.  This is 
accomplished through multiple regressions.  Two independent variables are used to 
measure the concepts of the presence of small members and the presence of large 
members. The concept of small members is measured by calculating the percentage of 
members that have a population under 2,000.  The concept of large members is measured 
                                                
80 Ibid., 43.  
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by calculating the percentage of an association’s membership population that is 
accounted for by its five most populous members.  These calculations are made by 
comparing 2011 census data to associations’ member lists.  
The first independent variable is the percentage of member municipalities with a 
population under 2,000.  This cut point is used to measure small municipalities because it 
roughly divides the associations into three categories: high, medium, and low presence of 
small members.  In four associations (FPEIM, MNL, SARM, and SUMA) between 85% 
and 97% of municipalities have a population under 2,000.  For three associations 
(AFMNB, AMM, and AUMA) the percentage is between 63.5% and 73%.  Finally, in 
four associations (AMO, UBCM, AAMDC, and the UNSM), less than 30% of members 
have a population under 2,000.  The lowest percentage is 21.7 in AAMDC.  The median 
is 68.2% and the average is 60.4%.  The percentage of member municipalities with a 
population under 500 and 1,000 were also tested.  Their regressions produced similar 
results to those discussed below because of the high correlations between the percentages 
of municipalities with populations under 500 1,000, and 2,000.  The correlation 
coefficients between the three measures were 0.88 (500 and 2,000), 0.96 (500 and 1,000), 
and .97 (1,000 and 2,000).  
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Figure 6-2. Presence of Small Members in Municipal Associations (2013) 
 
 
The second independent variable is the percentage of membership population 
accounted for by the five most populous members.  This measures the presence of large 
members in associations.  For example, the total population of MNL members is 457,021.  
Its five largest members – St. John’s, Conception Bay South, Mount Pearl, Corner Brook, 
and Paradise – have a total population 192,885.  They account for 42.2% of the total 
population of MNL members.  As with first variable, this cutoff point is chosen because 
it sorts out the associations rather well.   
In six associations, the five most populous members account for at least 60% of 
the total membership population.  In five associations, the five most populous members 
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account for less than 42.5% of the total population.  The percentages range from 12.9 in 
the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities to 83.6 in the Federation of Prince 
Edward Island Municipalities.  The average proportion of an associational population 
accounted for by the five most populous members is 51.8%, with a median of 62.5%.  
The presence of the top ten most populous municipalities was also calculated.  Similar to 
500 and 1,000 as measures of small populations, the 10 most populous members 
produced similar regression results as the 5 most populous members, because of the high 
correlation between the two members.  The correlation coefficient between the 
percentage of the membership population accounted for by the 10 largest members and 
the 5 largest members is .99.  
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Figure 6-3. Large Member Presence in Municipal Associations (2013) 
 
  
Associations carry out both advocacy and services, but advocacy is more difficult 
to quantify and compare across organizations.  All associations report firm numbers for 
their service provisions, but their advocacy efforts are reported as generalizations.  Much 
of the work undertaken by associational staffs and elected officials to persuade senior 
levels of government is not formally recorded, and the informal nature of advocacy work 
does not produce the same clear-cut, comparable record of work as member services.  For 
this reason, only service provision is measured.  It is not assumed or expected that the full 
remainders of associations’ budgets are devoted to advocacy – their expenditures include 
rent and occupancy fees, utilities, general staff salaries, honorariums to board members – 
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but services can be quantified and compared across all associations.  Measures of 
member services do not capture the full extent of advocacy, but they do capture a 
measurable piece of the services / advocacy tradeoff.   
The member services offered by associations vary widely, as discussed earlier.  In 
order to make service provision comparable between associations, a few rules are 
employed for counting the number of services that are offered.81  First, bulk purchasing is 
counted as a single service.  This is chosen rather than counting each individual item that 
is available through associations’ trade divisions.  The one exception to this rule is fuel 
procurement programs, because they are treated as separate service entities in 
associations that have a trade division and fuel procurement.  For example, AMM 
operates both the Municipalities Trading Company of Manitoba Ltd. (MTCML) and the 
Petroleum Products Buying Group (AMM 2013).  Similarly, where associations offer 
both insurance for municipalities and extended insurance programs for municipal 
employees, these are counted as separate services.  They address distinct aspects of 
municipal governance – liability and human resources.  
 Associations’ annual conventions are counted as a service, for two reasons.  First, 
although conventions do include advocacy work, such as the passage of resolutions and 
opportunities to meet with provincial government officials, they offer significant services 
to members.  They provide municipal leaders with networking venues, make available 
training and workshops, and include trade shows with access to service providers.  
                                                
81 The number of services and the percentage of budgetary services are used, rather than the number of 
staff members who work on service provision.  This is because the allocation of staff work is less clear than 
other measures of services.  Although some associations designate staff positions as advocacy or services 
based, not all associations have this clarity.  This is particularly true in small associations – where a staff 
size of three or five means that all employees work on both advocacy and service functions. 
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Second, it is not possible to separate convention costs from other service expenditures in 
all of the associations’ financial statements; that is, many associations treat conventions 
as services for accounting purposes.  Under these guidelines, the number of services 
offered by the eleven associations ranges from 4 offered by AAMDC and AMM to 21 
offered by SARM (Figure 6-1).  The median is six and the average is nine.  
The second dependent variable used in testing the relationship between 
membership composition and how associations allocate collective resources is the 
percentage of associational budgetary expenditures used to provide member services.  
These figures are calculated from the associations’ 2013 Statement of Operations.  All 
associations have a line item of “member services” in their financial statements.  But 
other line items also commonly represent member services and are therefore counted here 
in calculations of service expenditures.  These items include insurance and benefits plans, 
conventions, and training and education for elected officials or municipal employees.  
Where separate legal entities exist to provide services – such as the Municipal Employee 
Pension Centre Ontario, affiliated with AMO, and the Alberta Municipal Insurance 
Exchange (MUNIX) operated by AUMA – their expenses are added to the totals for 
member services and total expenditures.  The median is 38.0% and the mean is 39.4%.  
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Figure 6-4. Municipal Association Member Services Expenditures (2013) 
 
 
The distribution of budgetary expenditures and the number of services offered 
(Figure 6-1), by and large, fit with the matrix of expected service provision.  SARM and 
MNL are expected to have the highest levels of service provision, and UNSM is spected 
to have the lowest.  SARM does the highest level of service provision in both measures, 
and MNL is second highest number of services and has a high percentage of budgetary 
expenditures designated to services.  UNSM has one of the lowest levels of service 
provision in both measures.  
With these indicators specified, one can test the hypotheses about membership 
composition and the allocation of collective resources.  First, Table 6-3 displays the 
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bivariate correlations between all the variables.  There is a slight relationship between the 
independent variables.  Their bivariate correlation coefficient is 0.18 but this relationship 
is not strong enough to disturb our analysis.  There is also a relationship between the 
dependent variables, but the correlation coefficient of 0.35 between the number of 
services and service expenditures is not as high as might be expected.  
 
Table 6-3. Correlation Matrix 
 % of members 
with a 
population 
 < 2,000 
% of 
membership 
population 
accounted for 
by the five 
largest 
members 
% of budgetary 
expenditures 
allocated to 
services 
Number of 
member 
services 
offered  
% of members 
with a 
population  
< 2,000 
 .18 .44 .31 
% of 
membership 
population 
accounted for 
by the five 
largest 
members 
.18  -.59* -.61** 
% of budgetary 
expenditures 
allocated to 
services 
.44 -.59*  .35 
Number of 
member 
services offered  
.31 -.61** .35  
Note: Entries are two-tailed Pearson correlations.  
* p. < 0.10  
** p < 0.05 
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The correlations between the membership characteristics and the allocation of 
sources to services run in the expected direction.  For example, the percentage of 
members with a population under 2,000 had a positive effect on the number of services 
offered.  However, none is significant at the .05 level expect for the correlation between 
the percent of membership population accounted for by the five largest members and the 
number of member services offered.  From these basic results, multiple regressions can 
be run to test four hypotheses: 
• There will be a significant relationship between membership composition and the 
percentage of an association’s budgetary expenditures allocated to service 
provision.  
 
o The percentage of member municipalities with a population under 2,000 
will have a positive effect on the percentage of an association’s budgetary 
expenditures allocated to service provision. 
o The percentage of an association’s membership population accounted for 
by its five most populous members will have a negative effect on the 
percentage of an association’s budgetary expenditures allocated to service 
provision.  
 
• There will be a significant relationship between membership composition and the 
number of services provided by an association: 
 
o The percentage of municipalities with a population under 2,000 will have 
a positive effect on the number of services provided. 
o The percentage of an association’s membership population accounted for 
by its five most populous members will have a negative effect on the 
number of services provided. 
 
6.7 Analysis 
 
The results give support for all of the hypotheses (Table 6-4).  On the percentage of 
budgetary expenditures allocated to service provision, the F is significant overall.  Both 
independent variables are also significant at the 0.05 level and exert opposing forces of 
on the dependent variable.  Those forces are roughly similar in strength.  The percentage 
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of members with a population under 2,000 has a standardized coefficient of 0.559 on the 
budget allocated to services, whereas the percentage of the membership population 
accounted for by the five most populous members has a standardized coefficient of -.692. 
 
Table 6-4. Basic Regression Models 
 Percentage of Budgetary 
Expenditures Allocated to 
Services 
Number of Member 
Services Offered 
Constant .55** 
(.17) 
13.68** 
(4.62) 
% of members with a 
population  < 2,000 
.50** 
(.19) 
8.41 
(4.94) 
% of membership 
population accounted for by 
the five largest members 
-.88** 
(.27) 
-20.51** 
(7.39) 
F 7.52** 4.60** 
R-square (adjusted) .57 .42 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
** p < 0.05 
 
 
On the number of services offered by associations, the F is significant overall 
(4.60, sig. = .047), but only one independent variable – the percentage of the membership 
population accounted for by the five most populous members – is significant at the 0.05 
level.  The other variable – the percentage of members with a population under 2,000 – 
acts as expected, but its effect is just shy of the 0.05 confidence level.  
Both multiple regressions give support to the hypothesis that membership 
composition is a significant determinant of how associations balance service provision 
and advocacy.  The ANOVAs for the whole equations are significant at the 0.05 level.  In 
both cases, the null hypotheses can be rejected.  The adjusted R-square for budget 
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allocated to services is .57 and the adjusted R-square for the number of services is .42.  
Both account for a significant portion of the variation in the dependent variables.  
6.8 Conclusion 
 
There is considerable diversity in how municipal associations carry out the core group 
functions of member services and advocacy, but these findings support the idea that 
membership composition can help to explain patterns in this complexity.  Olson argued 
that large groups must provide services to their members, and the fact that all municipal 
associations provide member services reinforces this argument.  However, the regressions 
also provide support for the notion that Olson’s theory on group size and collective action 
is complemented by Moe’s argument that large members have different needs, and 
therefore exert different pressures on the behavior of associations.  Taken together, two 
aspects of membership composition are expected to influence how associations behave: 
the presence of large members and the presence of small members.  The results support 
the idea that Olson and Moe’s theories interact in determining associational behaviour.  
Municipal associations carry out two core functions: advocacy and member 
services.   Olson has argued that group size influences the extent of service provision.  
Other authors studying associations made up of organizations have contended that the 
size of members within a large group determines the extent of group work focused on 
selective incentives.  The limited internal capacity of small members increases the 
pressure they place on groups to provide member services.  Moe furthers these arguments 
by contending that, as small members are reliant on selective incentives, associations can 
sell them at a profit, and use the profit for advocacy.   As Moe argues, large members 
exert pressure on groups to undertake advocacy.  Large members have the internal 
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capacity to self provide services; their membership in groups is driven by the legitimacy 
and weight of a group speaking with a powerful and representative voice in 
intergovernmental relations.  
The findings of this chapter provide further support for Olson and Moe’s theories 
by testing how the presence of small members and the presence of large members interact 
in determining the allocation of associational resources between service provision and 
advocacy.  Municipal associations provide a complex mix of selective incentives and 
employ diverse range of advocacy tactics.  The results of analysis provide strong support 
for the idea that membership composition helps determine how associations balance their 
core functions.  
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Chapter 7  
7 Conclusion  
 
The memberships and behaviours of municipal associations in Canada are complex.  
There are 18 provincial level associations, with membership sizes that range from 8 
municipalities to more than 1,000.  There are associations that represent all municipalities 
in a province, and others that are organized along rural/urban, regional, or 
ethnic/linguistic lines.  In eight provinces, at least once association formed between 1899 
and 1919, but five provinces later underwent changes in the number and type of 
associations formed by their municipalities.  What the 18 associations in Canada share is 
their core functions of advocacy and the provision of member services.  They provide 
services more economically than self-provision by local governments could, work to 
strengthen and improve local governance, advocate for collective interests, and represent 
their members in dealings with senior levels of government.   
Despite their prominent role in local-provincial relations and municipal 
governance, little has been written about municipal associations.  This dissertation 
employed three research questions to empirically test whether there are patterns of 
behaviour that cut through the complexity of municipal association memberships and 
structures.  The findings indicate that two measures of membership composition, rural-
urban heterogeneity and population size, affect different aspects of associational 
behaviour: the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying, the jurisdictional aspect of 
policy requests, and the allocation of collective resources.  The results of each research 
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question are summarized before theoretical contributions and future research are 
discussed in detail.  
 
7.1 Theoretical Contributions 
 
The literature on municipal associations has been dominated by questions related to their 
lobbying strategies.1  In answering where associations target their lobbying efforts and 
the tactics that they employ, the dominant explanations for associations’ actions are 
institutional structures and access to senior government officials.  Membership 
composition has emerged as an important determinant of behaviour, but most research on 
local government associations has remained focused on lobbying tactics.2  This 
dissertation makes an important theoretical contribution by expanding our understanding 
of how membership composition affects other aspects of association behaviour: the 
allocation of collective resources, requests for jurisdictional responsibility, and the 
distribution of issues in intergovernmental lobbying.   
                                                
1 Jens Blom-Hansen, “Policy-Making in Central-Local Government Relations: Balancing Local 
Autonomy, Macroeconomic Control, and Sectoral Policy Goals,” Journal of Public Policy 19:3 (1999), 
237. Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal 
System (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995)..  Beverly A. Cigler, “Not Just Another Special Interest: The 
Intergovernmental Lobby Revisited,” in Interest Group Politics, eds. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2012).  Tom Entwistle and Martin Laffin, “The Multiple Strategies of the 
Local Government Association: Partner, Player, and Think-Tank?” Policy and Politics 31:1 (2003), 47.  
Patricia K. Freeman and Anthony J. Nownes, “Intergovernmental Lobbying in the States,” Southeastern 
Political Review 27:4 (1999), 619-634.  Donald H. Haider, When Governments Come to Washington: 
Governors, Mayors, and Intergovernmental Lobbying (New York: Free Press, 1974).  Beryl A. Radin and 
Joan Price Boase, “Federalism, Political Structure, and Public Policy in the United States and Canada,” 
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 2:1 (2000), 47 
2 William De Soto, “Cities in State Politics: View of Mayors and Managers,” State & Local Government 
Review 27:3 (1999), 188-194.  R. Allen Hays, “Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of 
Issue Priorities,” The Western Political Quarterly 44:4 (1991), 1081-1098. Beverly A. Cigler, “The 
County-State Connection: A National Study of Associations of Counties,” Public Administration Review 
54:1 (1994), 3-11.  
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 Associations carry out two core functions, advocacy and member services, but 
how they prioritize these functions and allocate their collective resources is shaped by the 
population sizes of their members.  Small municipalities join associations for the services 
they provide.  Large municipalities, that can provide the goods sought by smaller 
members themselves, prioritize advocacy and the collective weight small members 
provide in intergovernmental lobbying.   Small and large members place opposing 
pressures on associations.  These findings make a substantial contribution to our 
understanding of collective action in the municipal sector and other interest groups, 
including trade organizations and professional associations.  
 This dissertation also furthers our understanding of the substance of municipal 
associations’ advocacy.  Part of this substance is the jurisdictional aspect of policy 
requests.  Unlike other lobby groups, municipal associations represent another level of 
government that can request the authority and resources to carry out policy programs.  In 
lobbying senior levels of government, municipal associations are concerned with whether 
their interests are met through programs at the provincial level, or through resource 
transfers to fund municipal programs.  The dispersion of municipal populations, and the 
sense of shared interests among members, influences how associations approach 
jurisdictional control in intergovernmental lobbying.  These findings can be used for 
future research on how provincial governments respond to the jurisdictional aspect of 
policy requests.  
 Another major contribution of this dissertation is that it is the first direct analysis 
of how rural/urban dominance and association restructuring affects the behaviour of 
associations.  Prior research on local government associations asserted that they pursued 
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issues of common interest to all members, but did not provide evidence to substantiate 
this claim.  The findings in Chapter Four provide evidence to the contrary.  Rural and 
urban associations pursued issues that were common to their members.  Rural 
municipalities pursue a higher percentage of socio-economic issues when they are in their 
own association, and urban associations pass a higher percentage of jurisdictional 
resolutions.  The pattern of pursuing common interests does not hold true in unified 
associations.  The distribution of resolutions in unified associations is not altered by the 
present or absence of the minority municipal type.  Unified associations do not pursue 
functional issues that are common to all members at a higher rate than rural or urban 
associations.  These findings provide a foundation for further research on how the 
separation of municipalities along rural/urban lines affects their success in achieving 
policy change at the provincial level.  The interests of some municipalities are drowned 
out in unified associations, but it is unknown which type of membership has the strong 
success rate in persuading provincial governments to enact their requests. 
 The final, important, empirical contribution that this dissertation makes is adding 
analysis of Canadian municipal associations to the broader literature on government 
associations.  The literature on government associations has been dominated by research 
in the United States, particularly at the federal level.  This dissertation is the first 
empirical, cross-provincial examination of municipal associations in Canada.  Every 
province and provincial level association is discussed in at least one chapter and the 
majority of them are analyzed multiple times.  The descriptive chapter developed a 
comparable dataset of associational memberships and organizational structures, and the 
subsequent research chapters tested how membership composition affects different 
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aspects of associational behaviour.  These findings advance our understanding of 
municipal associations in Canada and serve as a basis for future research in this area.   
 
7.2 Results by Research Question 
 
Each research question was designed to test how an aspect of membership composition 
affected an aspect of associational behaviour.  Chapter Four examined how the 
restructuring of municipalities between unified, rural, and urban associations influenced 
the distribution of functional, socio-economic, and jurisdictional issues in 
intergovernmental lobbying.  Chapter Five analyzed how the dispersion of member 
populations within an association influences the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, 
whether associations request the power and resources to carry out programs, or whether 
they request the provincial government to carry out programs on their behalf.  Finally, 
Chapter Six tested how the competing interests of small and large municipalities affect 
how associations allocate their collective resources between member services and 
advocacy.  The findings all lend support to membership composition as a determinant of 
associational behaviour.  
 
Restructuring and Membership Cohesion  
 
Chapter Four examined rural-urban heterogeneity as a measure of membership 
composition.   This measure has not received direct attention in early research on local 
government associations.  In other federal states, each sub-national unit has one 
association containing both rural and urban members.  In Canada, provinces either have, 
or had, multiple associations divided along rural/urban lines.  The municipalities in four 
provinces have undergone associational restructuring, changing between unified and 
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rural/urban associations.  Prior research on local government associations found that they 
pursue issues common to all members, but restructuring and the altering of membership 
composition changes what issues are of common interest.   
It was expected that the effect of restructuring would manifest itself differently in 
rural and urban associations.  Rural areas were expected to pursue socio-economic issues 
and urban associations were expected to pursue jurisdictional issues.  Unified 
associations were expected to pursue functional issues that were common to all 
municipalities in the province.  The results gave support to the hypotheses on the 
behaviour of rural and urban associations, but found that unified associations reflected 
the interests of their majority municipal type, rather pursuing common, functional issues.  
The chapter tested the relationship between membership cohesion and the degree 
of non-financial control that associational members want over programs and policies.  In 
the research questions, heterogeneous and homogeneous were used to describe the 
dispersion of member populations.  When municipalities split into separate rural and 
urban associations, these are both more homogeneous than the unified association they 
left, and as a result they are expected to approach intergovernmental lobbying differently.  
When rural municipalities form their own organization, there is a greater cohesion in 
socio-economic conditions than in a unified association.  What urban municipalities share 
is the diversity of their conditions.  It is this shared diversity that is expected to translate 
to requests for jurisdictional responsibility in urban associations.   When associations 
restructure along rural/urban lines, the extent and basis of cohesion in their membership 
changes.  This is expected to change the types of issues they pursue when lobbying at the 
provincial level.  
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Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario were used to examine how restructuring 
affected the issues pursued by associations in intergovernmental lobbying.  In each 
province, a unified association was formed between 1899 and 1907.  Between 1933 and 
1949, municipalities left each unified association had municipalities leave to form either 
an urban association (Manitoba), a rural association (Ontario), or rural, cities, and towns 
associations (New Brunswick).  New Brunswick and Ontario both underwent further 
restructuring in the following decades.  Municipalities would later remerge into unified 
associations in Ontario (1982) and Manitoba (1999).  These changes are natural case 
studies for measuring how restructuring and changes in membership composition affect 
association behaviour.  
To test the effect of these changes, the resolutions passed by associations ten 
years prior to, and ten years following, instances of restructuring were coded and 
compared.  Two of the hypotheses were supported by the data: 1. When rural 
municipalities left a unified association to form their own association, the percentage of 
socio-economic resolutions increased and 2. When urban municipalities left a unified 
association to form their own association, they passed a higher percentage of 
jurisdictional resolutions than the unified association they left.  These findings support 
the idea that rural and urban associations act differently.  The findings did not support the 
hypothesis that unified associations pursued functional issues because they were common 
to all members.  Instead, unified associations reflected the interests of their majority 
municipal type and were not affected by a group of their members leaving to form a 
separate association.  The minority municipal type, whether rural or urban, gets drowned 
out in a unified association.  In short, the findings indicate that restructuring changes the 
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ability of the minority municipal type to express its interests in intergovernmental 
lobbying, but has little effect on the unified association.   
 
Jurisdictional Aspect of Policy Requests  
 
Chapter Five analyzed the relationship between the overall dispersion of member 
populations and how associations approach the jurisdictional aspect of advocacy.  It 
considered whether associations request provincial programs or resource transfers in 
order to enact programs at the municipal level.  It was expected that associations with 
relatively homogeneous member populations are expected to lobby for provincial 
programs to meet their requests, as they see the interests of other members as similar to 
their own.  In associations with significant dispersion in member populations, it was 
expected that members request the resources or authority to institute programs at the 
municipal level, as they are unlikely to think that the majority of other members share 
their interests.  The findings gave support to these hypotheses.  
 Prior research has established that associations use direct tactics to lobby senior 
levels of government.  There is little research on the nature of these lobbying requests, 
but local government associations differ from other interest groups because they are a 
level of government, and can request to carry out public policies themselves.  As 
Cammisa discussed, “while government lobbies are interested in particular policies, they, 
unlike other groups (or at least to a greater extent than other groups), are also interested 
in the spatial dimension of any policy, that is, who will have the authority in 
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implementation and control of funds.”3  In Hays’ examination of Congressional 
testimony by state, county, and urban groups, he found that state and local groups sought 
to evade jurisdictional responsibility, while urban groups sought to gain control over 
policy areas.4   He attributed jurisdictional requests to greater cohesion amongst city 
members, but Chapter Three considered the inverse of the extent of population dispersion 
and what associations demand in jurisdictional policy requests.  If a narrow dispersion of 
member populations translates into more cohesive interests, it is expected that cohesive 
associations would lobby for provincial programs to meet their needs, as they see the 
interests of other members as similar to their own.  In associations with a high variation 
in member populations, it is expected that members will request the resources to institute 
programs at the municipal level.  They are unlikely to think that the majority of other 
members share their interests.  
 The chapter used four municipal associations to test the relationship between 
population dispersion and the jurisdictional aspect of policy requests.  The four cases 
were drawn from three provinces: two with unified associations (Nova Scotia and British 
Columbia) and one with split rural and urban associations (Alberta).  Gini coefficients 
were used to calculate the extent of statistical dispersion with their member populations.  
The Alberta Urban Municipalities Association (AUMA) and the Union of British 
Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) had highly heterogeneous memberships, where as the 
members of the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) and the Alberta 
                                                
3 Anne Marie Cammisa, Governments as Interest Groups: Intergovernmental Lobbying and the Federal 
System (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 25.  
4  R. Allen Hays, “Intergovernmental Lobbying: Toward an Understanding of Issue Priorities,” The 
Western Political Quarterly, 44:4 (1991), 1081-1098. 
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Association of Municipal Districts and Counties (AAMDC) and more homogeneous 
populations.  
 The resolutions passed by four municipal associations were analyzed to test the 
hypotheses.  Resolutions are drafted and voted on by members, they are passed at their 
annual conventions, and they are the foundation of associations’ policymaking and 
agenda setting.  In short, they: 1. Indicate priority areas, and 2. Propose solutions of what 
to do about problems.  The governments of Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia 
all offer official responses to the resolutions passed by the municipal association(s) in 
their province.  Municipalities draft resolutions with the knowledge that, if they are 
passed at the association level, they will be seen and responded to by the relevant 
government ministry.  
 To test the relationship between the dispersion of member populations and 
jurisdictional requests, the resolutions passed over a fifteen-year period, 1999 – 2013, 
were examined.  Resolutions were coded by requested jurisdictional responsibility: 
municipal, provincial, federal, municipal-provincial, municipal-federal, municipal-
provincial-federal, provincial-federal, or non-jurisdictional.   The distribution of 
resolutions by jurisdictional responsibility by association supported both hypotheses.  In 
the two homogeneous associations, AAMDC and UNSM, the majority of resolutions 
requested that a higher level of government act without any municipal involvement or 
responsibility.   In the heterogeneous associations, AUMA and UBCM, a plurality of 
resolutions requested sole municipal responsibility and the majority of them requested 
municipal involvement, through either sole or shared responsibility.  Associations with 
homogeneous member populations lobbied primarily for provincial programs, and 
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associations with heterogeneous member populations lobbied primarily for the resources 
or authority to enact municipal programs.  These results reinforce the findings from 
Chapter Four that member diversity, whether rural/urban or population size, has a 
positive relationship with association requests for greater jurisdictional control.  
 
Allocation of Collective Resources 
 
Municipal associations carry out two core functions – member services (the 
provision of selective incentives) and advocacy (the promotion of common goods).  How 
associations prioritize these functions is largely unclear.  Chapter Five explored how two 
aspects of membership composition affect their activities.  These were the presence of 
small communities in the membership and the membership presence of large 
municipalities.  Multiple regression analysis found strong support for the aspects of 
composition affecting the number of services an association provides and the allocation 
of budgetary expenditures between member services and advocacy.  
 The chapter found that there is diversity in the member services offered by 
associations and the advocacy tactics that they employ.  The majority of prior research on 
local government associations has been focused on lobbying tactics, and the range of 
tactics they employ has been well documented.  There is a consensus that direct contact 
with incumbents at senior levels of government is the predominant lobbying strategy of 
groups that represent elected officials.  The predominance of direct tactics has been 
attributed to the status afforded to elected officials as elected officials.  The findings in 
Chapter Three reinforce the consensus in the literature.  Municipal associations in Canada 
use a variety of tactics to appeal directly to the provincial government.  These include 
conventions and resolutions; “bear pit sessions” with the premier and cabinet ministers; 
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ministers’ delegations; annual meetings with government officers; submissions to 
provincial committees, commissions, and reports; and memorandum of understanding.   
There have been some instances of associations “going public” with media 
strategies and public campaigns, but these are the exception, rather than the norm.   
Recent examples of public appeals indicate that associations only employ indirect 
advocacy when direct tactics have been exhausted and relations with the provincial 
government are strained.  In 2007, the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (UNSM) 
went public after the provincial government breached its Memorandum with UNSM.  In 
2013 and 2014, the Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM) went public on the 
issue of forced amalgamations.  Most associational advocacy is direct, but associations 
are willing to go to the public on major issues of municipal-provincial disagreement.   
Olson and Moe’s theories of group behaviour were used to test whether there are 
patterns that could cut through the complexity of advocacy and member services in 
associations.5  Municipal associations offer selective incentives in order to attract and 
retain members, but how they balance services or advocacy is dependent on their 
membership composition.  Due to their limited internal capacity, small municipalities or 
firms in an association have a high demand for services.  If these demands are not met, 
group membership is no longer rational for them.  So, the more small members there are, 
the greater is the pressure to provide services.  The rationale for large members to join 
groups is based on political, rather than service, considerations.  The greater the presence 
of large members, the more responsive associations must be to their demands for 
                                                
5 Mancur Olson Jr. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1965). Terry M. Moe, The Organization of Interests: Incentives and the Internal 
Dynamic of Political Interest Groups (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980).  
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advocacy.  That is, the higher the percentage of group size that is accounted for by large 
members, the more resources will be devoted to advocacy work.   
Multiple regressions were used to test how these competing pressures interact.  
Two independent variables were used to measure the concepts of the presence of small 
members and the presence of large members: the percentage of members that have a 
population under 2,000 and the percentage of an association’s membership population 
that is accounted for by its five most populous members.  Two dependent variables were 
used: the number of services that associations offer and the percentage of budgetary 
expenditures that are allocated to service provision.   It was expected that the percentage 
of member municipalities with a population under 2,000 would have a positive effect on 
percentage of an association’s budgetary and the number of services provided.  It was 
also expected that the percentage of an association’s membership population accounted 
for by its five most populous members would have a negative effect on the percentage of 
an association’s budgetary expenditures allocated to service provision and on the number 
of services provided. 
The results gave support to all of the hypotheses.  Both independent variables 
were also significant at the 0.05 level and exert opposing forces on the dependent 
variables.  There is considerable diversity in how municipal associations carry out the 
core group functions of member services and advocacy, but these findings support the 
idea that membership composition can help to explain patterns in this complexity.   
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7.3 Future Research 
 
The findings from this dissertation advance our understanding of how membership 
composition affects the behaviour of municipal associations, but they also create four 
avenues for future research.  
1. Evaluate provincial responses to associations 
2. Extend research by looking at other membership inputs and policy outputs 
3. Generalize through replication 
4. Examine internal politics  
 
As noted above, the research questions focused on associational input at the provincial 
level, but provincial responses to policy requests are still largely unknown.  This is the 
first avenue for future research.  The heterogeneity of member populations influences the 
jurisdictional aspect of policy requests, but to what extent do provincial governments 
follow an association’s requested course of action?  Associations with homogeneous 
populations are more likely to request provincial action and heterogeneous associations 
requested resource transfers to carry out programs at the provincial level, but do these 
translate into policy differences at the provincial level?   
 Similarly, Chapter Four found that the interests of some municipalities are often 
drowned out in unified associations.  What remains unknown is whether unified or split 
associations have better success in changing public policy.  The Union of Manitoba 
Municipalities and the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities merged, in part, 
because the provincial government used their division to defend inaction.6  Future 
research can test whether provincial governments are more responsive to the policy 
                                                
6
 Gordon Goldsborough, With One Voice: A History of Municipal Governance in Manitoba (Alton, MBL 
Frisen Printers, 2008), 113-115.  
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requests of unified or split associations.  Should minority municipal types advocate for 
better representation within unified associations or form their own, independent 
organizations?  Municipal associations facilitate local input at higher levels of 
government.  This dissertation examined how membership composition shapes the issues 
associations advocate for, creating a foundation for future research on provincial 
responses to associational requests.  
 The second avenue for future research is extending the methodological approach 
of correlating membership characteristics with associations’ behaviour to other 
membership inputs and policy outputs.  Two inputs – population size and rural/urban 
dominance are used – but other factors of membership composition can be employed.  
Does the number of member affect their behaviour?  What is the affect of members’ 
financial status?  How does the the geographic dispersion of municipalities affect their 
sense of member cohesion?  Likewise, three outputs are measured in this dissertation – 
issue types, jurisdictional requests, and the allocation of collective resources – but other 
aspects of associations’ behaviour can be measured and tested.  How do association staff 
and executives prioritize the resolutions passed by their members?  What determines the 
number of resolutions passed?  Which municipal functions receive the most attention in 
advocacy work?  What types of services do associations offer?  Extending this 
dissertation’s methodological approach to other policy outputs can deepen 
understandings of municipal associations’ behaviour.   
 Another avenue of future research is generalizing findings through replication. 
The research questions employed in this dissertation can also be extended to other federal 
and unitary states.  The 49 municipal leagues and 47 associations of counties in the 
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United States can be used to test whether the relationship between member populations 
and the allocation of collective resources holds true with a larger number of cases.  The 
more than 124 unitary state and federal-level local government associations can also be 
used to re-test the hypotheses in Chapter Six when advocacy is carried out a higher level 
of government.  Are the interests of small and large municipal balanced in the same way 
at both sub-national and national levels? 
 National level local government associations can also be used to expand the scope 
of the hypotheses tested in Chapter Four.  Although Canada is the only federal state to 
have separate rural and urban associations at the sub-national level, a number of countries 
have multiple associations at the national level.  These include: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Estonia, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the United States.7  
Do the patterns of behaviour between rural and urban associations found in Chapter Four 
hold true in other cases?  The research questions and methodologies used in this 
dissertation can be replicated in future research to test whether the relationships between 
membership composition and associational behaviour found in Canada’s sub-national 
associations hold true in other countries and in local-national relations.  
 The fourth avenue of future research is examining the internal politics of 
associations.  This dissertation used the approach of correlating inputs and outputs, 
without focusing on internal dynamics, but there are future research opportunities to 
study internal politics.  What are the internal processes of electing association officials 
and ensuring the representation of diverse interests in board meetings?  What role does 
                                                
7 United Cities and Local Governments, “UCLG Local Government Associations,” www.cities-
localgovernments.org.  
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the executive director play?  How strategic are associations in using unofficial partisan 
ties of their elected officials?  How, and to what extent, is the formally non-partisan 
nature of municipal governments in most provinces used in advocacy work?  What types 
of resolutions fail, and what factors contribute to resolution failure?  How has the change 
by AMO to pass resolutions within subsidiary groups changed its lobbying behaviour and 
effectiveness?  To what extent are internal tensions between members addressed in 
meetings and conventions?  How often do municipal association work with other interest 
groups?  Has the growth of other interest groups diminished municipal associations’ role 
within the policy process?  All four of these avenues of future research can be pursued to 
expand our understanding of local government associations and associational behaviour 
in Canada and abroad.  
 
7.4 Conclusion  
 
Municipal associations carry out a number of important functions in municipal 
governance and local-provincial relations.  They all provide services and carry out 
advocacy, but the forms that these functions take vary widely by association.  There are 
commonalities amongst them – all use organization structures to represent internal 
divisions, hold annual conventions, and lobby senior levels of government – but services 
reflect provincial conditions.  SARM members can purchase discounted gopher poison 
and AMBM helps its members provide services in French.  The policy requests made to 
senior levels of government reflect the same kinds of differences.  AFMNB advocates for 
greater francophone representation at the provincial level and UNSM has been heavily 
involved with the development of coastal management strategies.  Associations must also 
grapple with the internal diversity of member interests and needs.  Municipalities vary in 
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size, region, legal type, ethnicity/language, and rural/urban character.  Associations can 
represent tiny villages and large urban centres, local governments in strong economic 
regions and those in decline, densely populated areas and remote rural municipalities.  
 Despite the diversity of association members and their interests, the majority of 
research on local government associations has been focused on the lobbying tactics they 
employ.  Little has been written on the substance of their lobbying.   This dissertation 
does not cover all aspects of associational activities or measures of membership 
composition, but it does provide exploratory, empirical findings on how membership 
composition structures association behaviour.  More research is needed, but this 
dissertation provides evidence of the diversity in municipal associations’ memberships, 
structures, and activities, and how these areas interact.  In short, membership composition 
cuts through the complexity of municipal associations to explain patterns in how they 
function.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Record of Fieldwork  
 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador  
 
Locations and Dates Visited:   
• St. John’s, July 20 – 27, 2013 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 4,883 
 
Records Digitized at:  
• Legislative Library, Newfoundland and Labrador House of Assembly 
• The Rooms Corporation of Newfoundland and Labrador (Provincial Archive) 
• Memorial University of Newfoundland (MUN), Centre for Newfoundland Studies 
 
Digital Records Received from: 
• Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador  
 
Categories of NLFM / MNL Records Digitized: 
• Annual Briefs to the Provincial Government 
• Annual Conventions: Report of Proceedings 
• Clippings of Newspaper Articles Referencing the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Federation of Municipalities (NLFM) (Collected by the Legislative Library / 
Department of Municipal Affairs) 
• NLFM Committee Proceedings (Interventions Committee, Pension Benefits 
Committee, Resolutions Committee) 
• Miscellaneous Printed Documents 
• NLFM “Municipal News” Newsletter 
• President’s Report 
• Press Releases 
• Reports 
• Speeches 
 
 
Nova Scotia   
 
Locations and Dates Visited:   
• Halifax, June 9 – August 4, 2013 (excluding July 7-12 and 20-27)  
• Wolfville, July 30, 2013 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 16,492 
 
245 
 
Records Digitized at:  
• Provincial Archives of Nova Scotia 
• Legislative Library, Nova Scotia Legislative Assembly 
• Acadia University Library, Esther Clark Wright Archives 
 
Digital Records Received from: 
• Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities 
 
Categories of UNSM Records Digitized: 
• Annual Proceedings 
• Resolutions from Annual Meetings 
• Briefs and Submissions to Royal Commissions 
• Newsletter 
• Papers / Articles on UNSM 
• Press Releases 
• Publications (Municipal Councilor Orientation Guides, Candidates Guides, 
Handbook on Inter-Municipal Partnership and Co-Operation) 
• Reports 
• Speeches 
 
 
Prince Edward Island   
 
Locations and Dates Visited: 
• Charlottetown, August 5 – 21, 2013 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 3,353 
 
Records Digitized at:  
• Federation of Prince Edward Island Municipalities  
• University of Prince Edward Island, Robertson Library 
 
Categories of FPEIM Records Digitized: 
• Annual and Semi-Annual Meetings (Agendas, Minutes, and Proceedings) 
• Annual Submissions to Provincial Government 
• Constitution 
• Correspondence 
• Municipal Forum (Newsletter) 
• Presentations 
• Reports by FPEIM 
• Reports to FPEIM  
• Speeches to FPEIM 
• Submissions to Royal Commissions and Legislative Assembly Committees 
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New Brunswick   
 
Locations and Dates Visited: 
• Fredericton, July 5 – 12, 2015 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 7,590 
 
Records Digitized at: 
• The Legislative Library of New Brunswick 
• Provincial Archives of N.B. 
• University of New Brunswick Library, Archives and Special Collections 
 
Digital Records Received from: 
• Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau-Brunswick 
• Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-
Brunswick  
• Union of Municipalities of New Brunswick 
 
Categories of Association of Villages of New Brunswick Records Digitized: 
• Budgets and Financial Statements 
• Meeting Minutes (Committees, General) 
• Constitutions 
• Reports 
• Resolutions 
• Speeches 
 
Categories of Cities of New Brunswick Association Records Digitized: 
• Briefs 
• Constitutions 
• Minutes of Executive Council Meetings 
• Minutes of Proceedings 
• Reports 
• Resolutions 
• Resolutions of the Executive 
 
Categories of New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association Records Digitized: 
• Minutes of Meetings 
• Proceedings 
 
Categories of Provincial Municipal Council Records Digitized: 
• Briefs 
• Budgets and Warrants 
• Correspondence 
• Financial Documents 
• Meeting Minutes 
• Reports 
247 
 
• Resolutions 
 
Categories of Research and Information Centre Records Digitized: 
• Committees 
• Minutes 
• Reports 
• Summary of Activities 
 
Categories of Towns of New Brunswick Association Records Digitized:  
• Agendas 
• Auditor’s Report 
• Lists of Board of Directors Members 
• Correspondence 
• Financial Statements 
• Minutes 
• Reports 
• Resolutions 
 
Categories of Union of New Brunswick Municipalities Records Digitized: 
• Financial Documents 
• General Correspondence 
• Minutes 
• Miscellaneous Undated Documents 
• Proceedings 
• Programmes of Proceedings 
• Reports 
• Resolutions 
• Submissions to Government 
• Supporting Papers for Meetings 
 
Categories of Villages and Towns of New Brunswick Records Digitized: 
• Resolutions 
 
 
Ontario   
 
Resident, 2011 – 2015   
 
Visited: 
• Toronto, October 21-23, 2014; January 14-15 and March 27, 2015 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 13,943 
 
Records Digitized at:  
• Association of Municipalities of Ontario 
• Toronto Public Reference Library 
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• The University of Western Ontario, The D.B. Weldon Library   
 
 
Digital Records Received from:  
• Association of Municipalities of Ontario 
 
Categories of AMO Records Digitized: 
• Annual Reports 
• Conference Programmes 
• Policy Guidelines and Positions  
• President’s Reports 
• Resolutions  
 
Categories of AOMR Records Digitized: 
• Resolutions 
• Submissions to the Premier 
 
Categories of OARM Records Digitized: 
• Convention Proceedings 
• Resolutions 
 
Categories of OMA Records Digitized: 
• Annual Briefs 
• Convention Proceedings  
• Resolutions 
• Submissions to the Provincial Government 
 
 
Manitoba   
  
Locations and dates visited: 
• Winnipeg, June 7 – 14, 2014 
• Portage la Prairie, June 12, 2014 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 13,495 
 
Records Digitized at:  
• Association of Manitoba Municipalities 
• Legislative Library, Government of Manitoba 
• Provincial Archives of Manitoba 
 
Digital Records Received from:  
• Association of Manitoba Municipalities 
• Gordon Goldsborough, author of With One Voice: A History of Municipal 
Governance in Manitoba. Alton, MBL Frisen Printers, 2008.  
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Categories of AMM Records Digitized: 
• Annual Convention Programmes 
• Annual Reports 
• Financial Statements 
• Lobbying Highlights 
• Presidential Messages 
• Reports 
 
Categories of MAUM Records Digitized: 
• Annual Conference Proceedings 
• Reports 
 
Categories of UMM Records Digitized: 
• Annual Convention Programmes 
• Minutes (Conventions, Executive Meetings, General, June District Meetings) 
• Reports 
 
 
Saskatchewan 
 
Locations and Dates Visited: 
• Regina, May 25 – June 6, 2014 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 19,236 
 
Records Digitized at:  
• Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Legislative Library  
• Saskatchewan Archives Board 
• Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities 
• Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association 
 
Digital Records Received from:  
• The New North: Saskatchewan Association of Northern Communities 
• Provincial Association of Resort Communities of Saskatchewan 
• Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities 
• Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association 
 
Categories of SANC Records Digitized: 
• Memorandum of Understanding  
• Newsletter 
• Resolutions  
• Strategic Plan  
 
Categories of PARCS Records Digitized: 
• Constitution 
• Convention Proceedings 
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• Policy Papers 
 
Categories of SARM Records Digitized: 
• Annual Convention Proceedings and Resolutions  
• Annual Reports  
• Briefs to the Provincial Government 
• Minutes of Executive Government Meetings 
• Financial Statements 
• Policy Positions 
• The Rural Councilor (Newsletter) 
 
Categories of SUMA Records Digitized: 
• Annual Conventions  
• Annual Reports 
• Constitutions 
• Minutes of Executive Government Meetings 
• Internal Reviews 
• Reports  
• Resolutions 
• Strategic Plan Documents 
• Submissions to Government 
• Task Force on Urban Government Renewal – Various Documents 
 
Alberta   
 
Locations and Dates Visited: 
• Edmonton, May 12 – 24, 2014 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 15,176 
 
Records Digitized at:  
• Alberta Urban Municipalities Association 
• Legislature Library, Legislative Assembly of Alberta 
 
Digital Records Received from:  
• Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties 
• Alberta Urban Municipalities Association 
 
Categories of AAMDC Records Digitized: 
• Annual Convention Programmes 
• Annual Reports 
• News Coverage of AAMDC 
• Position Statements 
• Submissions to Government 
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Categories of AUMA Records Digitized: 
• Annual Convention Programmes 
• Annual Reports 
• Briefs to the Provincial Government 
• Reports 
• Resolution Books 
• Statuses of Resolutions 
 
British Columbia   
 
Locations and Dates Visited: 
• Victoria, April 26 – May 3, 2014 
• Vancouver, May 4 – 10, 2014 
 
Pages of Records Digitized: 21,250 
 
Records Digitized at:  
• BC Archives 
• Legislative Library of British Columbia 
• Union of British Columbia Municipalities  
 
Digital Records Received from:  
• Union of British Columbia Municipalities  
 
Categories of UBCM Records Digitized: 
• Annual Convention Minutes 
• Annual Convention Programmes 
• Annual Reports 
• Electoral Boundaries Commission 
• Okanagan Mainline Municipal Association 
• Provincial Responses to Resolutions 
• Speeches 
• Submissions to the Provincial Government 
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Summary  
 
Table Appendix A-1 – Summary of Fieldwork 
Province Days of Fieldwork Pages of Records Digitized 
Newfoundland and Labrador 8 4,883 
Nova Scotia 31 16,492 
Prince Edward Island 16 3,353 
New Brunswick 6 7,590 
Ontario 6 13,943 
Manitoba 8 13,495 
Saskatchewan 12 19,236 
Alberta 13 15,176 
British Columbia 14 21,250 
Total 114 115,418 
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Appendix B: Sources for Resolutions 
 
Alberta: 
 
• Alberta Association of Municipal Districts and Counties, Resolutions Database. 
1999-2013. www.aamdc.com.  
• Alberta Urban Municipalities Association. Status of Resolutions. Edmonton: 
Alberta Urban Municipalities Association, 1999-2007.  
• Alberta Urban Municipalities Association. Resolutions. 2008-2013. 
www.auma.ca. 
 
British Columbia: 
 
• Government of British Columbia. “Provincial Response to the Resolutions of the 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities Convention.” 1999-2013. 
www.umbc.ca.  
 
Manitoba:  
 
• Union of Manitoba Municipalities, Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities 
and Association of Manitoba Municipalities Resolutions, Compiled by Gordon 
Goldsborough.  
 
New Brunswick: 
 
• Union of New Brunswick Municipalities. Annual Proceedings. Fredericton: 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, 1939-1959. 
• Cities of New Brunswick Fonds. “Minutes of Proceedings.” 1949-1958. 
Provincial Archives of New Brunswick. 
• New Brunswick Rural Municipalities Fonds. “Minutes of Meetings and 
Proceedings.” 1950-1959. Provincial Archives of New Brunswick.  
 
Nova Scotia: 
 
• Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities. Annual Proceedings. Halifax: Union of 
Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1946-1971. 
• Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities. Report of Resolutions. Halifax: Union of 
Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1981.  
• Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities. The Municipal Open Line. Halifax: Union 
of Nova Scotia Municipalities, 1996-2006. 
• Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities. Resolutions. 2011-2013. www.unsm.ca.  
 
Ontario: 
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• Ontario Municipal Association. Convention Proceedings. Toronto: Ontario 
Municipal Association, 1923-1942.  
• Ontario Municipal Association. Resolutions Presented and Actions Taken. 
Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1962-1971.  
• Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities. Annual Convention Proceedings. 
Toronto: Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities, 1945-1967 
• Association of Municipalities of Ontario. Policy Guidelines and Resolutions. 
Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 1972-1987 
 
Saskatchewan 
 
• Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities. Report of the Proceedings of 
the Annual Convention. Regina: Saskatchewan Association of Rural 
Municipalities, 1946-1986. 
• Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities. Resolutions. 2011. sarm.ca. 
• Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association. Report of the Annual 
Convention. Regina: Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 1946-1971. 
• Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association. Resolutions. 2011. 
www.suma.org. 
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Appendix C: Member Services Provided by Primary Associations 
AAMDC 
• Trade Division 
• Jubilee Insurance Agencies 
• PFA Canada  
AFMNB 
• Municipal Insurance 
• Non-Profit Insurance 
• Accounting Standards  
• Bulk Purchasing 
• Payment method for procurement process 
AMM 
• Municipalities Trading Company of Manitoba Ltd. 
• Petroleum Products Buying Group 
• Municipal Insurance 
AMO 
• 311 Service for Municipal Information 
• Energy Procurement 
o Electricity 
o Natural Gas 
o Fuel 
• Planning Tools 
o Energy Planning Tool 
o Energy Management Tool 
• Home and Auto Insurance  
• Closed Meeting Investigator 
• Energy Consulting 
• Investments 
• Solar Photovoltaic 
• Consolidated Energy Billing 
• Group Benefits for Municipal Employees 
• Municipal Risk Management 
• Streetlight Program 
• Training Programs 
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AUMA 
• Consulting Services 
• Election Worker Training 
• Casual Legal Services 
• Sample Service Agreements 
• Human Resources 
o Benefits Services 
o Retirement Services 
o HR Documents and Templates 
o Job Postings 
• Energy Services / Energy Program 
• Insurance and Risk Management 
• Investment Services 
• Aggregated Utility Services 
o Electricity  
o Natural Gas 
FPEIM 
• Professional Development Training 
• Group Insurance 
• Discounted Furnace Oil Rates  
MNL 
• Government Purchasing Authority 
• TRIO – NL Municipal Employee Benefits Inc. 
o Complete Group Health and Life Insurance Programs 
o Pension Plan 
o Group Retirement Savings Plan 
o Employee Assistance Program 
• Municipal General Insurance Program 
• Telephone Parliamentary Procedures Advisory Service 
• Community Cooperation Office 
• Enterprise Rent-A-Car Discounts 
• World Lynx (Corporate Share Plan) 
• Telephone Legal Referral Service 
• Infonote (Email/Fax Broadcast System) 
• Municipal Symposium (Training) 
• Human Resources 
o CareerBeach.com Job Postings 
o Free Human Resources Telephone Advisory Service 
• Le Grow’s Travel Discounted Travel Agency Services 
• MNL – PFA Fuel Program 
• MNL Tire Program 
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• Provincial Airlines Ltd. Travel Agreement (Discounted Flights) 
SARM 
• Municipal Support (Training for Elected Officials and Municipal Administrators) 
• Information Services 
• Legal Services 
• Community Planning Services 
• Employee Benefits Programs 
• Trading Department 
• Municipal Fund Management 
• Beaver Control Program 
• Provincial Rat Eradication Program 
• Invasive Plant Programs  
o Plant Management 
o Plant Control 
• Strategic Initiatives Program 
• Municipal Capacity Development Program 
• Beaver Control Program 
• Irrigation Structures Program 
• Wild Boar Control Program 
• Municipal Leaders Development Program 
• Crown Land Survey Fund 
• Rural Municipal Administrator Internship Program 
• SARM Fuel Supply Program  
• Municipal Insurance  
SUMA 
• Group Benefits Program 
• Insurance for Municipal Protective Services Volunteers 
• SUMAssure Insurance Programs 
• SUMAdvantage (Bulk Purchasing) 
UBCM 
• Advertising and Sponsorship 
• Commercial Vehicle Licensing Program 
• Cat and Dog Tags 
• Group Benefits Program 
• Petro-Canada SuperPass Rebate Program  
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Appendix D: Background on Municipal Association Restructuring in Manitoba, 
New Brunswick, and Ontario 
 
 
The effects of municipal association restructuring in Manitoba, New Brunswick, and 
Ontario on the issues pursued in intergovernmental lobbying are tested in Chapter Four.  
This appendix provides further, descriptive details on these restructurings, including how 
associations have dealt with internal conflicts and external divisions.  
 
Manitoba 
 
Of Manitoba, New Brunswick, and Ontario, Manitoba has undergone the simplest set of 
changes in municipal association structures.  The province started with one unified 
association in 1905.  An urban association formed in 1949, making the unified 
association primarily rural.  In 1999 the two associations remerged into a unified 
organization.8  The first meeting of the Union of Manitoba Municipalities (UMM) in 
March 1905 was attended by 31 rural and urban municipalities.9  Within five years, its 
membership grew to 102 municipalities.  This number declined to 86 by 1924, and would 
continue to fluctuate in the following decades.  In his history of municipal governance in 
Manitoba, Gordon Goldsborough attributes this fluctuation to the dire economic status of 
many municipalities in the province during the World Wars and Great Depression.  He 
                                                
8 There is a section association in Manitoba, l'Association des municipalités bilingues du 
Manitoba (AMBM), that formed in 1995.  AMBM is not considered in this chapter because it does not use 
a resolutions process to carry out lobbying at the provincial level.  AMBM’s mandate is to help 
municipalities adopt bilingualism policies and provide municipal services in French.   Its seventeen 
members all belong to the Association of Manitoba Municipalities and have the opportunity to pursue 
issues through AMM. Association des municipalités bilingues du Manitoba, 
“Mandat,”directionmanitoba.com.   
9 Gordon Goldsborough, With One Voice: A History of Municipal Governance in Manitoba (Alton, MB: 
Frisen Printers, 2008), 13-14.  
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argues that the choice of municipalities to leave UMM was “more a reflection of tough 
economic times that caused penny-pinching municipalities to forego a perceived luxury 
than dissatisfaction with the UMM itself.”10  Dissatisfaction with UMM amongst urban 
municipalities did come to the surface in the 1940s and ultimately resulted in the 
formation of an independent urban association.  
In October 1949, delegates from urban municipalities across the province met to 
consider forming a new association of urban municipalities.  The Mayor of Dauphin had 
put forward the proposal of a new association in response to growing tensions between 
UMM’s urban and rural members.  At the meeting, delegates cited discontent with 
UMM’s priorities.  The Winnipeg Free Press reported that:  
The Mayor of Portage la Prairie, Rev. H.L. Henderson criticized former work 
done by the Union of Manitoba Municipalities on behalf of urban municipalities 
… [and] called for the formation of an ‘aggressive’ association to find a solution 
to the many problems in connection with provincial assistance in education, 
charity relief, fair distribution of the gasoline tax, and the maintenance of high-
speed heavy roads, now facing urban municipalities.11 
 
Others at the meeting, including Mayor John W. Pratt of Birtle, argued that it was “unfair 
to expect a group of rural men in the union to spend their time trying to solve problems 
which were related to towns and cities.”12  Delegates at the meeting voted to form the 
Manitoba Urban Association (MUA), later renamed the Manitoba Association of Urban 
Municipalities (MAUM).13  Delegates were split on whether the new association should 
be affiliated with, or stand in opposition to, UMM.  The issue was not resolved at the 
                                                
10 Ibid., 46.  
11 “Municipalities From All Over Province Organize Manitoba Urban Association,” The Winnipeg Free 
Press, October 28, 1949.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Goldsborough, 46.  
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meeting, but affected urban membership in UMM the MAUM and went on to become 
fully independent.  
A number of municipalities, including the Cities of Winnipeg and Brandon, 
maintained membership in both UMM and MUA, but after MUA formed, UMM’s urban 
membership immediately dropped by 40%.  In four years, the majority of cities, towns, 
villages, and suburban municipalities in Manitoba were MUA members.  MUA used this 
fact to leverage increased urban representation at the provincial level.  In 1953, MUA 
members passed a resolution that asked the provincial government “to have a 
representative from the Manitoba Urban Association appointed as a member of the 
various Provincial Boards on which there [were] representatives from the Union of 
Manitoba Municipalities.”14  Rural and urban municipalities in Manitoba were polarized, 
and MUA strove to institutionalize this division.  The two associations would remain split 
for fifty years.  
Despite their formal division, membership overlap between UMM and 
MUA/MAUM persisted.  Membership in both associations was open to any municipality.  
Many of MUA/MAUM’s records have been lost, but in 1987, 17 municipalities belonged 
to both associations (Figure Appendices-1).15  
                                                
14 Manitoba Urban Association, 1953 [Carried Motions Only] (Winnipeg: Manitoba Urban Association, 
1953), 3.  
15 As Goldsborough notes: “In February 2001, the early history of the MAUM and UMM vanished in an 
avalanche of snow when the roof of the AMM office in Portage la Prairie collapsed.”  Two of UMM’s 
secretary-treasurers had deposited most of UMM’s early records in the provincial archives, but MAUM’s 
records were not archived.   The City of Brandon had kept most resolutions passed by MAUM, which 
Goldsborough compiled and shared with the author, but nearly all other MAUM records have been lost.  
Goldsborough, 104.  
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Figure Appendix D-1. Membership Overlap of the Union of Manitoba 
Municipalities (UMM) and the Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities 
(MAUM) (1987) 
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Fifteen of the overlapping members were urban municipalities (one city, ten towns, and 
four villages) and two were rural (one local government district and one rural 
municipality).  In addition, two rural municipalities (both local government districts) 
belonged only to MAUM and 29 urban municipalities (one city, eight towns, and 20 
villages) belonged only to UMM.  Despite the overlap, MAUM was an explicitly urban 
association and UMM was primarily rural.  UMM had started as a unified association, but 
after MUA’s formation, it formalized rurality in its constitution.  A 1993 resolution noted 
that “the Union of Manitoba Municipalities constitution only [allowed] Rural Municipal 
Councillors to be eligible to run for Director of the U.M.M. Board.”16  UMM and 
MAUM’s memberships overlapped, but there were still distinct rural and urban 
differences between them.  
In spite of their distinctiveness, UMM and MAUM began discussions of 
reunification in the late 1980s.  In part, these discussions reflected a change in 
Manitoba’s primary municipal division.  When the Manitoba Urban Association formed 
in 1949, the core municipal tension was rural/urban.  By the time UMM and MAUM 
entered into merger talks forty years later, the core tension had shifted to Greater 
Winnipeg vs. non-Greater Winnipeg.  This shift is evident in the activities of MAUM in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Despite being an association for urban municipalities, its members 
passed resolutions that argued for “justice for rural Manitoba,”17 asked the province to 
                                                
16 Union of Manitoba Municipalities, 1993 Resolutions [All Motions] (Portage la Prairie: Union of 
Manitoba Municipalities, 1993), 16.  
17 Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, MAUM Resolutions – 1991 [Carried Motions Only] 
(Winnipeg: Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, 1991), 3.  
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protect rural interests vis-à-vis Winnipeg when drawing electoral boundaries,18 and 
advocated for changes in legislation to assist farmers.19  In 1996, they passed a resolution 
that stated: 
WHEREAS 60% of the population of Manitoba is concentrated in the City of 
Winnipeg; and WHEREAS this is detrimental to the rest of the province socially 
and economically; and WHEREAS the Rural Municipalities are losing their youth 
population; NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Manitoba Urban 
Association of Urban Municipalities urge the Province of Manitoba to take steps 
to decentralize and redistribute the population of Manitoba through strategic 
economic planning.20 
 
UMM and MAUM were split along rural/urban lines, but this division had become 
incongruent with the primary municipal division in the province.  It no longer served the 
primary interests of many municipalities.  
 In addition to this incongruence, merger talks were spurred by a sense amongst 
UMM and MAUM officials that “having two municipal organizations in the province 
was counter-productive to the advancement of municipal interests,” and that “a common 
response to both UMM and MAUM was along the lines of ‘that’s a good idea but we will 
have to consult with the other organization.’”21  Former MAUM president Jae Eadie later 
noted: 
When there were two associations in Manitoba, there were often the challenges of 
‘divide and conquer’ employed by the provincial governments, whereby they 
would pit urbans against rurals on many issues. These tactics allowed provincial 
governments to avoid dealing with serious issues while they sat back and watched 
the two municipal associations … battle things out with each other.22 
                                                
18 Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, MAUM Resolutions – 1990 [Carried Motions Only] 
(Winnipeg: Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, 1990), 5.  
19 Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, MAUM Resolutions – 1992 [Carried Motions Only] 
(Winnipeg: Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, 1992), 6.  
20 Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, MAUM Resolutions – 1996 [Carried Motions Only] 
(Winnipeg: Manitoba Association of Urban Municipalities, 1996), 6.  
21 Ibid., 110. 
22 Ibid., 111.  
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This recognition coupled with the shift from rural/urban to Greater Winnipeg vs. non-
Greater Winnipeg created openness to merging UMM and MAUM.  
The formal push for a merger originated with the City of Brandon.  Brandon had 
changed its membership multiple times between UMM and MAUM between 1972 and 
1984.  Although Brandon was the second-largest city in Manitoba, it felted overshadowed 
by Winnipeg in MAUM.  In 1984 it encouraged informal talks between the UMM and 
MAUM executives on reunification.  In 1989 and 1990, Brandon submitted resolutions to 
UMM’s annual convention that called for a merger between the two associations.  Both 
of these motions failed, but Brandon mayor Rick Borotsik continued to push for UMM 
and MAUM to merge.23   
 MAUM and UMM formed a joint task to consider a merger in 1995.  In 1997, 
MAUM’s members considered two resolutions on a potential merger.  One, put forward 
by the Village of Ste. Anne, called for MAUM to “discontinue its negotiations with the 
UMM for the purposes of amalgamation.”  It argued that “there [was] little to gain [from] 
such a move and that the concerns of the UMM [were] quite different in most part from 
those of the MAUM.”24  The second resolution, put forward by Brandon, asked MAUM 
to “proceed with the Union of Manitoba Municipalities in the formation of one municipal 
association to represent all municipalities in Manitoba.”25  MAUM members passed the 
second motion, and UMM members voted to support a merger the following year. 
                                                
23 Ibid. 111-13.  
24 Manitoba Urban Municipalities Association, MAUM Resolutions – 1996 [All Motions], 9.  
25 Ibid., 9.  
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 In 1999, the unified Association of Manitoba Municipalities (AMM) was 
founded.  AMM’s formation was promoted as a merger, but was it effectively a takeover 
of MAUM by UMM.26  Fifty years after leaving UMM, Manitoba’s urban municipalities 
were folded back into it – albeit under a new name.  Despite this, AMM did create 
accommodations for rural/urban representation that had not been present in UMM.  
AMM elects a Vice-President Rural and a Vice-President Urban.  Each of its six 
geographic districts elects one rural representative and one urban representative to the 
Board of Directors.  The City of Winnipeg is also given one seat on the Board.27  The use 
of the Board structure to represent both rural and urban interests in AMM appears to be 
effective.  All 201 municipalities in Manitoba joined AMM within its first year and it has 
maintained full municipal membership.28 
 
New Brunswick 
 
The initial restructuring of municipal associations in New Brunswick mirrored Manitoba, 
but its outcome has been more complex.  In 1948/9, an urban association broke away 
from the province’s unified association, the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities 
                                                
26 Goldsborough notes: “The office of the new Association of Manitoba Municipalities would be located 
in Portage la Prairie, in the former UMM office.  The UMM president would serve as its first president, 
with the MAUM president and UMM vice-president becoming the two vice-presidents.  Three MAUM 
vice-presidents were moved down to the board of directors along with all members of the existing UMM 
board and a single member representing the northern region from the 16-person MAUM board.  Assets of 
the two trading companies were merged under the name of UMM’s Municipalities Trading Company of 
Manitoba Limited.  … UMM Executive Director Jerome Mauws and the entire eight-person UMM staff 
became the incoming AMM staff.  The much smaller MAUM staff – executive director Rochelle Zimberg, 
an accountant, and secretary – stepped down and found other jobs in Winnipeg.” Goldsborough, 115.  
27 Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 1999 Annual Report (Portage la Prairie: Association of 
Manitoba Municipalities, 1999), 6-7.   
28 Association of Manitoba Municipalities, 2000 Annual Report (Portage la Prairie: Association of 
Manitoba Municipalities, 2000), 3.   Association of Manitoba Municipalities, “Who We Are,” 
www.amm.mb.ca.  
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(UNBM).29   By 1951, two more associations were founded in the province, one for 
towns and one for counties.  The complexity continued to grow in the following decades.  
A total of nine municipal associations have existed in New Brunswick, with up to four 
existing at one time.   
 The Union of New Brunswick Municipalities was in founded in 1906/7.  Its early 
records did not report membership lists, but by 1949 all but two municipalities in the 
province were members.30   In 1948/9, elected officials from the province’s three cities – 
Fredericton, Moncton, and Saint John – formed an association independent from UNBM.  
It was initially called the New Brunswick Tri-Cities Federation.  After a series of name 
changes, they settled on the Cities of New Brunswick Association (CNBA).31  Their early 
work focused on the financial status of cities and securing financial aid from the 
provincial government.  At their inaugural meeting, CNBA members passed a resolution 
stating that, unless their requests for financial assistance were given proper attention, “the 
responsibility of the three cities will cease when a financial crisis is reached.”32  CNBA 
members felt their needs were not given sufficient attention within UNBM and passed 
                                                
29 The first recorded meeting of the cities association in New Brunswick was held in January 1949.  The 
minutes of this meeting reference a prior meeting of the association, but do not specify its date.  The New 
Brunswick Tri-City Federation, “Minutes of the Proceedings of the ‘Tri-City Meeting,’” January 20, 1949, 
1. 
30 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Convention of the 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities (Fredericton: Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, 1949), 10-
11.  
31 The New Brunswick Tri-City Federation, 1. Other names formally used by the Cities Association in 
New Brunswick were: “Tri-City” Meeting (1949), The New Brunswick Tri-Cities Federation (1949), The 
Three Cities of New Brunswick (1951), Tri-Cities Association (1951), The Cities of New Brunswick (1952, 
1965-1966, 1968, 1970, 1972-1973), The Cities (1953), The Five Cities of New Brunswick (1958), The Six 
Cities of New Brunswick (1959-1964, 1967), The Cities of New Brunswick Association (1971, 1974-
1988).  Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cités du Nouveau-Brunswick has been 
used since 1988.  Other informal names used in the Association’s records include: New Brunswick Cities, 
Six Cities Organization, Cities Association.  
32 Ibid., 5.  
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resolutions to inform the provincial government when cities were not consulted in the 
preparation of UNBM briefs.33   The cities maintained their individual memberships in 
the Union, but used CNBA to lobby the provincial and federal governments 
independently.   
By 1951, associations for both rural municipalities (counties) and towns were also 
formed.  The records of the Union of New Brunswick Towns (UNBT) have been lost, but 
details on restructuring can be drawn from the records of UNBM, CNBA, and the New 
Brunswick Rural Municipalities Association (NBRMA).  Their records show that the 
formation of the associations was not without dissent.  The motion to form the “Rural 
Municipalities Association of New Brunswick” and meet independently before the 
UNBM’s annual convention passed unanimously at the initial meeting of counties, but 
conflict followed.  At the second meeting of NBRMA, L.P.A. Robichaud of Kent County 
put forward a motion to disband the rural association and express disapproval of the cities 
“meeting together and separately for any purpose.”34  Robichaud argued that any 
grievances should be aired at UNBM conventions.  He believed that separate 
organizations could lead to the downfall of the Union.  Referencing the inaugural 
meeting, Robichaud stated: “If I had known that one of the purposes of the meeting was 
to form a new association, I would have certainly been here, even if I had to walk.”35  He 
argued that rural municipalities were only reacting to the formation of CNBA and that 
they were being jockeyed into forming their own.   
                                                
33 The Cities of New Brunswick, “Proceedings of ‘The Cities of New Brunswick’ Meeting,” December 
17, 1952, 8.   
34 New Brunswick Rural Municipal Association, “1950-1: Proceedings of the Second Meeting,” 
December 11, 1950, 4.  
35 Ibid., 2. 
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 His motion did receive some support, but others did not share his belief that the 
formation of a rural association would break up UNBM. W.L. Durick from 
Northumberland County argued:  
As we all know the cities have a good many conditions to contend with that we in 
the rural municipalities have not.  But we, in the rural municipalities also have 
conditions that the cities are not faced with at all.  Now, Mr. Robichaud has 
stated, ‘Don’t let ourselves be jockeyed.’ We have been jockeyed for ten (10) 
years at least.  We have been jockeyed by the cities and towns and we have been 
jockeyed and gotten nowhere.  It is coming to a time today that in June, 1952, 
when the subsidy of the Dominion runs out we shall have to fight for anything we 
might get.  But we should have an association.  We should be able to talk this 
matter over with the association.  The conditions that exist in towns and cities and 
rural municipalities are entirely different in each of them.  They come with force 
and knowledge and all influence necessary [from] these cities and towns they 
have got all they want … we take the dregs or left-overs.  We don’t want in any 
way to bust up the Union of Municipalities.  I don’t think there is any necessity of 
busting up the Union.36 
 
Ultimately, Robichaud’s motion was not voted upon and delegates confirmed the 
existence of a rural association.  They proceeded to elect a new president, H.L. Thomas 
of Carleton County.  When he addressed the meeting, he echoed Durick’s sentiment that 
a rural association was needed, in part, because of the knowledge gap between urban and 
rural officials.  He stated: “It seems to me that many of us are farmers and fishermen in 
the rural districts and we are not up to the latest of everything of the resolutions that come 
before the Union.”37   He argued that the new association could be a space for rural 
councillors to learn more about proposed resolutions before they were voted on at the 
UNBM convention.  Rural municipalities formed their own union not only because they 
had distinct interests, but also because they perceived themselves as having different 
                                                
36 Ibid., 5. 
37 Ibid., 9.  
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capabilities in addressing municipal issues.  This sentiment was not unanimous, but there 
was enough support to form a rural association.  
The formation of the cities, towns, and rural associations also caused friction 
within the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities.  At the 1953 convention, the UNBM 
Executive put forward a special resolution on the matter:  
WHEREAS during the past few years several categories of muncipalitiés, cities, 
towns and counties, have each set up separate organizations to foster the interests 
of their respective groups; 
 
AND WHEREAS this action if continued, may result in the destruction of the 
Union because of friction arising between the several groups; 
 
BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED THAT the Union of N.B. Municipalities 
recommends to the several groups that such separate organizations be 
discontinued and that the provision be made in the Union programme for the 
cities, towns and counties to meet separately as committees during the Union 
meeting to consider any matters referred to such committees as having reference 
only to such group and that the reports of such committee be then referred to the 
general meeting of the Union for action.38 
 
Consideration of the resolution was deferred after representatives of the separate 
associations stated that they intended to keep meeting independently.  W.J. Gallant spoke 
on behalf of NBRMA and stated that the rural association discussed the UNBM 
Executive’s motion, but had decided to carry on as an independent organization.  Gallant 
argued that the rural union was set up as a study group, rather than a pressure group.  He 
pledged that NBRMA would “co-operate in every way with the parent Union of 
Municipalities.”39  The CNBA spokesperson, Mayor Thomas Horsler of Lancaster, stated 
that that the cities had come to the same conclusion as the rural municipalities.  He 
                                                
38 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, Proceedings of the 47th Annual Convention (Fredericton: 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, 1953), 17.  
39 Ibid., 17.  
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argued that the cities association was a study group that would co-operate with UNBM 
but wanted to maintain independence.  Only the towns association was “prepared to 
discontinue their organization if it would be beneficial to the Union.”40  They argued that 
there had been conflicting interests within the Union since the separate organizations 
formed.41   
 NBRMA and CNBA claimed that they were only study groups, and did not intend 
to act as pressure groups, but their actions do not support these claims.  Both associations 
passed their own resolutions, and while some of them were forwarded to the Union for 
consideration by its full membership, others were sent directly to the provincial 
government.  Both associations were exerting independent pressure at the provincial 
level.  UNBM continued to push for reunification, but CNBA rejected a request from the 
Union for them to disband in 1954.42 
 In the years that followed, the cities, towns, and rural associations interacted with 
one another outside of UNBM.  In 1954, CNBA requested to meet with UNBT because 
“The Cities’ problems were pretty much the same as those of ‘The Towns.’”43  There is 
no record of whether this meeting occurred.  CNBA requested collaboration with the 
Towns again in 1959.  They passed a resolution that: “’The Cities’ invite the Union of 
N.B. Towns to support the request of ‘The Cities’ that the Provincial Government 
                                                
40 Ibid., 18.  
41 Ibid., 18.   
42 The Cities of New Brunswick, “Report of the Proceedings of ‘The Cities of New Brunswick’ 
Meeting,” September 13, 1954, 5-6.  
43 Ibid., 10  
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participate to the extent of paying 50% of the total cost of snow removal.”44  Discussions 
around the role and affiliation of associations also continued within UNBM.  
 In 1960, the President of UNBM, Ralph T. Pearson, took a softer tone on the issue 
of separate associations.  In his address at the UNBM annual convention, he argued:  
It is good to have the Cities, Towns and Rural Municipalities meet as they do and 
discuss problems that are common to each and then when they meet here as a 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities let it be a Union of All and let the 
deliberations be for the best interests of all Municipalities so that they may go 
with near as possible the unanimous vote of this the Government closest to the 
people.45 
 
By 1962, the UNBM Executive had changed its tone again.  They put forward a 
resolution for consideration at the convention that stated: 
RESOLVED that whereas for the past several years there has been a division in 
the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities through having both a rural and 
cities organization; 
 
AND WHEREAS a common objective should be the aim of this Union in its 
relations with the Provincial Government; 
 
BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED that the Union of New Brunswick 
Municipalities revert to its original intent, one Union united for progress.46 
 
UNBM members did not vote on the motion.  The following year, the Union’s President 
proposed that the “subsidiary” organizations – Cities, Towns, and Rural – either cease to 
function or come under the purview of UNBM as caucuses.  If the groups continued to 
meet, he wanted them those meetings to happen within the UNBM structure, rather than 
independently.  This time, UNBM members adopted a resolution to undertake a study of 
                                                
44 The Six Cities of New Brunswick, “Minutes of ‘The Six Cities of New Brunswick’ Meeting,” 
September 23, 1959, 2. 
45 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, Proceedings of the 54th Annual Convention (Fredericton: 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, 1960), 12.  
46 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Convention (Fredericton: 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, 1962), 22.  
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incorporating the subsidiary associations as Union caucuses.47  However, provincial 
plans for the restructuring of municipal governments further divided municipalities in the 
province and thwarted the idea of a remerging.  
The 1964 Report of The Royal Commission on Finance and Municipal Taxation 
in New Brunswick, or Byrne Report, proposed large-scale restructuring of municipal 
governments.  Its recommendations would affect cities, towns, and counties differently.  
Most of the 1964 UNBM convention was devoted to discussions of the Byrne Report and 
members passed a resolution that asked the provincial government “not to implement the 
report of the Byrne Commission in its entirety.”48  The UNBM Executive called a special 
meeting in December 1965 to articulate further objections, but it had a difficult time 
reaching consensus on the issue, because NBRMA, UNBT, and CNBA were submitting 
their own reports to the Byrne Commission.  UNBM’s Executive members voted 
unanimously to reject the Byrne Report, but they could not agree on a proposed 
alternative.49   
CNBA passed a motion to inform UNBM that stated: “the Cities’ delegates will 
take a very keen and active part in the [Union’s] deliberations with the understanding that 
if the matter comes before a vote, the Cities’ delegates will not be bound by the vote as it 
is the intention of the Six Cities of N.B. to submit a brief regarding the Byrne Report to 
                                                
47 Ibid., 36.  
48 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, Proceedings of the 56th Annual Convention (Fredericton: 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, 1963), 25.  
49 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, “Meeting of the Executive of the Union of New Brunswick 
Municipalities,” December 10, 1965.  
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the Provincial Government.”50  Again, CNBA was acting as independent pressure group 
vis-à-vis the province.  
The Byrne Report furthered CNBA’s independence, but the New Brunswick 
Equal Opportunity Program caused UNBM to disband.  Equal Opportunity dissolved the 
province’s county governments, whose membership fees provided the majority of 
UNBM’s funds.  The last recorded UNBM convention was held in 1964.  In 1968, former 
UNBM members held a meeting intended to restart the Union.  Minutes from that 
meeting stated: “When the Municipal Re-Organization went through it left the Union in a 
state of disorder, with a large portion of the executive ceasing to exist, because of the fact 
that the Municipalities which they represented did not exist, and therefore the Union did 
not have a full executive at the present time.”51  If UNBM reformed it would need new 
leadership.  Prior to the 1968 meeting, the Union’s honorary secretary-treasurer, Mark 
Yeoman, sent letters to all cities, towns and villages in the province “regarding the 
reorganization and re-establishment” of UNBM.  He reported that “five out of seven 
Cities rejoining and paying their dues, fourteen of twenty towns done the same, and 
twenty-two out of seventy-six villages,”52 but not all elected municipal officials shared 
Yeoman’s vision of how, or whether, UNBM should be reestablished.  
A number of delegates at the meeting noted that associations for cities and towns 
already existed, and proposed than an association for villages should be formed.  Some 
argued that the Union could exist as a federation amongst three associations, but that the 
                                                
50 The Six Cities of New Brunswick, “Report of the Proceedings of the ‘Six Cities of New Brunswick’ 
Meeting,” August 25, 1964, 10.  
51 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, “Union of New Brunswick Municipalities Meeting, “April 
27, 1968, 1.  
52 Ibid., 2.  
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separate associations should continue to exist.  A village councillor argued that the 
priority should be the formation of a village association, in case the UNBM did not 
restart.  A resolution was passed to form a “committee of representatives from villages, 
towns, and cities who are now members of this organization in good standing, to make a 
study include the name or any changes which they may wish to bring out, on the 
reorganization and planning of the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities.”53  It 
included six representatives, split evenly between cities, towns, and villages.  There are 
no records of whether the committee met, but UNBM did not reorganize as a functional 
body.  
A July 1969 letter from Mark Yeoman to the Department of Regional Economic 
Expansion in Ottawa stated: 
I regret to tell you that our Association is now dormant and has not carried out 
any activities for the last two years or more. 
 
The Association was composed of the representatives of all the Municipal 
Governments of New Brunswick, including Cities, Counties, Towns and Villages.  
However, the financial backbone of the organization was provided by the 
Counties, and when these were abolished by the Provincial Government it became 
impossible for the Association to function.54 
 
He echoed the same sentiment in a January 1970 letter to the Executive Director of the 
Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities (CFMM): 
                                                
53 Ibid., 3.  
54 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, “Letter to the Department of Regional Economic 
Expansion,” July 14, 1969.  A letter to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities also stated 
“Our Union is made up of representatives of the Cities, Towns and Villages and Counties of New 
Brunswick, but the Counties contributed far the larger part of the costs of operation.  In the course of the 
municipal re-organization carried out by the present Government, the Counties were abolished, and with 
that the Union ceased to function.”  Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, “Letter to the Canadian 
Federation of Mayors and Municipalities,” 25 September 1969.  
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The Union of New Brunswick Municipalities still exists, but I very much regret to 
say that it is entirely dormant and has no funds with which to pay the [CFMM] 
dues. 
 
This Organization gave sixty years of honourable service to the citizens of New 
Brunswick.  I hope to see the day when it will be possible to revive it and make it 
useful again.  For the present, however, I can only ask you to allow our 
membership to remain in abeyance and to forego collection of dues.55 
 
This letter is the last recorded activity of the Union of New Brunswick Municipalities.  
The province’s other associations continued to function in its absence.   
 The post-UNBM period of municipal associations in New Brunswick was marked 
by disorganization and confusion.  The Cities of New Brunswick Association continued 
to be active and meet regularly, but the associations representing towns and/or villages 
were less formalized.56  The 1968 meeting of UNBM members noted that the province 
had a towns association, but a 1969 letter from Yeoman to The Special Senate Committee 
on Poverty in Ottawa stated “There is, in existence, an Organization representing the 
Cities, which is fairly active [and] there is also a Union of Towns, but as far as I know it 
is almost completely inactive.”57  A January 1970 letter from the Canadian Federation of 
Mayors and Municipalities to Yeoman noted “the confusion that surrounds the situation 
                                                
55 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, “Letter to the Canadian Federation of Mayors and 
Municipalities,” January 7, 1970.  
56 Although the Cities of New Brunswick (Association) was the most active of the municipal-type 
organizations both before and after UNBM dissolved, it was still less formalized than UNBM.  The Cities 
began to meet in 1949, but did not pass a constitution until 1970.  As well, the association’s internal records 
show that at least six names – The New Brunswick Tri-City Federation, the Three Cities of New Brunswick 
(The) Cities of New Brunswick, The Six Cities of New Brunswick, Cities of New Brunswick Organization, 
and Cities of New Brunswick Association – Association des Cite du Nouveau-Brunswick have been used 
since its formation.   
57 Union of New Brunswick Municipalities, “Letter to the Special Senate Committee on Poverty,” July 
31, 1969.  
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with regard to municipal associations in New Brunswick.”58  The incomplete records of 
municipal associations in the decades that followed clear up only part of this confusion.   
Pieced together, the fragmented records give a rough outline of what associations 
existed when in New Brunswick.  There is correspondence between the City of 
Campbellton and a Villages & Towns of New Brunswick Association (VTNBA) in 
1973.59  By 1976, an Association of the Villages of New Brunswick (AVNB) had 
formed.60  New Brunswick towns, which had organized under the name the Union of 
New Brunswick Towns prior to VTNBA, formed the Towns of New Brunswick 
Association – L’Association des Villes du Nouveau-Brunswick (TNBA-AVNB).61  
During this period of change and instability, the integration of the province’s 
municipalities into a unified association was considered several times.  
In 1971, a Municipal-Provincial Conference was held, which established the 
Provincial-Municipal Council (PMC).  The Council’s mandate was “to act as a liaison 
between the associations and the Province of on all issues of common concern.”62  It met 
every second month and involved representatives from the associations and the 
Department of Municipal Affairs.  The associations paid dues to belong to the Council, 
but the Council not have official jurisdiction over them.  It acted as an “umbrella 
                                                
58 C.H. Langlois, Executive Director Canadian Federation of Mayors and Municipalities, “Letter to the 
Union of New Brunswick Municipalities,” January 12, 1970.  
59 F.L. Caldwell, Assistant City Clerk, Campbellton, “Letter to Mayor Allen Hicks, President of the 
Villages & Towns in New Brunswick,” December 5, 1973.  
60 Association of the Villages of New Brunswick, “Excerpt from Minutes, Association of the Villages of 
New Brunswick,” May 1, 1976.  
61 Towns of New Brunswick Association – L’Association des Villes du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Financial 
Statements – Etats Financiers,” December 31, 1981.  
62 Provincial-Municipal Council, “Brief Presented to the Executive Council of New Brunswick,” 
February 25, 1988, ii.  
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organization,” rather than an independent association or federation of municipalities.63  
Following the formation of the Council, CNBA continued to forward its resolutions 
directly to the provincial government, but sent copies of them to the other members of the 
Provincial-Municipal Council.64  
Outside of the Provincial-Municipal Council, CNBA continued to consider further 
affiliation with the other associations in the province.  In 1970, the CNBA Executive 
proposed to associate with urban towns, in order to strengthen the voice of urban New 
Brunswick in provincial affairs.65   That same year, the CNBA’s President met with the 
President of the UNBT on the possibility of a “loose association” between the two 
organizations.  The CNBA President reported that the Towns’ President had agreed to 
discuss the proposal at towns’ next meeting and report back to the Cities.  The matter was 
not discussed at CNBA’s next meeting in December 1970.  It was next addressed in 
February 1974.  At that meeting, CNBA members passed a resolution that stated: 
“RESOLVED that the Cities of New Brunswick Association request the Minister of 
Municipal Affairs to convene a meeting of the three municipal associations of elected 
officials in the Province in the early spring, with a view of discussing the notion of one 
integrated municipal association for New Brunswick.”66  Two months later, CNBA 
tabled a motion to endorse an amalgamation of the province’s associations into one 
                                                
63 Ibid. 
64 Cities of New Brunswick Association, “Minutes of Meeting of the Cities of New Brunswick 
Association,” May 10, 1975, 2.  
65 Cities of New Brunswick, “Minutes of the Cities of New Brunswick Meeting,” January 30, 1970, 1.  
66 Cities of New Brunswick Association, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Cities of New Brunswick 
Association,” February 9,1974, 4. 
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union.67  This amalgamation did not occur.  A 1980 TNBA-AVNB Annual Meeting 
agenda includes a report from the “Federation of New Brunswick Municipalities 
Committee,” but there are no records of this committee’s work and a federation did not 
form.68  
In 1989, L’Association francophone des municipalités du Nouveau–Brunswick 
(AFMNB) was founded.69  Its membership was open to any francophone or bilingual 
municipality in the province.  There are minimal records of New Brunswick’s municipal 
associations from the 1980s and 1990s, but in 1994, Morrison v. New Brunswick, 19994 
3949 (NB QB) named “Villages of N.B. Association, Towns of N.B. Association, Cities 
of N.B. Association, and L’Association des municipalités du Nouveau Brunswick” as the 
province’s four municipal associations.70  
The most restructuring of municipal associations in New Brunswick occurred in 
1995.  The Association of the Villages of New Brunswick and the members of the now 
anglophone Towns of New Brunswick Association merged to form the Union of 
Municipalities of New Brunswick (UMNB).  Under UMNB’s constitution, “every 
municipality of the Province of New Brunswick, so incorporated by the virtue of Chapter 
20 of the Statues of New Brunswick 1966, shall be eligible for membership in the 
organization.”71   UMNB was intended as a unified association, but it functions as an 
                                                
67 Cities of New Brunswick Association, “Minutes of Meeting of Cities of New Brunswick Association,” 
April 27, 1974, 8.  
68 Towns of New Brunswick Association – L’Association des Villes du Nouveau-Brunswick, “Annual 
Meeting Agenda,” October 3-4, 1980.  
69 Association des francophone municipalités du Nouveau Brunswick, “Mission et mandat,” 
www.afmnb.org.  
70 Morrison v. New Brunswick, 1994 3949 (NB QB), 8.  
71
 Union of the Municipalities of New Brunswick. Constitution. Article 5.1. www.umnb.ca. 
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association for the province’s anglophone towns and villages.  AFMNB and CNBA have 
continued to function.  There is some membership overlap between the three associations, 
but only two cities belong to UMNB and only four other municipalities belong to both 
UMNB and AFMNB.   
 
Figure Appendix D-2. Membership Overlap of New Brunswick Municipal 
Associations (2015) 
 
 
 
UNBM and AFMNB now refer to one another as “sister organizations,” but do not have a 
formal relationship and neither association has a formal relationship with CNBA.  
 
Ontario 
 
Ontario has also had a complicated history of municipal association restructuring.  The 
Ontario Municipal Association (OMA) was founded as a unified association in 1899.  
Since then, Ontario has had five independent municipal associations and more than a 
dozen sub-associations.  Independent associations are the focus of analysis, but the 
280 
 
history of sub-associations will be discussed, as they highlight how municipal 
associations in Ontario have attempted to represent divisions amongst municipal types 
and geographic areas.  
 OMA was founded as a unified association, but by 1919 it had created a Rural 
Section and an Urban Section to ease rural/urban tensions within the organization.  The 
sections met at OMA’s conventions and were used as forums for rural and urban 
municipalities to discuss proposed resolutions that were germane to their members.  
Section members voted on recommendations as to whether germane resolutions should 
be passed by OMA’s general membership.72   The attempt to ease rural/urban conflict 
proved largely futile.  The association’s membership was too closely divided.  In 1929, 
OMA’s membership was nearly evenly divided between rural and urban municipalities.  
64 of the 126 members were townships, and there were 26 cities, 21 towns, 6 villages, 8 
counties, 1 municipal union.73   However, the number of votes that each member received 
was based on its municipal type and population. Each member was allocated one voting 
representative, plus an additional representative for each $5.00 of its membership fee, as 
long as each representative was a member of the council or an officer of the 
municipality.74   Fees were based on municipal type, with urban municipalities paying 
more than their rural counterparts, entitling them to greater representations.  At the 
extremes, cities with a population over 100,000 were entitled to have 41 representatives, 
while townships and villages were only entitled to 3.  The number of urban and rural 
                                                
72 Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of the Ontario 
Municipal Association (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1919), 53-72. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Meeting of the Ontario 
Municipal Association (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1931), 143.   
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municipalities that belonged to OMA was near parity, but the majority of votes belonged 
to urban representatives.   
The effect of this split and the association’s rural/urban tensions became evident 
in the resolutions process.  In 1929, 74.2% of proposed resolutions were carried.  In 1930 
the percentage fell to 55.8% and by 1931, the percentage dropped to 31.8%.  That year, 
only 56 of the 176 resolutions voted on by OMA received consensus from the general 
membership.  In 1932, the percentage of resolutions that passed jumped to 80.6%, but 
this jump reflected a large-scale exodus of rural members, rather than consensus between 
rural and urban members.  Between 1929 and 1932, OMA lost 27 members.  Twenty-four 
of them were townships.75  In 1933, a separate municipal association, the Ontario 
Association of Rural Municipalities (OARM) was founded.  
 The early records of OARM are missing, but it had a clear and immediate effect 
on OMA’s membership composition.  The year after OARM was founded, the number of 
townships in OMA fell to 36.  There was a 43% drop in township membership between 
1929 and 1934.76   OMA’s membership, including townships, grew steadily over the next 
decade and then doubled in size between 1940 and 1944.  Despite this growth, there was 
still a sharp rural/urban division between OMA and OARM.   
1949 is the first year where OARM membership records are available.  That year 
OMA had 262 members and OARM had 219.  50 municipalities were members of both 
associations.  Of OARM’s 219 members, 177 were townships.  Its other members were 
                                                
75 Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Ontario 
Municipal Association (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1932), 125.  
76 Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Thirty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the Ontario 
Municipal Association (Toronto: Ontario Municipal Association, 1934), 135.    
282 
 
15 villages, 8 towns, and 19 counties.77  It did not have any city members.  Conversely, 
OMA had 29 city members, as well as 67 towns, 42 villages, 18 counties, 98 townships, 
and two sub-associations.  Despite the high number of townships in OMA, more than half 
of its members were urban (cities, towns, and villages).  OMA and OARM’s 
memberships both grew over the next decade, but their urban-rural divide remained 
pronounced.  In 1959, OMA had 270 members and OARM had 322.   The majority of 
OMA’s members were still urban, and 252 of OARM’s members were townships.78   
 OARM’s formation was the first municipal association restructuring in Ontario, 
but two additional independent associations formed in the following decades.  The 
Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves (AOMR) was founded in 1944.  The 
Association of Ontario Counties, later renamed the Association of Ontario Counties and 
Regions (AOCR), was founded in 1960.79   Many of AOMR’s records are missing, but 
the name “Mayors and Reeves” indicates that its membership was open to both rural and 
urban municipalities.  A 1972 submission to the Province of Ontario listed AOMR’s past 
presidents and current executive.  All of its past presidents were the mayor of a city.  Its 
22 vice-presidents were composed of 7 city mayors, 8 town mayors, 2 village mayors, 
and three township reeves.  Its 32-member executive was composed of representatives 
                                                
77 Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Fifty-First Annual Convention (Toronto: Ontario 
Municipal Association, 1949), 76-78.  Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities, Proceedings of the 
Seventeenth Convention (Toronto: Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities, 1949), 96-98.  
78 Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings: Sixty-First Annual Convention (Toronto: Ontario 
Municipal Association, 1959), 83-85.  Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities, Proceedings of the 
Twenty-Eighth Annual Convention of Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities (Toronto: Ontario 
Association of Rural Municipalities, 1960), 83-85.  
79 Association of Ontario Counties, A Blueprint for Local Government Re-Organizing (Toronto: 
Association of Ontario Counties, 1967), 3-5.  Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, Disposition of 
Resolutions Presented to the 26th Annual Convention of the Ontario Mayors and Reeves (Toronto: 
Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeges, 1969).  The Association of Ontario Counties also referred to 
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Counties and Regions of Ontario.  
283 
 
from 6 cities, 18 towns, 2 villages, 6 townships, 1 borough, and 1 regional municipality.80  
AOMR was founded as an association for elected officials, and it included rural 
members, but this record indicates that it may have been primarily urban.  
 After OARM, AOMR, and AOCR were founded, rural/urban issues continued to 
arise within the primarily urban OMA, but urban municipalities pursued greater 
representation internally.  In 1971, the City of Oshawa put forward a resolution that 
stated: 
Whereas the trend of future growth in Ontario is everywhere anticipated to be 
marked by continuing rapid urbanization; 
 
And whereas, the pressures of this urbanizing process will continue to cause cities 
to be confronted with more and greater peculiarly urban problems which can only 
be solved by a united and co-operative effort on the part of urban municipalities in 
conjunction with the senior levels of government; 
 
And whereas, there now exists a number of associations which adequately reflects 
(sic) the views of predominantly rural municipalities; 
 
And whereas, at the present time no similarly suitable organization vehicles exist 
from which the cities in Ontario might speak with a united voice on these urban 
problems, as well as on all matters of common interest to urban municipalities; 
 
Be it resolved that the Ontario Municipal Association be petition to organize an 
Urban Section of the OMA in which membership will be open to all cities, 
boroughs and other similar urban municipalities in the Province of Ontario.81 
 
At OMA’s convention that year, the resolution was referred to the association’s executive 
for consideration.  When OMA merged with AOMR the following year, the newly 
                                                
80 Association of Counties and Regions of Ontario, Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, Ontario 
Association of Rural Municipalities, and Ontario Municipal Association, Submission to the Executive 
Council of the Province of Ontario (Toronto: Association of Counties and Regions of Ontario, 1972), 21-
23.  
81 Ontario Municipal Association, Resolutions Adopted at the 73rd Annual Convention (Toronto: Ontario 
Municipal Association, 1971), 52.  
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formed AMO included five sections: Large Urban, Small Urban, Rural, Second Tier, and 
District.82  
The formation of AOMR in 1960 highlighted an important feature of OMA’s 
structure: the formal involvement of appointed officials and affiliated associations.  
OMA’s constitution gave both elected and appointed official voting rights.83  In addition, 
OMA involved a number of affiliated associations that represented non-officials in its 
work, including the Ontario Municipal Social Services Association; the Association of 
Municipal Tax Collectors of Ontario; the Association of Municipal Clerks of Ontario, the 
Association of Municipal Clerks and Treasurers of Ontario; the Society of Directors of 
Municipal Recreation of Ontario; the Ontario Municipal Personnel Association; the 
Ontario Municipal Administrators Association; and the Welfare Officer’s Association.  In 
OMA, and in AMO from 1972-1982, affiliated groups had the right to submit resolutions 
for consideration and be involved with the resolutions committee.  AOMR was founded 
on the belief that policy was “exclusively within the jurisdiction of elected 
representatives.”84  It was a space for municipal elected officials to vote on policy 
stances, without the influence of appointed officials or affiliated associations. 
In addition to the affiliated associations, a number of sub-associations were part 
of OMA.  These associations contained municipalities in geographic regions of the 
province.  They held their own annual conventions, but were still a part of OMA, rather 
than independent.  These included the Rainy River Municipal Union, the Parry Sound 
                                                
82 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Constitution (Toronto: Association of Municipalities of 
Ontario, 1982), 10.  
83 Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, Resolutions Approved at Conference in The City of 
Kitchener, June 1965 (Toronto: Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, 1965), 54.  
84 Ibid.  
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Municipal Association, the South Temiskaming Municipal Association, the Association 
of Mining Municipalities of Ontario, the Sudbury District Municipal Association, and the 
North Eastern Municipal Association.85  Rural/urban tensions had led to the formation of 
independent municipal associations, but regional groups chose to work within OMA.  
 In 1972, only twelve years after the Association of Ontario Counties and Regions 
was founded, municipal associations in Ontario began a decade-long period of 
reunification.  In 1972, the Ontario Municipal Association and the Association of Ontario 
Mayors and Reeves merged, forming the Association of Municipalities of Ontario 
(AMO).86   The idea of reunification was first put forward by the City of London in 1956.  
That year, London proposed resolutions in both OMA and AOMR that called for the two 
associations to amalgamate.  The resolutions failed, but in the decade that followed, the 
associations collaborated on several issues.87  In the early 1960s, the two associations 
also set up a Special Joint-Committee of the Association of Mayors and Reeves and the 
Ontario Municipal Association, Organized to Explore Areas of Mutual Cooperation.88  In 
1965, AOMR passed a resolution that stated: 
WHEREAS this Association is convinced that policy is exclusively within the 
jurisdiction of elected representatives, and 
 
WHEREAS the present constitution of the Ontario Municipal Association 
provides equal voting rights for elected and appointed officials, and 
 
                                                
85 Ontario Municipal Association, Annual Convention Proceedings (Toronto: Ontario Municipal 
Association, 1929 – 1965). 
86 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Resolutions, Proposals and First Report of the Resolutions 
Committee to be Considered at the Founding Convention (Toronto: Association of Municipalities of 
Ontario, 1972), 6 
87 Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, Resolutions Approved at Conference in The City of 
Kitchener, 54. 
88 Ontario Municipal Association, Resolutions Presented and Taken Action at the Sixty-Seventh Annual 
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WHEREAS this results, on many occasions, in action on resolutions dealing with 
policy matters being determined by the preponderance of the votes of appointed 
officials who are delegates at the annual convention of the Ontario Municipal 
Association and 
 
WHEREAS there is a duplication of effort in that many elected representatives 
attend conferences of both organizations and also attend upon the Provincial 
Government on more than one occasion for the discussion of identical matters, 
and 
 
WHERE the Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves has been in existence 
since the early 1930’s89 and speaks for the elected representatives exclusively, 
and  
 
WHEREAS this Association believes that it is in the interest of sound municipal 
government in Ontario to have the Ontario Municipal Association and the 
Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves amalgamated into one organization 
having a constitution which would provide that only elected representatives vote 
on matters of policy.  
 
Therefore be it resolved that we express in the strongest possible terms the 
opinion that the Ontario Municipal Association and the Association of Ontario 
Mayors and Reeves should be amalgamated.90  
 
That same year, OMA passed a similar resolution, put forward by the Special Joint 
Committee: 
The joint committee recommends continued co-operation between the Association 
of Ontario Mayors and Reeves and the Ontario Municipal Association and that the 
Associations set up a joint committee, with representatives from both 
organizations, to explore greater areas of co-operation and to develop the basis for 
a new organization to absorb both associations and which would represent all 
municipalities and which would provide for representation by municipalities 
through elected and appointed representatives.91  
 
                                                
89 AOMR began as the Elected Representatives Section within OMA in 1931.  It became an independent 
association in 1944.  Ontario Municipal Association, Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Convention, 
77-79.   
90 Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, Resolutions Approved at Conference in The City of 
Kitchener, 54.   
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In 1972, the two associations finalized their merger and the Association of Municipalities 
of Ontario (AMO) was formed. 
  The Ontario Association of Rural Municipalities and the Association of Ontario 
Counties and Regions remained independent at the time of AMO’s formation, but there 
were instances of cooperation between all associations, both before and after AMO was 
created.  In 1969, for the first time, all four associations supported the same provincial-
municipal relations presentation to the Ontario cabinet.  The next year, they submitted a 
joint brief.  In 1972, they submitted another joint brief, one with a much larger scope.  
The 1972 brief addressed provincial-municipal relations, tri-level consultation, social 
welfare, assessment, education, environmental control, government structural reform, 
administration of justice, Northern Ontario, transportation, and urban renewal.  In the 
brief, the associations stated that problems of “local government structure, fiscal reform, 
reassessment, welfare and environmental control” had driven their collaboration.  That, 
“as the problems become more complex and the responsibilities [for municipalities] 
become more onerous, the questions of meaningful Provincial-Municipal partnership, the 
equitable redistribution of tax resources and the re-alignment of responsibilities between 
the Province and its municipalities become matters of utmost priority with us.”92  Ontario 
municipalities formed independent associations out of internal conflicts, but external 
issues of financial resources and provincial offloading brought them back together.  
 In addition to their unified stances vis-à-vis the province, AMO, OARM, and 
AOCR began to work together on internal functions.  In 1973-1975, a representative from 
                                                
92 Association of Counties and Regions of Ontario, Association of Ontario Mayors and Reeves, Ontario 
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Council of the Province of Ontario, 1-18.  
288 
 
OARM sat on AMO’s resolutions committee.  In 1974, the resolutions committee 
included a representative from AOCR.  Each association continued to submit their own 
resolutions to the province, but inter-associational involvement during the resolutions 
process was part of the shift toward greater collaboration and unity between the 
associations.93  
 Finally, in 1982, both OARM and AOCR joined AMO.  Ontario had a unified 
municipal association for the first time since in 1933.  The new association used sub-
associations and caucuses to manage population and geographic divides amongst 
municipalities.   When OARM and AOCR joined, AMO had four sub-associations: the 
Federation of Northern Ontario Municipalities (FONOM), the Northwestern Ontario 
Municipalities Association (NOMA), the Ontario Small Urban Municipalities (OSUM), 
and the Association of Municipal Districts (AMD).  AMO’s founding policy guidelines 
also recognized a Northern Ontario distinction:  “The communities of Northern Ontario 
have unique problems that require solutions different to those of Southern Ontario.  The 
Association believes that consideration of this principle is consistent with the sound and 
healthy development of the whole province.”94  Although Nothern Ontairo was the only 
sub-association to be identified in AMO’s policy guidelines, the establishment of OSUM 
and AMD within AMO indicated that the new association wanted to reduce the tensions 
                                                
93 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Policy Guidelines and Resolutions Adopted at the Annual 
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Ontario, Policy Guidelines and Resolutions Adopted at the Annual Conference (Toronto: Association of 
Municipalities of Ontario, 1974), 2. Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Policy Guidelines and 
Resolutions Adopted at the Annual Conference (Toronto: Association of Municipalities of Ontario, 1975), 
2.  
94 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, Resolutions, Proposals and First Report, 6 
289 
 
that had caused its precedessor, OMA, to fracture.  Over the following decades, AMO 
could create additional sub-associations for its internal factions.  
At present, there are nine sub-associations and caucuses: FONOM, NOMA, 
OSUM, the Rural Ontario Municipalities Association (ROMA), the Large Urban Mayors 
Caucus of Ontario (LUMCO), the Eastern Ontario Warden’s Caucus (EOWL), the 
Western Ontario Warden’s Caucus (WOWL), the Mayors and Regional Chairs of Ontario 
(MARCO), and L'Association française des municipalités de l'Ontario (AFMO).  In 
addition, AMO’s board has representation from six caucuses (County, Large Urban, 
Regional and Single Tier, Rural, Small Urban, and Northern) as well as AFMO.95  AMO 
has incorporated the divisions that existed between the four independent associations, and 
accounted for other municipal divisions within the province. 
Despite its complex structure of caucuses and sub-associations, AMO has had to 
take further steps to minimize instances of intra-associational conflict.  Since the mid-
1990s, AMO members have voted on resolutions at the caucus and sub-association level, 
rather than as a full membership.  The resolutions passed by caucuses and sub-
associations are forwarded to AMO’s Board of Directors, which uses them to set the 
association’s lobbying priorities.  Ontario is the only province where the largest 
municipal association does not vote on resolutions at its annual convention.   OMA 
demonstrated how rural/urban tensions could make the resolutions process tumultuous in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, but AMO’s current resolutions process undermines its 
status as a “unified” association.  Municipalities only vote on resolutions within their own 
                                                
95 Association of Municipalities of Ontario, “AMO Board and Executive Committee Structure,” 
www.amo.on.ca.  
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caucus and the full membership is never forced to vote collectively.  AMO members do 
not have to grapple with what issues are of common interest to all municipalities in the 
province.  This may reduce intra-associational conflict, but it also prevents the 
membership from taking a truly common stance.   
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